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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit formalen Wahrheitstheorien, die unter einer nicht
transitiven Logik geschlossen sind. Formale Wahrheitstheorien sind typischerweise
Erweiterungen einer arithmetischen Theorie, in unserem Fall Peano Arithmetik,
durch Axiome oder Regeln, die das Verhalten eines einstelligen Wahrheitsprädi-
kats betreffen. Ohne jegliche Einschränkungen sind solche Theorien inkonsistent
und trivial auf Grund von Paradoxien. Solche Inkonsistenzen lassen sich dadurch
ausräumen, dass man entweder die zugrunde liegende Logik oder die Regeln, die
das Wahrheitsprädikat betreffen, einschränkt. Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit
der ersten Option. Sie diskutiert die Möglichkeit und Vorteile, die Transitivität der
Logik einzuschränken und damit eine Wahrheitstheorie auf Grundlage einer nicht
transitiven Logik zu definieren.
Das erste Kapitel führt die nötigen technischen Begrifflichkeiten für das Verständ-
nis der Materie ein. Dazu gehört die Definition der formalen Sprache der Arithmetik
erweitert durch ein Wahrheitsprädikat, die Gödel-Kodierung, sowie ein passendes
Sequenzen-Kalkül. Letzteres erlaubt es uns, die Verwendung der Annahme, dass
die zugrundeliegende Folgerungsrelation transitiv ist, explizit zu machen. Dies
geschieht durch die Verwendung einer Regel namens Cut. Zudem wird aufgezeigt,
wie sich die gängigen Paradoxien im Zusammenhang mit dem Wahrheitsprädikat
als Instanzen des arithmetischen Diagonalisierungslemma verstehen lassen und wie
sich dieses im Sequenzenkalkül beweisen lässt. Darauf folgt eine Übersicht über
Zweifel an der Transitivität aus der Literatur. Einzelne Ansätze werden erläutert
und diskutiert, wobei wir zum Schluss kommen, dass die meisten Ansätze Probleme
aufweisen weil sie Instanzen der Transitivität als problematisch deklarieren, die für
mathematische Theorien notwendig sind.
viii Zusammenfassung
Im folgenden Kapitel wird deswegen eine alternative Motivation für die Ein-
schränkung der Transitivität im Sinne der Cut Regel erläutert. Es wird gezeigt,
dass die Cut Regel äquivalent zu einer Regel ist, die die Konsistenz der bisherigen
Teilbeweise annimmt. Eine solche Annahme kann jedoch in einer Theorie mit
Paradoxien, die zu Inkonsistenzen führen, nicht gerechtfertigt sein. Vielmehr sollte
die Cut Regel nur dann anwendbar sein, wenn man einen Grund für die Annahme
der Konsistenz der bisherigen Teilbeweise hat. Eine Möglichkeit aus der Literatur,
solche Einschränkungen zu formalisieren, besteht in der Verwendung einer Default
Logik. Es wird jedoch aufgezeigt, dass die Mechanismen dieser Logiken aus Gründen
der Komplexität der formalen Wahrheitstheorien nicht anwendbar sind.
Das vierte Kapitel entwickelt deswegen einen alternativen Ansatz zur Formali-
sierung der Konsistenzannahme. Cut wir dahingehend eingeschränkt, dass beide
Prämissen in einer konsistenten Wahrheitstheorie bewiesen sein müssen. Durch
die Verwendung einer konsistenten Theorie wird die Konsistenz der bisherigen
Teilbeweise garantiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass die resultierende Theorie in vielerlei
Hinsicht fruchtbar ist: Es können sowohl alle Theoreme der klassischen Logik
bewiesen werden, sowie alle Instanzen des T-Schemas und darüber hinaus auch alle
Theoreme der stärksten klassischen Wahrheitstheorie.
Im fünften Kapitel wird ein systematischer Ansatz entwickelt, Wahrheitstheo-
rien zu bewerten und zu vergleichen. Dafür werden verschiedene Werte sowohl
aus der Literatur der Wahrheitstheorien als auch der Wissenschaftsphilosophie
herangezogen. Zudem werden unterschiedliche Rollen des Wahrheitsprädikats, die
substitutionelle und die quantifizierende, unterschieden. Neben den Werten ist eine
Wahrheitstheorie auch vor allem daran zu messen, inwieweit das Wahrheitsprädikat
in einer solchen Theorie diese Rollen erfüllen kann. Es wird argumentiert, dass
der hier vorgestellte nicht transitive Ansatz sowohl in Hinblick auf die Rollen
des Wahrheitsprädikats, als auch in Hinblick auf die relevanten Werte anderen
Wahrheitstheorien der Literatur überlegen ist.
Das letzte Kapitel diskutiert Einwände gegen nichtklassische Wahrheitstheorien,
zu dem auch unser nicht transitiver Ansatz zählt. Dabei wird auf Einwände einge-
gangen, die gegen die Revision klassischer Logik im Allgemeinen und solche, die
gegen die Revision der Transitivität im Speziellen argumentieren. Die Konklusion
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gibt letztlich einen Überblick über die neuen Erkenntnisse und Verbesserungen im
Bereich der formalen Wahrheitstheorien im Vergleich zur bestehenden Literatur.

Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation is concerned with motivating, developing and defending nontran-
sitive theories of truth over Peano Arithmetic (PA). Its main goal is to show that
such a nontransitive theory of truth is the only theory capable of maintaining all
functional roles of the truth predicate: the substitutional and the quantificational
roles. By the substitutional roles we mean that the theory ought to prove φ iff
it proves Tpφq (potentially even if φ is a subformula of a complex formula such
as a conditional) and that it proves all instances of the T-schema Tpφq ↔ φ. A
theory fulfils the quantificational role if its axioms governing the truth-predicate are
strong enough to mimick as much second-order quantification as possible. Where
the literature on classical theories of truth has focused primarily on the fulfilment
of the quantificational role, the nonclassical literature is very much obsessed with
the substitutional roles.
The problem of having a theory of truth fulfilling both the substitutional and
quantificational (or already just the full substitutional) role are paradoxes of truth
such as the Liar. Where the Liar is a sentence which informally says about itself that
it is not true, we can show that it is both true and not true, which typically allows
us to conclude any formula whatsoever. This problem is overcome in the current
approach by blocking the use of transitivity principles under certain conditions.
Chapter two is concerned with the technical preliminaries necessary for our
investigations. We begin by defining our formal language of truth and define a
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typical Gödel-coding scheme in order to encode expressions of the language into
numerals. As structural aspects of the consequence relation such as transitivity
play an important role, we will study formal theories of truth as sequent calculi
consisting of rules for the logical constants, arithmetic, the truth predicate as well
as the structural rules. The property of transitivity will be expressed by the rule
of Cut. Last, we give an overview over formalised versions of the most prominent
truth-theoretic paradoxes in the previously defined sequent calculus on the basis of
the weak and strong diagonal lemma.
The third chapter explores different reasons why transitivity has been rejected
or restricted so far. This includes reasons from relevance logic, proof-theoretic
semantics and bilateralism, an inferentialist theory of meaning. We argue that these
motivations suffer from the fact that they dismiss Cut in domains where the rule is
necessary and well justified. Last, we discuss proposals of the literature on how to
restrict Cut as a rule. Similar to before, we argue that the proposals so far are not
apt to recover as much Cut as necessary for different purposes.
Building on the failure of motivations to restrict Cut properly in the previous
chapter, the fourth chapter introduces a new motivation of this kind. We show that
Cut turns out to be a rule, which implicitly assumes consistency. This is achieved by
independently motivating a rule which clearly makes such an implicit consistency
assumption and then proving that it is equivalent to Cut. This understanding of
Cut then suggests to restrict it to cases in which this assumption is true. This is
to say that Cut is applicable iff the subderivations of the premise sequents do not
contain an inconsistency. We discuss how this idea can be applied to a theory of
truth formulated as a sequent calculus and dismiss traditional ideas of capturing a
consistency constraint in terms of a default condition due to issues of complexity.
Rather, we show how this consistency constraint can be easily and effectively be
captured by demanding that the Cut-premises must be derived in some theory of
truth known to be consistent.
The fifth chapter is dedicated to the study of nontransitive theories of truth
which can be obtained from this restriction. We start with the most severe version
of this restriction by blocking all applications of Cut where the premises are not
derived in PAT (i.e. the theory of PA formulated in the language containing the
3
truth predicate). Already this weak theory, called NTT, has interesting properties
as it preserves all classically valid inferences for the full language with the truth
predicate and thus it preserves everything which is provable in PAT. This initial
theory is strengthened by embedding strong classical theories of truth into it. Given
a classical theory of truth S, we construct a nontransitive theory of transparent
truth NTT[S] in which Cut is only blocked if at least one of its premises were derived
using an instance of a rule not contained in S. We study the case of the classical
theory UTB(Z2) which is particularly strong with respect to the quantificational
role of the truth predicate as it proves all translated sequents of full second-order
arithmetic Z2. Different formulations including elimination rules or indices are
explored. Last, we show that Cut is the only rule which can be restricted this way
to obtain a nontrivial theory of truth.
The following two chapters motivate and defend the developed nontransitive
approach. Chapter six gives a systematic overview over desiderata for theories of
truth as they have been formulated in the literature. We isolate a set of virtues for
theories of truth, which aim to preserve the full functionality of the truth predicate
and show that our nontransitive approach fulfils these desiderata. Further, we
discuss theoretical virtues which sometimes pop up in the literature on theories of
truth as well. We approach this issue from a systematic overview over theoretical
virtues in the natural sciences.
Chapter seven presents various objections against revising classical logic in
general or Cut in particular as well as against the approach of blocking Cut in
order to escape other paradoxes such as those of validity. We successfully defend
our nontransitive approach against these objections by highlighting that it does not
share most issues and weaknesses of well known nonclassical alternatives. The final
chapter concludes by highlighting the advancements of the dissertation in applying
nontransitive logics over the current literature.

Chapter 2
Technical Preliminaries
This chapter is concerned with the technical preliminaries necessary for our investi-
gation into paradoxes and their structure. We begin with some basics of Arithmetic
and Gödel-coding, which are used as a syntactic background for the truth-predicate
and which allow us to generate a wide range of paradoxical sentences. We further
introduce an appropriate sequent calculus to formalise paradoxical arguments while
making assumptions about transitivity in them explicit. The chapter closes with
formal proofs of the most prominent truth-theoretic paradoxes.
2.1 Syntax
We are concerned with first-order formal theories of truth based on Peano Arithmetic
(PA). First, we need to define the languages in which we will work. LPA, the language
of Peano Arithmetic is defined using the following vocabulary:
¬ | → | ∀ | = | × | + | S | 0 |
It also contains a stack of variables x1, x2, ... and function symbols f. 1, f. 2, ... for
all primitive recursive functions. Where f is a function, we denote its representing
function symbol in our formal language by f. . S denotes the successor function
and 0 the number 0, × and + represent multiplication and addition respectively.
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The language of truth, LT , is defined by adding to LPA a unary truth-predicate T.
Terms and formulae of our languages are defined inductively as usual.
If a variable in φ is within the scope of a quantifier for the same value, it is
called bound, otherwise it is a free variable. If a formula contains no free variables,
it is a sentence. Where n is a natural number, we write n for its numeral. For
example, the intended interpretation of the numeral 0 is 0. If n is a numeral, then
Sn is its successor numeral.
2.1.1 Coding
Informally, a truth-predicate T should apply to sentences (or propositions), not
terms. For example, we might want to say ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is true or ‘Snow is white’ is
true. However, our formal definition above only allows applications of T on terms
made up of 0 and function symbols but no sentences. To overcome this syntactic
problem, we interpret some terms as names of sentences of our language. The
standard way to do this is by Gödel-coding. We follow (Smith, 2013: p.136) here in
setting up a coding scheme.
The goal of such a coding procedure is to give to each expression of LT a term
which encodes it, s.t. i) the term is itself contained in LT and ii) there is exactly one
code for each expression of LT . To do this, we first set up basic codes by associating
each symbol of the language (except variables) with an odd number. For example,
¬ is associated with the basic code 1, → with 3, ∀ with 5 etc. Variables are then
associated with even numbers. Having set up the basic codes, we can construct
codes for complex expressions based on the basic codes of their constituents.
Let π0, π1, ... be the succession of prime numbers and c1, c2, ..., cn the basic codes.
An expression e of LT can be thought of as the ordered list s1, ..., sn of symbols s
of LT . Where cn is the basic code of sn, the Gödel code of e is defined as
πc10 × πc21 × ...× πcnk
Since, by the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, every natural number can be
rewritten as a unique factorisation into primes, it is guaranteed that every expression
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e of the language has at most one code. Of course there are enough primes for all
expressions of the language, thus there is exactly one coding expression. Where φ
is a formula of LT , we write #φ for its Gödel code.
Note, however, that #φ is not an expression of LT itself, since it is a natural
number! However, we can use the corresponding numeral, which is contained in
LT . Where #φ is the Gödel code of a formula, we will denote the numeral of that
Gödel-code by pφq. Thus whenever we write Tpφq, this is just a tidy way of writing
an expression of the form TSSS...0.
We denote a primitive recursive substitution function by s. . Let φ be a formula
with exactly x free. Then s.(pφq, t) is to be read as the numeral of the code of the
result of replacing all occurrences of x in φ by t. We abbreviate s.(pφq, t) by pφt.q.
This allows us to express quantification ‘into’ the truth-predicate by writing e.g.
∀xTpφx.q.
2.2 Sequent Calculi
As we investigate the nature of paradoxes, we need to set up a precise formal
framework in which we can study them. Since we are particularly interested in the
structure of paradoxes, we ought to choose a framework which makes this structure
explicit. One type of calculus, which is predominantly used for this purpose is
the sequent calculus introduced by Gentzen in 1934 (see (Gentzen, 1969) for the
collected works).
Where many other calculi deal with premises and conclusions in the form
of formulae, a sequent calculus works via manipulating sequents. A sequent is
an expression of the form Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are sets of formulae and
⇒ is the sequent arrow. The sequent arrow expresses a relation of consequence
between the sets. The left-hand side of the sequent arrow (in our case Γ) is
interpreted conjunctively, whereas the right-hand side (here ∆) is read disjunctively.
So Γ = {φ1, ..., φn} is read as φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ ... ∧ φn and ∆ = {ψ1, ..., ψn} is understood
as ψ1 ∨ψ2 ∨ ...∨ψn. To highlight some formula in a set, we write it separately next
to the set, so φ,Γ⇒ ∆ is an abbreviation of {φ} ∪ Γ⇒ ∆.
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There are many different ways to interpret the consequence claim of the sequent
arrow. For an overview see e.g. (Paoli, 2013). Right now, it is sufficient for our
purposes to understand the sequent arrow as the claim that the left-hand side
entails, proves or implies the right-hand side in some informal sense. We will later
introduce a more sophisticated, inferentialist interpretation of sequents.
Sequents can then be manipulated and put in relation to each other by sequent
rules (we will use sequent rules and rules interchangeably). Although a system S
does not explicitly contain a particular rule R, it can be the case that S proves the
conclusion of R given a proof of its premise(s) . Similarly, it sometimes happens
that eliminating a rule from our system does not affect what is in principle provable
within it. In these cases we speak of admissible or eliminable rules respectively:
Definition 2.2.1. Admissible rule
A rule R is said to be admissible in a system S iff: if S proves the conclusion
sequent of R, then it proves its premise(s).
Definition 2.2.2. Eliminable rule
A rule R is said to be eliminable in a system S whenever S contains R but S
without R proves the same sequents as S itself.
2.2.1 Rules For Logical Constants
We will consider the following, classical rules for the logical constants of LT :
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
¬L¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
¬R
Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
→ L
φ→ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
φ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
→ R
Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
φs,Γ⇒ ∆
∀L∀xφx,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φy
∀R
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀xφx
Where in ∀R, y must be an eigenvariable, i.e. it must not occur in the conclusion
sequent. The formula(e) written explicitly in the premise of the rule is (are) called
the active formula(e) of an application of a rule, the explicit formula(e) in the
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conclusion the principal formula(e). All other formulae are called side-formulae
or the context. All rules concerned with logical constants are sometimes called
operational rules.
Our language LT also includes a sign for identity, for which we can give the
following rules. First, it will make things easier to add initial sequents for all
identities true and false:
= T
Γ⇒ ∆, s = t = Fs = t,Γ⇒ ∆
Where in = T , s = t must hold and for = F it must be the case that s 6= t.
These rules are not purely logical since they allow for arithmetical instances such as
⇒ 0 = 0. However, they are particularly handy for our purposes and the fact that
they are not purely logical does not seem to bring about any problems. Second, we
will also want to make use of substitutions based on identity claims. Those can be
made via the following rules on either the left- or the right-hand side:
φs,Γ⇒ ∆
SubL
s = t, φt,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φs
SubR
s = t,Γ⇒ ∆, φt
Last, it will come in handy for many derivations to have a rule around which
lets one eliminate true identities on the left hand side of the sequent:
s = t,Γ⇒ ∆
= E
Γ⇒ ∆
where s = t must be true and where s or t involve function symbols, the
respective functions must be primitive recursive. Note that = E makes = T
admissible by the rule of Reflexivity (see below). For we can derive any sequent of
the form s = t,Γ⇒ ∆, s = t and then conclude Γ⇒ ∆, s = t by = E. Despite this
redundancy, it is simply practical and saves time in derivations to have both rules
around.
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2.2.2 Rules For Structure
The following rules are not concerned with any kind of vocabulary, be it logical (as
above) or arithmetical (as below). Rather, these rules express certain structural
features of the consequence relation of our theory such as reflexivity, transitivity
and monotonicity. Our working theory will only include two of these rules, the
others will be shown to be admissible. The first structural rule included in our
system is the rule of Reflexivity:
Ref
φ,Γ⇒ ∆, φ
Alternatively, Reflexivity is sometimes formulated as φ⇒ φ without the arbi-
trary contexts Γ,∆. A nice feature of using the formulation above is that it makes
the rules of Weakening admissible (see 2.2.3). These are the following:
Γ⇒ ∆
WL
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
WR
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
Another set of structural rules is that of Contraction:
φ, φ,Γ⇒ ∆
CL
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ, φ
CR
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
Due to the way in which sequents are defined in terms of sets of formulae, CL
and CR can easily be shown to be admissible (regardless of other rules):
Lemma 2.2.1. CL and CR are admissible in NT.
Proof. Sequents Γ ⇒ ∆ are defined in terms of sets Γ,∆ of formulae. Since sets
are insensitive to the number of occurrences of elements, the sequents φ, φ,Γ⇒ ∆
and φ,Γ ⇒ ∆ are identical. The same holds for Γ ⇒ ∆, φ, φ and Γ ⇒ ∆, φ.
Thus, trivially, the conclusion of CL or CR is provable whenever its premise is
provable.
The final and most important structural rule we will discuss is the rule of Cut.
This rule can be formulated in at least two ways, which turn out to be equivalent
in our setup:
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Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Cut
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
Cut∗
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
The left formulation Cut is called context-sharing, the right one Cut∗ is called
context-free. The distinction is based on the side formulae of the Cut-premises. In
the context-sharing version, both premises must contain the same side formulae,
this requirement is lifted in the context-free version. It is easy to show that by
admissible Weakening and Contraction (more on this below), the two formulations
are equivalent, i.e. they prove the same sequents. Due to this equivalence, we will
use the two formulations rather liberally. When we talk of Cut as a rule, we mean
the context-sharing version. However, for simplicity and readability reasons, we
sometimes apply Cut even though the contexts are not identical thereby implicitly
using the context-free formulation.
In the rule of Cut, we call φ the Cut-formula. The rule makes explicit the
transitivity of the consequence relation of our logic. Considering a simple example,
an application of Cut allows us to infer from the premises φ ⇒ ψ and ψ ⇒ ε to
φ⇒ ε. In other words, if φ implies ψ and ψ implies ε, then φ implies ε. The beauty
of the sequent calculus here is that transitivity is made into an explicit feature on
the level of derivations. In other calculi such as natural deduction, the consequence
relation is of course transitive as well but we can only talk about transitivity on
the metalevel1. In sequent calculus, we can spot where transitivity comes into play
in a derivation simply by looking at whether and where the derivation contains
applications of Cut. In the case of paradoxes, this allows us to check, where they
depend on an application of Cut and thus on the assumption that transitivity of
the consequence relation holds. Once this structure is made explicit, we can find a
way around paradoxical conclusions by suitable restrictions on Cut.
It can be shown for certain formulations of classical logic2 with identity that
1In fact, there is an explicit and well-understood connection between sequent calculi and natural
deduction calculi here. Applications of Cut translate into non-normal derivations in natural
deduction and vice versa. These are derivations where a logical constant is first introduced and
later eliminated by an elimination rule (see e.g. (von Plato, 2003; Prawitz, 1965)
2Gentzens Hauptsatz is quite sensitive to the way in which e.g. the operational rules are formulated.
Instead of ¬L, we may add φ,¬φ,Γ ⇒ ∆ to our system which together with Cut makes ¬L
admissible. However, Cut in this system without the ¬L rule is not eliminable (or admissible) as
can easily be checked.
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Cut is an eliminable (or admissible) rule. This is known as the Cut-elimination
(Cut-admissibility) theorem or Gentzen’s Hauptsatz.
2.2.3 Rules For Arithmetic
As we will see soon, typical paradoxes of truth can be formally reconstructed as
instances of the weak or strong diagonal lemma provable in many arithmetical
theories. So in order to investigate paradoxes in our calculus, it should be strong
enough to prove these lemmata for LT . This is ensured by adding rules for the axioms
of Robinson Arithmetic (Q) and for the axiom schema of Induction, obtaining a
calculus for Peano Arithmetic (PA). One way to provide a sequent calculus for Q is
to simply add its axioms as initial sequents3 (see (Takeuti, 1987)):
Q1
0 = St,Γ⇒ ∆
Q2
Sr = St,Γ⇒ ∆, r = t
Q3
Γ⇒ ∆, r + 0 = r
Q4
Γ⇒ ∆, r + St = S(r + t)
Q5
Γ⇒ ∆, r × 0 = 0
Q6
Γ⇒ ∆, r × St = (r × t) + t
Q7
∀x¬(r = Sx),Γ⇒ ∆, r = 0
Whilst Cut-elimination holds for the system of classical logic with identity
above, it no longer holds after adding these sequents for Q. However, there are
ways around this issue. A formulation of Q in terms of rules rather than initial
sequents was provided by Negri and von Plato in (Negri and Von Plato, 2011). The
system is deductively equivalent to one in which we add the sequents above, yet
Cut is an eliminable (admissible) rule. For the purpose of simplicity, we will stick
to the formulation of Q above using initial sequents. Although we will later put
restrictions on Cut, this will not affect what is derivable arithmetically.
In order to work with PA instead of just Q, we need to further add the axiom
schema of Induction. Axiomatically, Induction is typically written as
3Q7 is formulated a bit differently with the universal quantified formula on the left instead of the
negated universal on the right. The two formulations are deductively equivalent, this is simply
done in order to maintain the invertibility of the right ¬-rule.
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(φ0 ∧ (φx→ φSx))→ ∀xφx
A straightforward formulation of the schema as a rule is the following:
Γ⇒ ∆, φ0 φx,Γ⇒ ∆, φSx
Ind
Γ⇒ ∆,∀xφx
While it is possible to rewrite the rules for Q in order to regain Cut-elimination,
this is not possible once Induction is around. At least not if we assume proofs
composed of sequent rules to be finite constructions. A technical proof of this
fact is given in (Troelstra and Schwichtenberg, 2000). One option to regain the
eliminability of Cut in arithmetical theories is to replace Induction (and the right
quantifier rule) by the infinitary ω-rule (see e.g. (Schütte, 2012) and (Buchholz,
1997) for a translation between the finitary and infinitary case). However, the
ω-rule as an infinitary rule is only semi-formal. Without going into the details of
the discussion about the rule, we will take this as sufficient reason to abandon the
possibility for our purposes.
Call the collection of all of the above rules formulated in LPA the theory PA and
PAT the theory which is the result of formulating the rules in LT . Assuming that
PA is consistent (which we do), PAT is of course consistent as well, since all we did
was to add a predicate into the language. We did not add any further principles,
axioms or rules which would allow for a derivation of an inconsistency. In order to
study paradoxes, we need to strengthen PAT by adding rules for T.
2.2.4 Rules For Truth
In studying the truth-predicate T proof-theoretically, we treat it as a primitive
symbol, which is only governed by the principles we add to our theory in the form
of sequent rules. Tarski, prominently argued that ideally, a theory of truth should
include all instances of what is now known as the T-schema (or T-(bi)conditionals):
φ↔ Tpφq
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In order for all these conditionals to be provable in our theory of truth, we add
the following introduction rules for T:
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
T1
Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
T2
Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
That these rules are adequate to capture the instances of the T-schema in a
sequent calculus setting can be shown by proving the conditionals:
φ⇒ φ
T1
Tpφq⇒ φ
→R⇒ Tpφq→ φ
φ⇒ φ
T2
φ⇒ Tpφq
→R⇒ φ→ Tpφq
Besides these introduction rules for the truth predicate, we may also consider
according elimination rules T3 and T4:
Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
T3
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
T4
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
However, we will later show that in the presence of our introduction rules T1
and T2, these rules are admissible and so we will not add them to our main theory
of naive truth. These rules are strongly connected to an often desired property of
transparency:
Definition 2.2.3. Transparent truth predicate
A theory of truth S is said to have a transparent truth predicate iff: `S
Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆ iff `S φ,Γ⇒ ∆ and `S Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq iff `S Γ⇒ ∆, φ.
Clearly, any theory closed under T1-T4 (regardless of whether the rule is
included in the system or merely admissible) has a transparent truth predicate.
Besides instances of the T-schema, axiomatic theories of truth often consider a
quantified version of the biconditionals, the uniform T-schema:
∀x1, ..., xn(Tpφ(x1. , ..., xn. )q↔ φ(x1, ..., xn))
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It is straightforward to derive all instances of the uniform T-schema using our
substitution function s. :
φy ⇒ φy
T2
φy ⇒ Tpφyq
SubR
pφyq = s.(pφq, y), φy ⇒ Ts.(pφq, y)
= E
φy ⇒ Ts.(pφq, y) →
⇒ φy → Ts.(pφq, y)
∀R
⇒ ∀x(φx→ Ts.(pφq, x))
⇒ ∀x(φx→ Tpφx.q)
φy ⇒ φy
T1
Tpφyq⇒ φy
SubL
pφyq = s.(pφq, y), T s.(pφq, y)⇒ φy
= E
Ts.(pφq, y)⇒ φy →
⇒ Ts.(pφq, y)→ φy
∀R
⇒ ∀x(Ts.(pφq, x)→ φx)
⇒ ∀x(Tpφx.q→ φx)
The last step in each of the derivations is simply the notational convention for
the substitution function. Using more sophisticated substitution functions (see e.g.
Cantini, 1990)then gives us the more general schema with multiple quantifiers as
we introduced it above. Having set up our theory of naive truth NT, we proceed by
showing some of its basic properties and defining the graph-theoretic structure of
proofs in sequent calculi.
Last, we will consider some additional truth-theoretic principles. These are not
concerned with the introduction or elimination of the truth-predicate. Rather, they
impose that the connectives and the quantifier interact with the truth predicate in
a compositional way. In Hilbert-style calculi, the compositional principles for ¬,→
and ∀ are typically formulated by the following axioms:
∀s(Sent(s)→ (¬Ts↔ T¬. s))
∀s, t(Sent(s) ∧ Sent(t)→ ((Ts→ Tt)↔ T (s→. t)))
∀v∀x(Sent(∀.vx)→ (T (∀.vx))↔ ∀tTs[t/v])
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Here Sent is a predicate applied to exactly those terms t, which denote a
sentence. The new function symbols ¬. ,→. ,∀. denote p.r. functions, which take the
numeral of a code of (a) formula(e) and give back the numeral of the code of the
formula obtained by applying the respective logical constant. So given a formula φ,
¬. pφq denotes p¬φq.
A standard translation of these axioms into sequent rules is given in (Halbach,
2011: p.71):
Γ,¬Tt⇒ ∆
¬CL
Γ, Sent(t), T¬. t⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ¬Tt,∆
¬CR
Γ, Sent(t)⇒ T¬. t,∆
Γ, T t→ Ts⇒ ∆
→CL
Γ, Sent(t→. s), T (t→. s)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ Tt→ Ts,∆
→CR
Γ, Sent(t→. s)⇒ T (t→. s),∆
Γ,∀tTs[t/v]⇒ ∆
∀CL
Γ, Sent(∀.vs), T (∀.vs)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∀tTs[t/v],∆
∀CR
Γ, Sent(∀.vs)⇒ T (∀.vs),∆
Note that T1 and T2 together with the rules for logical constants are sufficient
to prove all instances of compositional schemata such as ¬Tpφq↔ T¬. pφq:
φ⇒ φ
¬R⇒ φ,¬φ
T2⇒ Tpφq,¬φ
T2⇒ Tpφq, Tp¬φq
¬L¬Tpφq⇒ Tp¬φq
SubR
p¬φq = ¬. pφq,¬Tpφq⇒ T¬. pφq
= E¬Tpφq⇒ T¬. pφq →R⇒ ¬Tpφq→ T¬. pφq
The other direction and schemata are provable in the analogous way. However,
T1 and T2 are too weak to prove the universally quantified versions, expressed
in the axioms above, in any consistent subtheory of PAT + T1 and T2 (which is
why they are typically added as additional axioms in the first place). But given
the compositional principles as the above sequent rules, it is easy to show that the
universally quantified sentences expressing compositional truth are provable. The
theory of naive truth NT is defined by extending PAT via T1, T2 (for all formulae
φ) and the compositional principles.
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2.2.5 Inversion And Admissibility
Applications of sequent rules can be put together to form a proof with the structure
of a rooted tree. This structure is intuitive and we already used it above to prove
sequents in our sequent calculus but for a formally precise definition see (Bimbó,
2014: p.356ff).
Being presented with a sequent in a proof of NT including a complex formula,
it will come in handy to show that there is also a proof of the premise(s) of the
rule introducing the relevant logical constant.
Definition 2.2.4. Invertibility of R
A rule R in a system S is said to be invertible in S iff: if S proves an instance of
the conclusion sequent of R,then it proves the respective instance of the premise(s)
of R.
To give an easy example, invertibility of ¬R means that if S proves Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ,
then it also proves φ,Γ⇒ ∆.
Theorem 2.2.2. Invertibility of →, ¬.
The rules ¬L, ¬R, →L and →R are invertible in NT.
Proof. We give a typical argument by induction on the height of the proof tree as
depicted in (Negri et al., 2008). For the case of height 0, consider the rule ¬L – the
other cases work analogously. If ¬φ,Γ ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent, we distinguish
the following cases. If Γ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent, then so is Γ⇒ ∆, φ. If Γ⇒ ∆
is itself not an initial sequent, this must be because ¬φ ∈ ∆. In this case we
have φ,Γ ⇒ ∆′, φ as an initial sequent (where ∆′ = ∆ \ {¬φ}). An application
of ¬R gives us Γ ⇒ ∆, φ. For the induction step, assume invertibility for height
n. This time we consider the case of →R, again the other cases work analogously.
Assume a proof ending in Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ. If the last inference has the conditional
as its principal formula, we are done. If not, apply the induction hypothesis to
the previous line containing the conditional. The same strategy goes through for
→L.
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It will come in handy later not to have the rules of Weakening, T3 and T4 in our
theory of truth. Since we still want to make sure that our systems are closed under
these rules, we prove them to be admissible. But proving the admissibility of any
rule in NT does not tell us much, since the theory is trivial. Thus any rule would
be admissible. Instead, we define a nontrivial subtheory of NT, ST, by dropping all
instances of Cut. The name ST is also used by (Cobreros et al., 2012) where ST
stands for Strict-Tolerant and refers to a non-trivial theory of truth closed under
T1-T4, in which Cut is dropped completely.
The next two lemmata show the admissibility of the rules of Weakening as well
as the elimination rules for T. We referred to these results earlier in the text and
here the full proofs are finally given.
Lemma 2.2.3. WL and WR are admissible in ST.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the height of derivations. For the base case, if
Γ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent, so is φ,Γ⇒ ∆ and Γ⇒ ∆, φ. For the induction step,
apply the induction hypothesis to the previous line(s) in the derivation.
Lemma 2.2.4. T3 and T4 are admissible in ST.
Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
T3
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
T4
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
are admissible in ST.
Proof. The proof is by Induction on the height of the derivation. Here we only
discuss the case of T3, the proof for T4 is completely analogous.
For the base case, if Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent, we distinguish two cases:
If Tpφq /∈ ∆, then φ,Γ⇒ ∆ is an initial sequent as well. If Tpφq ∈ ∆, then replace
the initial sequent by the short proof
φ,Γ⇒ ∆′, φ
T2
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
For the Induction step assume the Induction hypothesis that the admissibility
holds for proofs of height n. If Tpφq is not principal, then apply the Induction
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hypothesis to the previous line (in the case of multiple premises, apply the Induction
hypothesis to any line containing Tpφq). If the T-formula is principal, it could have
been introduced by either a T-rule or a substitution rule. In the case of the T-rule,
the admissibility is immediate by taking the premise sequent of the T-inference.
If the T-formula was introduced by a substitution rule, the derivation looks as
follows:
...
Tt,Γ⇒ ∆
SubR
t = pφq, Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
Where t could be either a closed or an open term. Consider the case that t is a
closed term. Either t = pφq does or does not hold. If it does not, then the desired
conclusion sequent t = pφq, φ,Γ ⇒ ∆ is an instance of =F. If t = pφq holds, we
distinguish cases based on whether t is a numeral or not. If it is a numeral and
since t = pφq holds, Tt and Tpφq are actually the same formula. So the conclusion
follows by applying the Induction Hypothesis to the previous line.
If t is not a numeral, the occurrence of Tt could have either been introduced
by Reflexivity or by a substitution rule. In the case of Reflexivity, consider the
respective initial sequent, which is of the form Tt,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′. If Tt /∈ ∆′, then replace
the initial sequent by φ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ and eliminate any rules below in which Tt (or
conclusions derived from it) were active. If Tt ∈ ∆′, then the initial sequent has
the form Tt,Γ′ ⇒ ∆∗, T t. In this case, replace the initial sequent by φ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆∗, φ
and plug in the following proof:
φ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆∗, φ
φ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆∗, Tpφq
t = pφq, φ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆∗, T t
Π
t = pφq, φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Where Π are the corresponding steps of the original proof. The last case to
consider is in which Tt was introduced by a substitution rule (assuming that it is
principal, otherwise apply the Induction Hypothesis to the previous line). If so,
then the substitution rule introduced some identity t = s. If s is a closed term as
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well, then apply the corresponding step from above depending on whether or not
s = t holds.
If the T-formula was obtained by a substitution with an open term, consider
how the active formula in this substitution was obtained. If it was introduced by an
instance of Reflexivity, apply the same strategy as above for closed terms. If it was
introduced by an instance of a substitution rule, the proof has the following form:
Tx,Γ′ ⇒ ∆
x = t, T t,Γ′ ⇒ ∆
t = pφq, Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
Where Γ = Γ ∪ {x = t}. Again, go up the proof and find the formula in the
trace of Tx, s.t. the active formula from which it was obtained involves either only
closed terms or was obtained by an instance of Reflexivity. Apply the respective
strategy from the case of closed terms above.
2.3 Paradoxes
As Tarski’s theorem (see Tarski, 1956) famously shows, no sufficiently strong
classical theory such as NT can be closed under all instances of the T-schema, i.e.
all instances of T1 and T2:
Theorem 2.3.1. Tarski’s theorem.
Let S be a consistent, classical theory including a predicate T , strong enough
to derive equivalences of the strong or weak diagonal lemma. Then S cannot prove
all instances of φ↔ Tpφq.
Proof. The proof proceeds via a typical Liar-sentence argument. Consider the
instance of the weak diagonal lemma λ ↔ ¬Tpλq. Since S is classical, either
Tpλq or ¬Tpλq must be the case. If Tpλq is the case, then by the T-schema λ
follows. Using the equivalence from the weak diagonal lemma, we get ¬Tpλq, a
contradiction. Assuming ¬Tpλq, using first the weak diagonal lemma and then
the other direction of the T-schema gives us Tpλq, which again contradicts our
assumption. Contradiction.
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The problem with the naive theory of truth NT which figures in the proof of
Tarski’s theorem is the problem of paradoxes of truth. This section is dedicated to
the study of such paradoxes starting from an informal perspective and moving on
to formalisations of paradoxical arguments in sequent calculus.
Informally, paradoxes are often defined as An argument with (prima facie)
true premises, valid reasoning but an unacceptable conclusion (see e.g. (Sainsbury,
2009)). NT formalises the relevant premises as rules and ensures classically valid
reasoning. We distinguish some forms of unacceptable conclusions and fix a formal
definition of a paradox in NT. The most prominent candidate of truth-theoretic
paradoxes is the Liar paradox, which we already discussed in the proof of Tarski’s
theorem. The Liar entails a contradiction: In NT we can show that it is both true
and not true. The reason for the unacceptability of this conclusion in classical logic
shared by all authors is that a contradiction entails every formula of the language
(by the so-called principle of explosion). But not all paradoxes prove an arbitrary
formula of the system via a detour over a contradiction. A Curry-sentence for some
arbitrary formula φ lets us prove φ directly.
The Curry-sentence says about itself that if it is true, then some arbitrary
conclusion φ follows. Consider for example the conclusion that ‘the moon is made
of green cheese’. Then our particular Curry-sentence says about itself that if it is
true, then the moon is made of green cheese. Again, classical logic dictates that
the sentence must either be true or false. If it is true, then also what it says must
be true. So it holds that if it is true, the moon is made of green cheese. By modus
ponens it follows that the moon is made of green cheese. If it is not true, it also
follows that if it is true, then the moon is made of green cheese (the conditional is
trivially true, since the antecedent is not). But this is just the Curry-sentence so it
is true as well. Again by modus ponens we arrive at the absurd conclusion.
So in order to block the trivialisation of our theory of truth, we should focus on
derivations of triviality rather than mere inconsistencies. As such, we will group
them together by a more formal criterion. Both cases can be subsumed under the
derivability of the empty sequent ⇒. If a paradox leads to a contradiction, we
derive ⇒ φ and ⇒ ¬φ. If we can derive any formula whatsoever, we can of course
also derive such a contradiction. The empty sequent is then easily derived:
22 2. Technical Preliminaries
...
⇒ ¬φ
...
⇒ φ
¬φ⇒
⇒
So paradoxes leading to these kinds of unacceptable conclusions can be defined
as proofs ending in the empty sequent:
Definition 2.3.1. Paradox
A proof t is paradoxical (or is called a paradox) iff it ends in the empty sequent.
We write p to denote a paradox.
Almost all of the paradoxes of truth which are discussed in the literature and
which we will discuss here can be subsumed under our formal notion of paradox.
But there is one kind of conclusion, which evades this definition but is often seen
as unacceptable and thus paradoxical: An ω-inconsistency, i.e. proofs of ⇒ ¬∀xφx
and⇒ φn for every n ∈ ω. The intuitive trouble here is that every instance of φx is
derivable, yet also the negation of the universal claim that φ holds of all instances.
From the informal perspective, the universal formula should be true given that all
its instances are, which then forms a contradiction with the derivation of ¬∀xφx.
As such, a contradiction as in the Liar-case is just around the corner.
Formally of course this contradiction cannot be obtained in first-order theories
(as our NT) due to Compactness: there is no finite subset of premises which entails
the contradiction. This also means that ω-inconsistencies cannot be subsumed
under our definition of paradox above. But we will stick to the definition and
discuss ω-inconsistencies separately from the other Paradoxes.
2.3.1 All Things Paradoxical
A theory of arithmetic augmented with a truth-predicate T allows us to prove
equivalences and identities of what we would informally call paradoxical sentences.
We will show below that all truth-theoretic paradoxes typically discussed in the
literature can be seen as instances of the weak or strong diagonal lemma:
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Theorem 2.3.2. Strong Diagonal Lemma.
Where φx ∈ LT having only x free, there is a term t in LT , s.t. t = pφtq is
provable in PAT.
Proof. Consider the primitive recursive substitution function sub(r, s, t), which
returns a term the code of a formula, which is the result of replacing all free
occurrences of s in r by t. We can then define the p.r. diagonalisation function
d(pφxq) = sub(pφxq, pxq, pφxq). So given the code of a formula φ with only x free,
d returns the code of the result of replacing all free occurrences of x by pφxq. It is
then straightforward to show d(pφd(x)q) = pφ(d(pφxq))q by substitution. Letting
d(pφxq) = t gives us the desired t = pφtq.
Theorem 2.3.3. Weak Diagonal Lemma.
Given a formula φx with just x free, there is a sentence ψ ∈ LT , s.t. ψ ↔ φpψq
is provable in PAT.
Proof. One way to prove the weak diagonal lemma is via the strong version. Consider
an arbitrary formula φx with x free. By classical logic it holds that φt↔ φt, where
t is a term obtained by the strong diagonal lemma s.t. t = pφtq. By substitution
we get φt↔ φpφtq. It is also possible to prove the weak diagonal lemma without
function symbols for p.r. functions such as substitution or diagonalisation in the
language. Such proofs accordingly also make no use of the strong diagonal lemma –
see e.g. (Picollo, 2018a; Boolos et al., 2007).
Consider for example the Liar sentence, which informally is a sentence that
says about itself that it is not true. By weakly diagonalising the formula ¬Tx, we
can show that there is a sentence – call it λ – s.t. λ↔ ¬Tpλq is provable in PAT.
Using the Strong Diagonal Lemma, we get a variation of the Liar, namely a term l,
s.t. l = p¬T lq holds.
This section provides derivations for many prominent examples of paradoxes
from the literature. The starting point for all of them is the diagonal lemma given
above. It sometimes makes a difference in the use of structural rules whether we
consider the Weak Diagonal Lemma or the Strong Diagonal Lemma, which is why
we always present both versions.
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Liar
Consider first the Liar sentence λ obtained from the Weak Diagonal Lemma, for
which we can prove the biconditional λ ↔ ¬Tpλq. Since the sequents ⇒ λ →
¬Tpλq and ⇒ ¬Tpλq→ λ are derivable with Q as a base theory, we can conclude
via the inversion lemmata for ¬ and→ that λ, Tpλq⇒ and⇒ λ, Tpλq are derivable.
The empty sequent then follows swiftly:
...
⇒ λ, Tpλq
T2⇒ Tpλq
...
λ, Tpλq⇒
T1
Tpλq⇒
⇒
Using the Strong Diagonal Lemma, the Liar is a sentence denoted by a term l,
s.t. l = p¬T lq holds:
T l⇒ T l ¬R⇒ T l,¬T l
T2⇒ T l, Tp¬T lq
SubR
l = p¬T lq⇒ T l
= E⇒ T l
T l⇒ T l ¬L¬T l, T l⇒
T1
Tp¬T lq, T l⇒
SubL
l = p¬T lq, T l⇒
= E
T l⇒
⇒
An application of Cut to ⇒ T l and T l⇒ then yields the empty sequent and so
a paradox.
Liar Cycle
A Liar Cycle is an ordered, finite list of sentences, s.t. each sentence says about its
successor that it is true and the last element says about the first that it is false. As
an example we here investigate a Liar Cycle of length two with sentences λ1, λ2,
where λ1 ↔ Tpλ2q and λ2 ↔ ¬Tpλ1q hold. Using the inversion lemma similar to
the Liar case, we can construct the following paradox:
...
⇒ λ2, Tpλ1q
T2⇒ Tpλ2q, Tpλ1q
...
Tpλ2q⇒ λ1
Cut⇒ λ1, Tpλ1q
T2⇒ Tpλ1q
...
λ1 ⇒ Tpλ2q
...
Tpλ1q, λ2 ⇒
T1
Tpλ1q, Tpλ2q⇒
Cut
Tpλ1q, λ1 ⇒
T1
Tpλ1q⇒
Cut⇒
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A strong version of the paradox is achieved by constructing terms l1 = pT l2q
and l2 = p¬T l1q via the Strong Diagonal Lemma:
T l1 ⇒ T l1 ¬R⇒ T l1,¬T l1
T2⇒ T l1, Tp¬T l1q
SubR
l2 = p¬T l1q⇒ T l1, T l2
= E⇒ T l1, T l2
T2⇒ T l1, TpT l2q
SubR
l1 = pT l2q⇒ T l1
= E⇒ T l1
T l1 ⇒ T l1 ¬L¬T l1, T l1 ⇒
T1
Tp¬T l1q, T l1 ⇒
T1
l2 = p¬T l1q, T l2, T l1 ⇒
= E
T l2, T l1 ⇒
T1
TpT l2q, T l1 ⇒
SubL
l1 = pT l2q, T l1 ⇒
= E
T l1 ⇒
⇒
Curry
For a weak Curry-sentence κ, we can prove the biconditional κ ↔ (Tpκq → φ)
for some arbitrary φ ∈ LT . Again using the inversion trick gives us the following
paradox:
...
⇒ Tpκq, κ
T2⇒ Tpκq
...
κ, Tpκq⇒ φ
T1
Tpκq⇒ φ
Cut⇒ φ
For the strong version, construct a term k, s.t. k = pTk → φq holds.
Tk ⇒ Tk φ⇒ φ
→L
Tk, Tk → φ⇒ φ
T1
Tk, TpTk → φq⇒ φ
SubL
k = pTk → φq, Tk ⇒ φ
= E
Tk ⇒ φ
...
Tk ⇒ φ
→R⇒ Tk → φ
T2⇒ TpTk → φq
SubR
k = pTk → φq⇒ Tk
= E⇒ Tk
Putting the two derivations together via Cut gives us a proof of ⇒ φ.
26 2. Technical Preliminaries
McGee
One much discussed example of a sentence, which generates an ω-inconsistency for
(some) theories of truth is the McGee sentence (see (McGee, 1985, 1990)). It may
be seen as a universally quantified version of the Liar as it says about itself that
not all iterations of the truth-predicate on it are true. To represent this formally,
consider the function f(n,#φ), which is defined as follows:
f(0,#φ) = #φ
f(n+ 1,#φ) = τf(n,#φ)
τ is a primitive recursive function which applied to #φ yields #T#φ. Let f.
be the function symbol in LT which represents f . By weak diagonalisation we can
then obtain a sentence µ, s.t. µ↔ ¬∀xTf. (x, pµq) holds. Again, using the inversion
trick we get sequents ⇒ ∀xTf. (x, pµq), µ and µ, ∀xTf. (x, pµq)⇒. Some elaborate
reasoning then leads to an ω-inconsistency as follows. First, we derive the case of
φ0, i.e. Tf. (0, pµq):
...
⇒ ∀xTf. (x, pµq), µ
Tf. (0, pµq)⇒ Tf. (0, pµq) ∀L
∀xTf. (x, pµq)⇒ Tf. (0, pµq)
Cut
⇒ Tf. (0, pµq), µ
T2
⇒ Tf. (0, pµq), Tpµq
SubR
pµq = f. (0, pµq)⇒ Tf. (0, pµq)
= E
⇒ Tf. (0, pµq)
Starting from an instance φn, we can derive the successor case φSn:
...
⇒ Tf. (n, pµq)
T2
⇒ TpTf. (n, pµq)q
SubR
pTf. (n, pµq)q = f. (Sn, pµq)⇒ Tf. (Sn, pµq)
= E
⇒ Tf. (Sn, pµq)
Together with the zero-case above, it is clear that φn for every n ∈ ω is derivable.
To complete the ω-inconsistency, we show that ¬∀xφx is derivable:
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...
µ,∀xTf. (x, pµq)⇒
T1
Tpµq,∀xTf. (x, pµq)⇒
SubL
pµq = f. (0, pµq), T f. (0, pµq),∀xTf. (x, pµq)⇒
= E
Tf. (0, pµq),∀xTf. (x, pµq)⇒ ∀L
∀xTf. (x, pµq)⇒ ¬R
⇒ ¬∀xTf. (x, pµq)
The same steps can be derived using the Strong Diagonal Lemma for a term
m = p¬∀xTf. (x,m)q:
Tf. (0,m)⇒ Tf. (0,m) ∀L
∀xTf. (x,m)⇒ Tf. (0,m) ¬R
⇒ Tf. (0,m),¬∀xTf. (x,m)
T2
⇒ Tf. (0,m), Tp¬∀xTf. (x,m)q
SubR
m = p¬∀xTf. (x,m)q⇒ Tf. (0,m), Tm
= E
⇒ Tf. (0,m), Tm
...
⇒ Tf. (0,m), Tm
SubR
m = pTf. (0,m)q⇒ Tf. (0,m)
= E
⇒ Tf. (0,m)
...
⇒ Tf. (n,m)
T2
⇒ TpTf. (n,m)q
SubR
pTf. (t,m)q = f. (Sn,m)⇒ Tf. (n,m)
= E
⇒ Tf. (Sn,m)
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∀xTf. (x,m)⇒ ∀xTf. (x,m) ¬L
¬∀xTf. (x,m),∀xTf. (x,m)⇒
T1
Tp¬∀xTf. (x,m)q,∀xTf. (x,m)⇒
SubL
m = p¬∀xTf. (x,m)q, Tm,∀xTf. (x,m)⇒
= E
Tm,∀xTf. (x,m)⇒
SubL
m = f. (0,m), T f. (0,m),∀xTf. (x,m)⇒
= E
Tf. (0,m),∀xTf. (x,m)⇒ ∀L
∀xTf. (x,m)⇒ ¬R
⇒ ¬∀xTf. (x,m)
(Fjellstad, 2016b) gives another (much more complex) proof of ω-inconsistency
using a McGee-sentence in order to show that the nontransitive approach of
(Cobreros et al., 2012) is ω-inconsistent. However, it is much easier to prove the ω-
inconsistency without Cut starting from an inconsistency such as Tpλq∧¬Tpλq as
it is provable in our nontransitive approach. Consider the formula φ : Tpλq∧ y = y.
We can then prove ¬∀xφx and φn for all n ∈ ω as follows without Cut:
...
⇒ Tpλq =T⇒ n = n ∧R⇒ Tpλq ∧ n = n
...
Tpλq⇒ ∧L
Tpλq ∧ n = n⇒ ∀L
∀x(Tpλq ∧ x = x)⇒
¬R
⇒ ¬∀x(Tpλq ∧ x = x)
Chapter 3
Reasons Against Transitivity
This chapter gives an overview over different ways of constructing a nontransitive
logic and reasons to do so. We begin by exploring some motivations stemming
from considerations regarding relevance and go on to reasons regarding paradoxes.
Further, we discuss reasons to give up Cut, which come from bilateralism, an
inferentialist theory of meaning. Last, we argue for the necessity of restricting Cut
rather than giving it up completely in the context of theories of truth over PA and
argue that various restrictions from the literature are unsatisfactory.
3.1 Reasons From Relevance
Logicians have been formulating nontransitive logics for different reasons. One line
of motivation stems from considerations regarding relevance. The main idea is that
logical consequence must make sure that if a conclusion φ follows logically from
some set of premises Γ, then all premises γ ∈ Γ are relevant for obtaining φ. What
relevance amounts to differs of course between philosophical accounts. However,
it is easy to see why transitivity of the logical consequence relation fails in some
cases if we demand relevance. Suppose that our relevance constraint demands that
for ψ to follow logically from φ it must be the case that there is an overlap of
propositional variables between φ and ψ. Let φ ` ψ and ψ ` ε hold. Then it may
very well be that there is an overlap of propositional variables between φ and ψ as
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well as between ψ and ε but not between φ and ε. Thus transitivity fails.
One of the earliest (if not the earliest) formulation of a nontransitive logic
for reasons of relevance can be found in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre from 1837.
Much later, there is a range of papers exploring alternative failures of transitivity,
often motivated by the paradoxes of material implication. These paradoxes, unlike
the paradoxes of truth, do not lead to triviality. They rather raise issues with an
intuitive or natural language reading of the material conditional →. For example,
it is rather unintuitive that because 1 + 1 = 2 is true, it follows that ‘If pigs
can fly, then 1 + 1 = 2’ holds. Again, the intuitive request is that the antecedent
of the conditional should somehow be relevant for its consequens. Nontransitive
approaches roughly in this line can be found in (Lewy et al., 1958; Smiley, 1958;
Epstein, 1979).
These failures of transitivity due to considerations regarding relevance are not
important to our project of restricting Cut in formal theories of truth. They are
irrelevant for at least two reasons. First, in these approaches, the property of
transitivity of the consequence relation is not expressed in terms of a rule in the
calculus. Rather, the authors give a new definition of logical consequence, which
then turns out to be nontransitive. At least in some cases (see e.g. (Smiley, 1958)),
it turns out that the definition of logical consequence works for propositional but
not for predicate logic. Second, their relevance conditions would not block an
application of Cut to conclude the empty sequent from ⇒ Tpλq and Tpλq ⇒.
Thus the restrictions do not offer a way around the paradoxes and so no non-trivial
subtheory of NT.
However, there are also authors, which develop nontransitive logics on the basis
of considerations about relevance specifically in order to escape paradoxes of naive
notions of truth and set. (Weir, 2005) discusses a nontransitive logic in order to
block truth-theoretic paradoxes such as the Liar and (Weir, 1998, 1999) apply the
same approach to set-theoretic paradoxes in naive set theory. But Weir’s approach
as well is not a restriction of transitivity in our sense by putting a restriction on Cut
in a sequent calculus. In his system, the lack of some transitivity is a consequence
of restrictions of elimination rules for the connectives such as ¬ or →. It is also
not the case that all instances of transitivity are lost – all instances of what he
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calls ‘simple transitivity’, i.e. if φ ` ψ and ψ ` ε then φ ` ε, remain valid. As a
consequence of the restriction of the rules governing →, the conditional no longer
contracts. In Weir’s system, it is no longer the case that φ→ (φ→ ψ) ` φ→ ψ.
In NT, however, it is immediate that no operational rule is affected by restricting
transitivity, since this restriction amounts to a restriction of Cut, which is a separate
rule. Also contraction for the conditional holds in full generality. So although Weir’s
consequence relation may be nontransitive in some cases, his approach and ours
are rather different1.
3.2 Reasons From Proof-Theory
There is a historical line of investigations into the structure of paradoxes, which is
relevant for our purposes. Instead of sequent calculi, the investigation takes place
in systems of natural deduction. Translations between sequent calculi and natural
deduction are well-understood and it can be shown that an application of Cut
corresponds to a derivation in non-normal form in natural deduction (von Plato,
2003). A derivation is in non-normal form iff it introduces a complex formula and
this complex formula is also a premise in an application of an elimination rule of the
introduced connective. For example, consider the following two natural deduction
rules:
[φ]
...
ψ
→I
φ→ ψ
φ φ→ ψ
→E
ψ
Then a derivation containing the following applications would be in non-normal
form:
...
φ
[φ]
...
ψ
→I
φ→ ψ
→E
ψ
1This is acknowledged by Weir himself, comparing his approach to Ripley’s in (Weir, 2015).
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The derivation of the conditional φ→ ψ is a redundancy in the overall derivation
of ψ for the conditional is introduced before it is eliminated again. One can then
define transformation strategies, which transform derivations from non-normal form
into normal form. In the case of the conditional, such a transformation strategy
has the following form
...
φ
[φ]
...
ψ
→I
φ→ ψ
→E
ψ
B
...
φ
...
ψ
It can be shown that all derivations of classical logic can be turned into normal
form (see Prawitz, 1965), just as every derivation of classical logic in sequent calculus
can be turned into one without Cut (given a suitable formulation as explained in the
technical preliminaries). However, in the case of paradoxes such transformations fail.
To our knowledge, it was first shown in (Prawitz, 1965) that derivations of absurdity
from Russell’s paradox do not normalise. Applying transformation strategies similar
to the one above will, after some repetitions, give back the original derivation in
non-normal form. Thus the derivation does not normalise. The same behaviour
of derivations of absurdity has been shown for truth-theroetic paradoxes such as
the Liar, Liar-cycle, Curry by (Tennant, 1982, 2015). (Tennant, 1995) extends
this analysis successfully to Yablo’s paradox (see (Yablo, 1993) for the original
paradox).
Neither Prawitz nor Tennant argue explicitly that their analysis of paradoxes
in terms of non-normalisability should be turned into a solution to the paradoxes.
However, there is a long standing proof-theoretic tradition arguing that only proofs
in normal form are ‘real proofs’ (see e.g. (Prawitz, 1974) for a seminal paper). In
fact, Tennant has long been arguing for a nontransitive logic in our sense by giving
up the rule of Cut (Tennant, 1987, 2017) for reasons other than the paradoxes.
So giving up Cut in order to escape triviality in theories of truth seems to be
an independently motivated approach. The motivation is in line with the proof-
theoretic tradition just mentioned: Proofs in non-normal form (and thus with Cuts)
are seen as impure, as they contain roundabouts. In natural deduction, connectives
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are introduced only then to be eliminated again. Proper logical consequence ought
to be defined only by those proofs which are free of such redundancies. So the
reason to give up Cut can be summarised as follows:
Redundancy Criterion
Applications of Cut should be avoided completely in order not to allow
redundancies in proofs.
3.3 Bilateralist Reasons
David Ripley is currently the most prominent proponent of a nontransitive logic
and applies it to a wide range of paradoxes (truth-theoretic and others). A strength
of Ripley’s approach is that the argument to give up Cut does not stem from the
paradoxes directly but has independent grounds in a theory of meaning called
b̈ilateralism,̈ which was originally introduced in (Rumfitt, 2000). Bilateralism is an
inferentialist theory of meaning. Roughly, this amounts to saying that the meaning
of e.g. a logical constant is defined by the rules governing it. This particular
inferentialist theory takes two speech acts as primitive: assertion and denial.
A sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is interpreted as a position {Γ,∆}, in which all formulae
γ ∈ Γ are asserted and all δ ∈ ∆ are denied. Positions can then either be coherent
or incoherent. The intuitive idea here is that the consequence claim of the sequent
Γ⇒ ∆ is reduced to the level of speech acts:
∨
∆ follows from
∧
Γ iff it is incoherent
to assert all formulae in Γ but to deny all in ∆.
Sequent rules can then be justified via this reading by demanding that rules lead
only from incoherent positions to other incoherent positions as argued in (Restall,
2005, 2009, 2013). For example, consider the rule ¬R:
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
¬R
Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ
This inference is then justified as follows: Assume that it is incoherent to assert
φ and
∧
Γ but to deny all formulae in ∆. If (given the context) it is incoherent to
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assert φ, then it must be incoherent as well to deny its negation, which amounts to
introducing ¬φ on the right-hand side of the sequent. The crucial question now is
how the bilateralist story fares with respect to the rule of Cut:
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Cut
Γ⇒ ∆
To see the problem with Cut, consider its contraposition. Then Cut amounts to
the claim that if the position 〈Γ,∆〉 is coherent, then at least one of the positions
〈{φ} ∪ Γ,∆} or 〈Γ,∆ ∪ {φ}〉 is coherent as well – for any φ. In terms of assertion
and denial this amounts to the claim that any position can be extended by either
an assertion or a denial of any sentence while remaining coherent. This is why both
Restall and Ripley speak of Cut as an extensibility criterion of the consequence
relation understood in the bilateralist framework.
Such an extensibility criterion seems to be perfectly fine for many domains and
in fact it is inevitable for systems in which Cut is an eliminable or an admissible
rule: There Cut holds, even if we decide to drop it. So the point is not to argue
against Cut and expect it to have counterexamples in every domain. Again, some
systems are closed under Cut even if the rule is absent. Rather, Ripley simply
points out that the closure under Cut (and thus transitivity) is something that is
to be discovered rather than to be imposed on a set of rules:
[...] we might think that extensibility only happens to hold over the
usual classical rules. If this is so, there’s no particular reason to expect
it to continue to hold when we consider a richer set of rules, such as
one including appropriate constraints on T. As we have seen, it does
not: there are things (like the empty sequent) derivable in [NT] plus
cut that are not derivable in [NT] alone. (Ripley, 2013a: p.151f)
The crucial question is when we should expect Cut, the extensibility criterion,
to hold and when not. Ripley (as in the passage just cited) seems to suggest that
extensibility should be assumed if and only if Cut is an admissible rule:
Admissibility Criterion
Cut should only be applicable where it is admissible.
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3.4 Restricting Cut
3.4.1 The Need For Cut
In this section we provide arguments for the claim that despite the issues with Cut,
it is necessary to keep some instances of it. We also argue that the Redundancy and
Admissibility criterion are not apt to motivate a useful restriction. It will be shown
that there are theories and other formulations of classical logic which depend on
the presence of Cut in order to be deductively as strong as one would like them to
be.
We already saw an example of this in the technical preliminaries for the case
of arithmetical theories. Where it is still possible to have Cut as an admissible
rule for the rather weak arithmetical theory Q, this is no longer possible if we
add Induction in order to obtain full PA. To be more precise, Cut-elimination for
PA is not possible in a setting in which we require proofs to be finite objects (i.e.
have a finite number of nodes). (Siders, 2013) gives an improved reconstruction of
Gentzen’s original proof of the consistency of PA via Cut-elimination techniques and
(Siders, 2015) shows normalisability of PA in natural deduction (which translates
to Cut-elimination in sequent calculus). As a historical note: Gentzen’s original
proof (or rather all four versions of it) are not proofs of full Cut-elimination for PA
but rather transformations of proofs s.t. all Cuts have atomic arithmetical formulae
as their Cut-formula. This is enough to conclude consistency.
Despite the normalisability proof of (Siders, 2015), it is crucial to see that some
proofs in normal form are of transfinite height. They can only be given in a finite
setting if Cut (or non-normal derivations) is (are) allowed. Recall that Ripley argued
that Cut as the extensibility criterion on assertion and denial is not to be imposed
on the consequence relation but has to be discovered by showing its admissibility.
This then fits nicely with paradoxes of truth since Cut is no longer admissible if we
extend the system with transparent T-rules. However, we take it that there are no
paradoxes in PA. Typically, we think of PA to behave perfectly classical and so the
extensibility criterion should hold here as well: for any arithmetical φ and every
coherent position, that position can be extended by either the assertion or denial of
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φ s.t. the result is coherent as well. Thus Cut should be admitted as a rule despite
the fact that the Redundancy and Admissibility Criterion tell us otherwise. So
the admissibility criterion does not match the reading of Cut as an extensibility
criterion.
A similar point can be made with respect to even stronger theories in set
theory s.a. ZF. Here the situation is even worse. Not only are there no finite proofs
for every theorem of ZF without Cut, we even know that Cut-elimination in it
fails (despite a reasonable formulation of sequent rules). Crabbé provided a rather
straightforward counterexample to the normalisability of ZF in (Crabbé, n.d.). Here
the same argument works: In our conversational norms we would like to be able to
either assert or deny any φ of the language of ZF. However, Cut is not admissible
here, so by the Redundancy and Admissibility Criterion, we must not add Cut to
our set theory.
Last, we want to give another example of theories in which Cut-admissibility
fails, yet we expect that the extensibility criterion to hold. For this purpose, consider
again CL, i.e. just the operational rules for ¬,→,∀ and the structural rules. With
the given formulation of the operational rules, Cut can be shown to be admissible.
However, this fact is highly dependent on the formulation of these rules. Consider
for example the alternative formulation CL∗ in which we replace ¬L by the initial
sequent φ,¬φ⇒. Given Cut, we can then easily show ¬L to be admissible:
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,¬φ⇒
Cut¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
So CL and CL∗ with Cut are deductively equivalent. But without Cut, this
admissibility fails. So in CL∗, Cut is not eliminable. The Admissibility Criterion
would then tell us that we cannot expect extensibility to hold here. However, we
are in pure classical first-order logic. There is nothing to be suspicious about when
it comes to the fact that every φ is either assertable or deniable. So given the
examples of PA, ZF and alternative formulations of CL, we conclude that we need a
restriction on Cut more sophisticated than checking its admissibility. The following
section discusses some proposals of restricted Cut rules from the literature, which
we argue have problems as well. The following chapter then introduces new reasons
to be suspicious of Cut and how to restrict it accordingly.
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3.4.2 Some Attempts To Restrict Cut
One restriction of Cut in the literature is discussed in (Schroeder-Heister, 2003,
2012a,b, 2016) and (Tranchini, 2016) for a natural-deduction formulation of the
same technical idea. Schroeder-Heister’s notation is slightly different as he is working
in a typed sequent calculus, but we can easily adapt the idea to our untyped setting.
The motivation to restrict Cut comes from the Prawitz-Tennant tradition discussed
above, in which only proofs in normal form or without Cuts are considered to be
proper proofs. Schroeder-Heister proposes to restrict Cut, s.t. the rule can only be
applied iff the application is eliminable.
There are at least two problems with this proposal. First, we have already
argued that there are applications of Cut in theories such as PA, which cannot be
eliminated. So to propose that Cut is only applicable where it is eliminable again
means to cripple basic arithmetic. Second, the criterion is too complex: Depending
on the theory we are working in, judging whether or not an application of Cut is
eliminable is not a decidable matter. This definitely holds in the case of arithmetical
theories such as PA. So the proposed restriction is too complex in order to work as
a restriction on a formal theory such as NT.
Another proposal for a restriction on Cut is given in (Barrio et al., 2018). Here
Cut is restricted via a recovery operator ◦, inspired by recent developments of LFIs
(Logics of Formal Inconsistency) (see Carnielli et al., 2007):
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒ ∆ ⇒ ◦φ
Gentle Cut
Γ⇒ ∆
The intended reading of the recovery operator is then that ◦ applies to φ,
whenever φ can be assumed to receive a classical truth-value (see (Barrio et al.,
2018: p.6)). So far so good, but the question remains: how are we to determine
which formulae φ can safely be assigned a classical truth-value? In an attempt
to answer this question, the authors point to Kripke’s fixed point construction
famously introduced in (Kripke, 1975). There Kripke develops a strategy of how to
build three-valued models (given some three-valued valuation scheme) by building
transfinite stages on top of a ground model, in which every successor stage puts
into the extension of the truth-predicate what is true in the previous model (and
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analogously for the anti-extension of T). What ends up in the fixed point is called
grounded and is thus often regarded to be non-pathological.
However, the authors themselves point out that there are at least two problems
when trying to restrict Cut to grounded φ. First, what ends up being grounded
depends on the choice of the base model. It is hard to see what criteria could
determine the choice of the correct base model. Second (if we consider all possible
fixed points and not just the set of grounded expressions), Kripke’s construction
process leads to an infinite plethora of fixed points. Thus one would have to give
a criterion to pick out exactly one of these fixed points and the authors admit
that they have no such criterion available. One may further point out that what
ends up being grounded is also dependent on the valuation scheme. Kripke himself
shows that the construction can be executed using the strong Kleene scheme, weak
Kleene scheme or a supervaluationist scheme. So one would have to give additional
arguments about which valuation scheme to choose in order to determine the
grounded sentences.
As a consequence of such problems, Barrio et al. conclude that “[...] there is no
absolutely general way of determining which are the non-pathological sentences
according to Kleene-Kripke valuations and, thus, of determining which sentences
ought to be marked with the recovery operator.“ (Barrio et al., 2018: p.7) But
even given that the above questions are satisfactorily answered, there remains a
bigger issue about the proposal which cannot be overcome. Kripke’s fixed points are
arithmetically very complex: the minimal fixed point is known to be too complex
to be even recursive and so restricting Cut to grounded φ is not decidable. The
arithmetical part of the fixed point model is of course not axiomatisable by Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem. (Fischer et al., 2015) show that the truth-theoretic
part of the model is not axiomatisable either. Thus the authors are confronted with
the burden to show an axiomatic way of approaching the truth-theoretic part of
the fixed point model.
The authors go on to explain that these issues do not need to end the project
of recovering applications of Cut in terms of ◦. They argue that “[...] although
we cannot exhaustively pin down a set of sentences that can be marked with the
recovery operator, we can still recover all the meta-inferences [...] by reasoning
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under the assumption that some of the featured sentences are non-pathological“
(Barrio et al., 2018: p.7). However, they say little to nothing about the notion of
assumption at hand here. The most pressing questions are left unanswered: Can we
assume any φ to be non-pathological? What happens if our assumption turns out
to be false as in the case of the Liar?2 We conclude that this approach would have
to clarify the relevant notion of assumption here before it can be properly assessed.
If the above problems weren’t enough, Barrio et al. deliver the striking blow
against the applicability of their approach to our setup of self-reference in NT.
(Barrio et al., 2018: p.10) shows that if self-reference in the underlying theory is
expressed in terms of identity, then the nontransitive system with recovered Cut
via ◦ is trivial. NT clearly fulfils this criteria, for it is strong enough to express
self-reference in terms of identity via the strong diagonal lemma and thus proves
the existence of Liars like l = p¬T lq. Thus we cannot recover instances of Cut in
NT via ◦ – at least not in the way proposed by Barrio et al. Our formal theory of
truth must be able to handle paradoxical sentences expressed as identities.
At this point, one might wonder whether we simply do not choose a very easy,
pragmatic and straightforward way of restricting Cut: It is clear that we cannot have
Cut for the full language LT , but we can have it for the full arithmetical language
LPA. This would fit neither the Redundancy, nor the Admissibility Criterion, since
Cut is not eliminable in PA. However, one might argue that this is a suitable
restriction because by the (at least plausible) consistency of PA, we can safely
apply Cut whenever the Cut-formula is contained in LPA. Let NTPA be the result
of adding to NT the rule of Cut given that the Cut-formula φ ∈ LPA.
It is easy to see that NTPA is non-trivial (assuming the consistency of PA).
However, we want to argue that it is too weak to be a satisfactory theory of truth.
Restricting Cut to only arithmetical formulae has the consequence that we can
do very little with the truth predicate. By this we mean that NTPA may prove
all instances of the (uniform) T-schema, but it does not allow us to prove new
arithmetical theorems.
To be fair, some authors have argued that a theory of truth ought to be
2The authors cite (Carnielli and Coniglio, 2016: p.18), but the cited source does not help in
clarifying the notion of assumption here.
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conservative over its base theory, i.e. it precisely should not allow one to prove any
new arithmetical theorems when added to PA (see e.g. Cieslinski, 2017). However,
the non-conservativity is also often seen as a desideratum (see e.g. Leitgeb, 2007) of
theories of truth (we will discuss this in more detail below). Many (mostly classical)
theories of truth over PA are strong enough to prove the consistency of PA in terms
of a purely arithmetical formula. We can easily show that NTPA proves no such
thing, i.e. it is LPA-conservative.
Definition 3.4.1. LPA-conservativity
A theory S is said to be LPA-conservative over a theory S′ iff for all Γ,∆ ⊆ LPA
it holds that `S Γ⇒ ∆ iff `S′ Γ⇒ ∆.
Lemma 3.4.1. NTPA is LPA-conservative over PA.
Let Γ,∆ ⊆ LPA. If `NTPA Γ⇒ ∆, then `PA Γ⇒ ∆
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is an arithmetical sequent Γ ⇒ ∆
which is provable in NTPA but not in PA alone. Since it is not provable in PA, the
proof of the sequent must contain some instances of T1 or T2, which introduce
a T-formula. However, since the conclusion sequent is purely arithmetical, the
principal T-formula must have been eliminated, which is impossible without Cut
for formulae containing T.
So although restricting Cut to arithmetical formulae works in the sense of
leading to a nontrivial theory of truth arithmetically as strong as PA, it still leaves
Cut and thus the proof-theoretic power rather crippled. Our goal is to find a
nontransitive theory of truth (or multiple such theories) which overcome all of the
above problems: A nontransitive theory of truth with a strong Cut-rule and which
is proof-theoretically strong. To do so, we will formulate a restriction on Cut in
a rather unusual way. Instead of finding some recursive subset of LT , s.t. we can
safely apply Cut as long as the Cut-formula is contained in that subset, we will
choose a restriction relative to the rules used so far in the proof. The following
chapter shows that Cut is a rule, which implicitly assumes the consistency of the
subderivations leading to its premises. On the basis of this observation, we restrict
Cut to cases in which the consistency of these premises is guaranteed.
Chapter 4
Cut and Consistency
In the previous chapter we have seen some reasons to restrict Cut and how to
do so, as well as arguments why these reasons and ways of restricting Cut are
unsatisfactory. In this chapter, we present a new motivation to restrict Cut and
discuss different ways of translating this motivation into axiomatisable restrictions.
This new restriction is based on the observation that Cut includes an implicit
assumption of consistency. Thus Cut should only be applicable to sequents derived
in a consistent theory.
Generally, when one wants to restrict a rule, one has to answer at least two
questions: First, why should the rule be restricted? Second, how should it be
restricted? Bilateralism gives us an interesting and intuitive answer to the first
question: Cut amounts to the assumption that every coherent position can be
coherently extended by either the assertion or the denial of any formula φ. But
such a principle is questionable in the presence of paradoxical sentences such as
the Liar. This answer to the first question translates into the following answer to
the second question on how the restriction looks like: Cut can be applied iff the
position can be safely extended by either the assertion or denial of any φ. But
how is this supposed to be axiomatised? Ripley’s answer is that we can only apply
Cut if the system proves its conclusion anyway: The safe instances of Cut are its
admissible ones. We already saw that this answer is unsatisfactory since Cut is not
admissible in many theories where we would expect the extensibility criterion to
hold, including PA.
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First, we show that Cut is equivalent to a rule expressing an assumption of
consistency. This is achieved by showing that a rule expressing such an assumption
in natural deduction can be translated into a sequent rule and is equivalent to Cut.
This analysis of Cut as a rule expressing an assumption of consistency suggests that
Cut may only be applied in a consistent context. The rest of the chapter discusses
two ways of axiomatising this approach. The first comes from default logics but
turns out to be inapplicable. Lastly, we sketch my own approach, which is based
on the idea that in order for Cut to be applicable, its premises need to be derived
in a theory known to be consistent.
4.1 A Rule Assuming Consistency
The goal here is to show that Cut is equivalent to a rule expressing an assumption
of consistency. Typical formulations of first-order logic or PA do not include such a
rule. So how should a rule expressing such a consistency assumption look like? We
understand consistency as the absence of a contradiction. A contradiction is any
formula of the form φ∧¬φ. Its absence can be expressed via negation, so ¬(φ∧¬φ).
Classically this is provably equivalent to φ ∨ ¬φ, the law of excluded middle. Thus
we can understand consistency on the level of our object language in terms of the
law of excluded middle.
How then can we understand the assumption of consistency as a sequent rule?
Sequent calculi do not include notions of assumption but there are other calculi,
such as natural deduction, which do and which have a well understood connection to
sequent calculi. In natural deduction, one can make assumptions within derivations.
Certain rules then allow one to discharge these assumptions, concluding some
formulae, s.t. its derivation is no longer dependent on the original assumption.
To recall how this works, consider as an example the following standard natural
deduction rule for the introduction of the material conditional:
[φ]1
...
ψ
→I1
φ→ ψ
4.1 A Rule Assuming Consistency 43
Given a proof of ψ from the assumption of φ (and possibly other assumptions
and subderivations), the rule allows us to drop the assumption of φ. The derivation
of the conditional φ → ψ is no longer dependent on the assumption of φ. Given
this schema and an understanding of consistency in terms of the law of excluded
middle, we can construct a natural deduction rule expressing the assumption of
consistency as follows:
[φ ∨ ¬φ]1
...
ψ
EME1
ψ
Given a derivation of ψ from the assumption of φ ∨ ¬φ, we can infer ψ and
drop the assumption of φ ∨ ¬φ. Whatever ψ we have derived assuming consistency,
its derivability is no longer dependent on that assumption. The use and discharge
of assumptions in natural deduction is found in terms of left-hand rules in sequent
calculi. The rule for the conditional above corresponds to the right-hand rule for
the conditional in NT:
φ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
→R
Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
Given a proof from φ to ψ (ignoring the context), we can conclude the conditional
φ→ ψ while the occurrence of φ on the left-hand side disappears – just like when it
is discharged in the case of the natural deduction rule. So given a natural deduction
rule discharging an assumption of consistency and this translation between rules of
natural deduction and sequent calculi, our sequent rule expressing an assumption
of consistency must look like this:
φ ∨ ¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
EME
Γ⇒ ∆
Where EME stands for Excluded Middle Elimination. We now only need to
show that EME and Cut are equivalent:
Lemma 4.1.1. Cut and EME are interderivable.
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Proof. For the purpose of this proof, consider the following standard left rule for
disjunction:
φ,Γ⇒ ∆ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
∨L
φ ∨ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
This rule of course correspond to the rules for ¬ and → in NT given the
expressibility of disjunction in terms of negation and the conditional.
We first show that given Cut, EME is a derivable rule:
φ⇒ φ
¬R⇒ φ,¬φ
∨R⇒ φ ∨ ¬φ
...
φ ∨ ¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Cut
Γ⇒ ∆
Second we show that Cut is derivable given EME:
...
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
¬L¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
...
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
∨L
φ ∨ ¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
EME
Γ⇒ ∆
Alternatively, we can also prove this fact by observing that the sets of premises
of the rules are interderivable. From the Cut premises Γ⇒ ∆, φ and φ,Γ⇒ ∆ we
get φ∨¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆ by first applying ¬L to Γ⇒ ∆, φ to get ¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆ and then ∨L
with the other Cut premise to introduce the disjunction. The other direction from
the EME premise φ∨¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆ to the Cut premises follows by the invertibility of
¬L and ∨L. For a proof of the invertibility of ∨L, see (Negri et al., 2008: p.32).
Thus Cut is equivalent to EME, a rule expressing an assumption of consistency.
So Cut is a rule expressing an assumption of consistency. The same argument can
be made with a similar rule, which we call contradiction elimination (CE):
Γ⇒ ∆, φ ∧ ¬φ
CE
Γ⇒ ∆
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CE allows one to eliminate a contradiction on the right-hand side of the sequent.
The reasoning behind this rule could be described as follows: The right-hand side
of a sequent is read disjunctively, so the contradiction on the far right is merely a
disjunct (given that ∆ is non-empty). Assuming consistency means to assume the
absence of a contradiction, which is its negation alas ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). Via a disjunctive
syllogism, we can then drop the disjunct which is the contradiction, leaving us with
the rest of the disjunction made of the formulae in ∆. But this reasoning of course
only works given the assumption of consistency in the form of ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). So CE
as well includes an implicit assumption of consistency. It is easy to show that CE
is interderivable with EME and thus with Cut. This further supports my argument
that Cut as a rule makes an implicit assumption of consistency.
Lemma 4.1.2. CE, EME and Cut are interderivable.
Proof. Given the lemma above, it suffices to show that CE and EME are interderi-
vable. Given a proof of φ ∨ ¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆, it follows by inversion of ∨L and ¬L that
the sequents Γ⇒ ∆, φ and φ,Γ⇒ ∆ are provable. An application of ¬R gives us
Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ and using the standard right rule for conjunction
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
∧R
Γ⇒ ∆, φ ∧ ψ
then concludes Γ⇒ ∆, φ∧¬φ. The other direction works analogously: Assuming
a proof of Γ⇒ ∆, φ ∧ ¬φ, the invertibility of ∧R ensures that we have proofs of
Γ⇒ ∆, φ and Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ. ¬L and inversion of ¬R give us sequents φ,Γ⇒ ∆ and
¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆. An application of ∨L finally concludes φ∨¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆. So the premises
of CE and EME are interderivable, which implies that the rules themselves are
interderivable as well. Again, since Cut and EME are shown to be interderivable,
this suffices to conclude that CE and Cut are interderivable as well.
Given the analysis of Cut as a rule making an implicit assumption of consistency,
the reason to restrict Cut is simple: A rule should only be applicable if its (implicit)
assumptions are true. In the case of NT, however, we know the assumption of
consistency to be false – for we can easily derive a contradiction. This answer to
the question of why the rule should be restricted also leads to an answer to the
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question of what the restriction should look like. Cut should only be applied in
consistent contexts. The following subsections explore how this restriction can be
made precise in terms of axiomatisable restrictions on Cut.
But before we go on to discuss potential axiomatisations of this so far informal
idea of restricting Cut, we want to note a further benefit of this motivation
in contrast to the bilateralist argument. The argument against the unrestricted
applicability of Cut from Ripley rests on an understanding of logical consequence
in terms of assertion, denial and (in-)coherent positions. Thus this motivation to
restrict Cut is only appealing to bilateralists or those who are ready to understand
logical consequence in bilateralist terms. As such, the scope of the argument against
Cut in its general form is rather limited.
This not the case with my argument above. We have made no use of vocabulary
specific to any kind of particular philosophical theory or understanding of logical
consequence. The only, also independently motivated, assumptions we made were
that consistency in the object language can be understood as the negation of a
contradiction and that assumptions are represented in sequent calculi by rules in
which formulae on the left-hand side disappear. The latter was shown to directly
correspond to rules making use of assumptions in natural deduction. So my argument
is much wider in scope and generally applicable in discussions about Cut or suitable
restrictions to get around paradoxes.
4.2 Default Logics
Probably the most well-understood and most prominent approach of putting a
consistency constraint on rules is to make use of a default logic. A default logic is
a logical system including default rules, which are of the form
φ : ε
ψ
In such a default rule, φ is called the prerequisite, ε the justification (or default)
and ψ the conclusion. One interpretation is that given φ and no information that ε
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is false, one can conclude ψ (see (Antonelli, 2005: p.14)). Another interpretation
makes the idea of retaining consistency via default rules more explicit: If φ is
provable and ¬ε is not provable, then infer ψ (see (Brewka et al., 1997: p.41)). The
latter interpretation by talking about (un)provability of formulae sounds already
pretty close to what we would expect in a sequent rule, so we will go with this
one. Using this idea for a restriction of Cut, we would, ideally, like to restrict Cut
as follows: Given proofs of Γ⇒ ∆, φ, φ,Γ⇒ ∆ and the unprovability of φ ∧ ¬φ,
conclude Γ⇒ ∆.
How could such default rules be formulated in sequent calculi? (Bonatti and
Olivetti, 1997) offer a rather straightforward way of doing so. In order to express
the justification (or the unprovability claim) of a default rule, the sequent system is
augmented by anti-sequents Γ ; ∆. Where sequents express a claim of consequence
between the left- and right-hand side, anti-sequents express the opposite:
∨
∆ does
not follow from
∧
Γ. In the special case of an empty left-hand side ; φ we speak
of φ as an anti-theorem. So our restricted rule of Cut would look like this
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒ ∆ ; φ ∧ ¬φ
DefCut
Γ⇒ ∆
An Initial sequent of the anti-sequent calculus is then any sequent Γ ; ∆,
where Γ and ∆ share no atomic formulae and anti-sequents are proven by rules for
the logical constants including the following:
Γ ; ∆, φ
¬φ,Γ ; ∆
φ,Γ ; ∆
Γ ; ∆,¬φ
Γ ; ∆, φ
φ→ ψ,Γ ; ∆
ψ,Γ ; ∆
φ→ ψ,Γ ; ∆
φ,Γ ; ∆, ψ
Γ ; ∆, φ→ ψ
Such an anti-sequent calculus can then be shown to be complete with respect to
the anti-theorems of classical, propositional logic (see also (Varzi, 1990, 1992) for
discussion of such calculi). Thus they nicely and fully capture the intended meaning
of anti-theorems. However, it can easily be seen that this strategy is unsuccessful
in formulating an interesting restriction of Cut in NT.
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The first reason is that a complete axiomatisation of anti-theorems of a theory
can only work in principle if it is decidable. For decidability simply means that
there is a mechanical procedure to determine both what is and what is not provable.
Classical propositional logic is decidable, so the strategy works nicely. However,
already adding quantifiers by moving on to predicate logic makes the decidability
impossible – let alone considering arithmetical theories. One might object that
the anti-sequent calculus need not be complete with respect to the anti-theorems.
However, we could then only construct such a calculus for the decidable core
of our theory, i.e. something not much more powerful than predicate logic with
restricted quantifiers. Since the Cut-rule would then have to be defined relative to
this anti-sequent calculus, our Cut rule would be too weak to be interesting.
The second reason is concerned with the question, relative to which theory
our anti-sequent calculus is supposed to prove the anti-theorems. An anti-sequent
calculus is supposed to prove what is unprovable in some other calculus. However,
NT is trivial, so there are no sequents, which it does not prove. So there is nothing
about NT for the anti-sequent calculus to axiomatise. We would have to look at
non-trivial subtheories of NT which then have a non-empty set of anti-theorems.
But then we would not capture the relevant notion of consistency, which is the
one relative to NT. Further, the considerations regarding the low complexity of
decidable theories would still push us to pick a very weak subtheory of NT. All in
all, expressing the consistency statement via an anti-sequent calculus is doomed
due to issues of complexity.
However, we will show that there is another way of expressing the non-triviality
requirement on Cut. The non-triviality requirement will be formalised in terms
of whether or not the Cut-premises have been derived in a consistent theory. The
consistency assumption contained in Cut has a local character: it is only concerned
with the consistency of the Cut-formula but not necessarily with the consistency of
all formulae contained in the contexts of the Cut premises. The new requirement
we just sketched – that the Cut premises must be derived in a consistent theory –
has a global character. Its consistency notion is concerned not only with a single
formula but with all formulae in the subderivations leading up to the Cut premises.
The difference between the local and global character also means that the new
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consistency requirement is considerably stronger than the local one speaking of
assumptions. This also entails that if the sequents are derived in a consistent theory,
then they do not contain inconsistencies in the local sense and thus the consistency
assumption is true.
Note also the crucial difference that the anti-sequent calculus used a notion of
being derivable in S, whereas we only require a notion of being derived in S.
We would like to point out that David Ripley mentions a similar idea of
restricting Cut in his work (although he never, to our knowledge, formulated a
nontransitive theory of truth with such a restriction):
This suggests adding a restricted rule of cut to the target systems. Such
a rule could be used in a derivation only above truth [...] rules, never
below them. That is, the premises of the cut would have to be derived
without use of the truth [...] rules, although any rules at all could be
freely applied to the conclusion of the cut. (Ripley, 2013b: p.11)
Ripley also seems to think that it’s not worth fully articulating this restriction,
since “[...] cut is admissible for G1c [a sequent calculus for classical logic, i.e. his
base theory], it follows that this restricted cut is admissible for the target systems“
(Ripley, 2013b: p.11). However, given that Cut is not eliminable (or admissible)
in our base theory PA, such a restricted Cut rule would not be admissible in our
theory of truth either.
4.3 L- and S-classicality
This kind of restriction turns out to be very powerful in terms of keeping classical
logic around. We will see later on that a nontransitive theory with such a restriction
on Cut can emulate classical logic in a number of interesting and important ways.
One of these is that it proves all classically provable sequents for the full language
LT . This is not the case for any other non-classical approach since, by definition,
the classical rules must be dropped for at least some instances involving the truth
predicate. To make more sense of what is going on in such cases, we introduce two
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notions of what it may mean for a theory to be classical or to preserve classical
logic. These are the notions of L-classicality and S-classicality:
Definition 4.3.1. L-classicality
Given a language L and a theory S, S is said to be L-classical iff: if `CL Γ⇒ ∆
then `S Γ⇒ ∆, where Γ,∆ ⊂ L.
Definition 4.3.2. S-classicality
Given theories S, S′, where S is closed under classical logic, S′ is called S-classical
iff: if `S Γ⇒ ∆ then `S′ Γ⇒ ∆.
When logicians defend the preservation of classical logic, they typically seem to
have the notion of L-classicality in mind, where L is any language . The driving
argument against a revision of classical logic is that logic is universal in the sense of
being language independent. In the study of pure logic, we derive theorems and use
inferences which are valid regardless of the language one may choose to instantiate
these theorems with. Non-classical approaches to paradoxes break this idea because
they make such theorems and inferences dependent on the language. According
to standard non-classical approaches, such inferences can only be used for the
arithmetical language but not for formulae involving the truth predicate. So the
resulting non-classical theory is not L-classical (and therefore also not S-classical).
Since the universality and independence from language of classical logic is
captured by L-classicality, what could be an argument for S-classicality? As we
will see in more detail below, for theories of truth to be closed under classical logic
often brings with it the benefit of greater proof-theoretic strength. This strength
expresses itself in the fact that the theory is able to prove higher ordinals to be
well-ordered and to emulate more second-order quantification (more on this below).
Such points have been used in the recent literature to argue against non-classical
variants of classical theories of truth (see e.g. Halbach and Nicolai, 2018). We agree
with such arguments in favour of classical logic and we will show later on that
our nontransitive approach is able to handle such requirements just as well the
strongest classical theory in these respects.
However, there is a crucial difference between the two notions of classicality:
Where there can be theories which are fully L-classical with respect to the language
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LT , this is not possible in the case of S-classicality. For simply let S be NT. Then
the claim for S-classicality amounts to demanding that our theory be trivial, which
is absurd. So if the notion of S-classicality is to be fruitful at all, we need to be
careful relative to which classical theory S we judge the S-classicality of our theory.
Later on we will see that our nontransitive approach is (or can be made) S-classical
with respect to any classical theory of truth S, i.e. a consistent theory of truth
obtained from NT by restricting the rules T1, T2 or the compositional principles.

Chapter 5
Nontransitive Transparency
In the previous chapter we showed that Cut makes an implicit consistency as-
sumption and argued that Cut should accordingly be restricted to cases where this
assumption is true. Default logics proved to be ill-suited for our purposes. However,
it seemed promising to impose on Cut that it be applicable if and only if both its
premises have been derived in a consistent theory of truth. For this captures the
requirement that there are no formulae φ and ¬φ in the Cut premises. This chapter
fills in the details, shows how to build non-trivial, nontransitive theories of truth
and explores some of their properties. We start with a nontransitive theory NTT,
which demands that its premises must be derived in PAT and then later strengthen
it by considering extensions of PAT.
5.1 The Theory NTT
We can now formulate theories of truth where Cut is restricted to cases where both
premises have been derived in a consistent theory of truth. We begin with a radical
version of this restriction, using PAT, our weakest theory of truth. Recall that PAT
is simply PA formulated in LT and contains instances of neither T1, T2 nor the
compositional principles. We will call this theory Non-Transitive Transparency
(NTT).
Definition 5.1.1. Non-Transitive Transparency NTT
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The theory NTT is obtained from NT by replacing its rule of Cut by
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒ ∆
PAT-Cut
Γ⇒ ∆
where both premises of PAT-Cut must have been obtained using only (instances
of) rules of PAT.
First some basic facts about the non-triviality, inconsistency and ω-inconsistency
of NTT :
Lemma 5.1.1. NTT is i) inconsistent and ii) ω-inconsistent.
Proof. i) can be easily shown via e.g. the Liar-Paradox that both ⇒ Tpλq and ⇒
¬Tpλq are provable, where all. ii) The ω-inconsistency of NTT cannot be established
by the derivations from the McGee-sentence, since both versions (stemming from
either the weak or strong diagonal lemma) contain at least one application of
Cut, s.t. its premises cannot be derived in PAT alone. However, there is an easy
derivation from the inconsistency of the Liar. Consider the formula φ : Tpλq∧y = y.
We can then prove ⇒ φn for every n ∈ ω and ⇒ ¬∀xφx in NTT:
...
⇒ Tpλq =T⇒ n = n ∧R⇒ Tpλq ∧ n = n
...
Tpλq⇒ ∧L
Tpλq ∧ n = n⇒ ∀L∀xTpλq ∧ x = x⇒ ¬R⇒ ¬∀xTpλq ∧ x = x
Lemma 5.1.2. NTT does not prove the empty sequent.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the empty sequent is provable in NTT. By
the consistency of PAT and its closure under Cut, it follows that PAT does not
prove the empty sequent. So the derivation of the empty sequent must contain
instances of T1, T2 or the compositional principles. However, Cut would be the
only rule of NTT to derive the empty sequent, which is impossible after the use of
truth-rules.
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Theorem 5.1.3. NTT is non-trivial.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that NTT is trivial, so it proves all sequents of
the form ⇒ φ and φ⇒. Consider the derivations of ⇒ 0 = 1 and 0 = 1⇒. Since
PAT (by its consistency) does not prove ⇒ 0 = 1, this derivation must involve
some application of truth rules. However, the conclusion is arithmetical so the
principal formula of this T-inference must have been eliminated. But the only rule
which could do so is Cut, which could not have been applied since the alleged
Cut-premises cannot be derived in PAT alone due to the use of truth rules.
Despite the radical restriction of blocking all Cuts which would happen after
making use of a truth rule, it is easy to show that full PAT is preserved in our
nontransitive theory and thus all classically provable sequents for the full language
LT remain provable:
Lemma 5.1.4. If `PAT Γ⇒ ∆ then `NTT Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. Immediate, since no proof of PAT includes an application of a truth rule.
Corollary 5.1.4.1. For any Γ,∆ ⊆ LT : if `CL Γ⇒ ∆, then `NTT Γ⇒ ∆ (where CL
is pure first-order logic).
Proof. Immediate by the previous lemma.
Thus all classically provable sequents for the full language LT remain provable,
including all theorems of classical logic. Further NTT is also strong with respect to
its truth-theoretic content. We can show that the theory proves all instances of the
T-schema and is transparent by showing first the admissibility of the elimination
rules for T:
Lemma 5.1.5. T3 and T4 are admissible in NTT.
Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
T3
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
T4
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
are admissible in NTT.
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Proof. The proof is the same as for ST in 2.2.4.
Corollary 5.1.5.1. NTT is a transparent theory of truth
Proof. Immediate by the unrestricted rules T1 and T2, as well as the admissibility
of T3 and T4.
Lemma 5.1.6. For all φ ∈ LT ,`NTT⇒ φ↔ Tpφq.
Proof. Immediate by NTT’s transparency and the unrestricted →R-rule:
φ⇒ φ
T1
Tpφq⇒ φ
→R⇒ Tpφq→ φ
φ⇒ φ
T2
φ⇒ Tpφq
→R⇒ φ→ Tpφq
Making use of the substitution function s. , it is easy to show that NTT derives
all instances of the uniform T-schema as well. Despite many nice properties for a
theory of truth, NTT falls short of other desiderata. In particular, it can be shown
that NTT does not prove any new arithmetical sequents compared to PA and is
therefore also not strong enough to prove PA’s consistency.
Lemma 5.1.7. NTT is LPA-conservative over PA.
If `NTT⇒ φ with φ ∈ LPA, then `PA⇒ φ.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is a proof of a new arithmetical theorem,
which is not provable in PA alone. Since it is not provable in PA, the proof needs
to involve a T-rule at some point, yet the proved formula needs to be arithmetical.
However, since Cut is blocked after making use of a T-rule, there is no rule which
could eliminate the introduced T-formula.
One might want to argue that the LPA-conservativity of the nontransitive theory
is only a proof-theoretic weakness because it lacks elimination rules for T. In fact,
it can be observed that classical theories closed under the schema Tpφq→ φ are
very strong in (among other things) proving new arithmetical theorems (see e.g.
(Cantini, 1990) and (Halbach, 2014)). However, this fact cannot be blamed on the
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absence of elimination rules for T, since they have been shown to be admissible in
NTT. Thus adding them to the theory does not allow one to prove any new sequents,
let alone new arithmetical ones not provable in PA. The following section explores
ways of strengthening NTT in order to overcome this proof-theoretic weakness.
5.1.1 Strengthening NTT
NTT can be seen as a strengthening of a completely nontransitive theory of truth
by allowing some Cuts back in given that its premises can be derived in PAT.
The straightforward way to strengthen NTT is then to again consider stronger
theories to derive the premises of our Cut rule. Thus our guiding question is Which
classical subtheories of NT can be made nontransitively transparent while remaining
nontrivial? We have shown that the strategy works for PAT and are now interested
to see, for which extensions of PAT this holds as well.
We will study nontransitive theories based not only on PAT but on classical
theories of truth, which extend PAT by some instances of the truth-rules:
Definition 5.1.2. Classical theory of truth
A classical theory of truth S is any consistent subtheory of NT, s.t. all rules but
the compositional principles, T1 and T2 are unrestricted.
Note that PAT, by this definition, is a classical theory of truth as well. It is the
special case in which all instances of the compositional principles, T1 and T2 are
dropped. In the case of NTT above, we defined our nontransitive theory of truth
by replacing the Cut rule of NT by one in which the premises must have been
derived using only rules of PAT. We can generalise this restriction with the notion
of a classical theory of truth S. In the following we define a class of nontransitive
theories, which restricts the naive Cut rule to cases in which the Cut-premises
have been derived using only instances of rules of S. Such a theory will be called
Nontransitive Transparency over S:
Definition 5.1.3. Nontransitive Transparency over S
The theory NTT[S] (for ‘Nontransitive Transparency over S’) is defined by
taking NT and replacing its rule of Cut by
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Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒ ∆
SCut
Γ⇒ ∆
where in SCut, both its premises must be derived using only (instances of) rules
of a classical theory of truth S. Note that the theory from the previous section
NTT corresponds to NTT[PAT] in the new notation.
Theorem 5.1.8. Let S be a classical theory of truth. Then NTT[S] does not derive
the empty sequent.
Proof. Analogous to the proof that NTT does not prove the empty sequent.
Since S only needs to be classical and consistent, it makes sense to go for the
strongest one. Most classical theories of truth in the literature take the compositional
principles for granted and focus on restricting T1 and T2. So strong, classical theories
amount to those with many instances of T1 and T2. So should we not simply
consider the maximally consistent classical theory S with as many instances of T1
and T2 as possible? Closing this theory under the remaining instances of T1, T2
and the accordingly restricted Cut rule would then give us the strongest possible
nontransitive theory possible.
Definition 5.1.4. Maximal consistency of S with respect to T1 and T2
A classical theory of truth S is maximally consistent with respect to T1 and T2
iff the addition of a new instance of T1 or T2 to S renders it inconsistent.
As is well-known due to (McGee, 1992), the quest for a maximally consistent
classical theory of truth is in vain: He showed that there are infinitely many such
theories and none of them are axiomatisable1. It is a short way from this result to
show something very similar for nontransitively transparent theories of truth.
Definition 5.1.5. Maximally transitive transparency of S
A theory S is maximally transitively transparent iff a single addition of an
instance of Cut to S renders it trivial.
1Strictly speaking McGee’s paper discusses maximally consistent sets of instances of the T-
schema. But due to the equivalence in NT between the T-rules and the T-schema, the theorem
immediately transfers.
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It is a short way from McGee’s theorem to the analogous result for maximally
transitive transparency. A nontransitively transparent extension of classical theory
of truth S would be maximally transitively transparent iff S is maximally consistent
with respect to T1 and T2. But since there is no such unique S and none of the
candidates are axiomatisable, the same holds of maximally transitively transparent
theories. But this only means that the search for the best logically possible restriction
of Cut with respect to instances of T1 and T2 is futile. However, it still makes
sense to look for subtheories of maximally consistent theories of truth, which are
then extended by the missing T-rules and a restricted Cut-rule. In the following,
we investigate such theories.
Proposition 5.1.9. For any S, NTT is a subtheory of NTT[S].
Corollary 5.1.9.1. For any S, NTT[S] is inconsistent and ω-inconsistent.
Proof. Immediate by the previous proposition, since NTT is both inconsistent and
ω-inconsistent.
Theorem 5.1.10. Nontrivial instances of NTT[S].
Let S be a classical theory of truth. Then NTT[S] is nontrivial.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of non-triviality for NTT.
Lemma 5.1.11. NTT[S] is LPA-conservative over S.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there are Γ,∆ ⊆ LPA, s.t. NTT[S] proves
Γ⇒ ∆ but S does not. Since the only rules which S compared to NTT[S] lacks are
instances of T1 and T2, the proof of Γ⇒ ∆ must include at least one of these new
instances of T1 or T2. But since the conclusion sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is arithmetical,
the principal formula of this new T-inference must have been eliminated. The only
rule, which could do so, is Cut. But since the proof includes an application of at
least T1 or T2 not included in S, SCut cannot be applied. Thus there can be no
such proof.
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5.1.2 A Strong Instance of NTT[S]
After investigating some basic properties of NTT[S] independently of some particular
classical theory S, it is now time to look at some instances. One of the driving
motivations to strengthen NTT to NTT[S] was to use the embedding of S in order
to make our nontransitive theory proof-theoretically stronger. It should at least
be able to prove the consistency of PA. The only thing we need to do is to find a
classical theory of truth S, which already proves the consistency of PA and embed
it into our nontransitive theory. Since NTT[S] proves everything S does, this makes
sure that NTT[S] proves the consistency of PA as well.
But proving the consistency of PA is a relatively modest aim in terms of the
proof-theoretic strength of formal theories of truth. Proving the consistency of a
theory is inherently linked to ‘how much’ transfinite induction a theory is able to
prove, i.e. what is the first ordinal the theory is not able to prove to be well-ordered.
As shown originally by Gentzen (see Gentzen, 1969), transfinite induction up to
ε0 is necessary (and sufficient) in order to prove the consistency of PA. But ε0 is
a rather small proof-theoretic ordinal compared to some theories of truth, which
prove much higher ordinals to be well-ordered.
Instead of going through various classical theories of truth of increasing strength,
we simply show what the instance of NTT[S] looks like for the strongest theory of
truth known so far. The strongest theory of truth is known as UTB(Z2) and was
introduced by (Schindler, 2018). The idea behind the theory is both simple and
genius. Instead of starting with some principles for T and hoping that the resulting
theory is arithmetically stronger than PA, we start with a very strong arithmetical
theory: Second-Order Arithmetic Z2 formulated in a second-order language L2.
Formulae of L2 are then translated into our first-order language of truth LT and
we add to PAT all instances of T1 and T2 where φ is a translation of a formula of
L2 into LT .
In the following, we provide a partly simplified presentation of this powerful
theory of truth. The language L2 of Z2 is a two-sorted language, extending our
arithmetical language L by second-order quantifiers and second-order variables
X, Y, ... as well as a binary relation symbol ∈. The theory Z2 can then be defined
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as the extension of PA formulated in L2 (including the formulation of the Induction
scheme) by all instances of the comprehension scheme
∀y1, ..., ym∀Y1, ..., Yn∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ φ(x, y1, ..., ym, Y1, ..., Yn))
Schindler then defines a primitive recursive translation function ∗, mapping
formulae of L2 to formulae of LT (see Schindler, 2018: p.454):
Definition 5.1.6. The translation function ∗
x∗i = x2i
X∗i = x2i+1
0
∗
= 0
(f(t1, ..., t2)
∗) = f(t∗1, ..., t
∗
n)
(t1 = t2)
∗ = t∗1 = t
∗
2
(¬φ)∗ = ¬φ∗
(φ→ ψ)∗ = φ∗ → ψ∗
(t ∈ X∗i ) = Ts.(x2i+1, t∗)
(∀xφ)∗ = ∀x2iφ∗
(∀Xiφ)∗ = ∀x2i+1(Fm1T (x2i+1)→ φ∗)
Where Fm1T applies to exactly those codes of sentences of LT , which contain
exactly one free variable.
Definition 5.1.7. UTB(Z2)
The theory UTB(Z2) is defined by adding to PAT formuated in L2 all instances
of the uniform T-schema
∀x1, ..., xn(Tpφ(x1. , ..., xn. )q↔ φ(x1, ..., xn))
where φ must be in the range of the translation function ∗.
We can easily give a sequent calculus for UTB(Z2) by replacing the T1 and T2
of NT by
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φ,Γ⇒ ∆
T1∗
Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
T2∗
Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
where in both rules it must be the case that φ is in the range of ∗. It is then
straightforward to embed UTB(Z2) into NTT[S], obtaining NTT[UTB(Z2)]. We
simply take UTB(Z2), add the instances of T1 and T2 s.t. their active formula is
not in the range of ∗ and demand of Cut that it is only applicable if both of its
premises are derived using instances of rules of UTB(Z2).
Lemma 5.1.12. For any Γ,∆ ⊂ L2, `UTB(Z2) Γ∗ ⇒ ∆∗ iff `Z2 Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. For a proof see (Schindler, 2018: p.473).
Just how strong is NTT[UTB(Z2)]? Recall that some of the strongest theories
of truth prove transfinite induction up to Γ0. These theories are too weak to prove
the comprehension scheme restricted to Π11-formulae. In contrast to that, UTB(Z2)
proves all (translated) instances of the comprehension scheme for Π1n – formulae for
any n ∈ ω. So UTB(Z2) and thus NTT[UTB(Z2)] are very, very strong and much
stronger than any other known classical or non-classical theory of truth. In fact,
there is still no notation to capture the proof-theoretic ordinal of Z2. The result
of LPA-conservativity for NTT[S] over S then shows that NTT[UTB(Z2)] does not
prove any more arithmetical consequences than UTB(Z2) itself. So NTT[UTB(Z2)]
is as arithmetically strong as our strongest classical theory of truth.
The ability to ‘absorb’ the proof-theoretic strength of classical theories of
truth, puts the nontransitive approach into a very powerful position compared to
other non-classical approaches. Recently, proponents of classical theories of truth
have argued against non-classical approaches by pointing out that they are much
weaker than their classical counterparts compared to the arithmetical theorems
they are able to prove. Where the classical theory KF (for Kripke-Feferman) proves
transfinite induction up to ε0, its non-classical cousin PKF (for Partial Kripke-
Feferman) formulated in a paracomplete logic only proves transfinite induction up
to ωω (see (Halbach and Nicolai, 2018) and (Halbach and Horsten, 2006)). (Picollo,
2018b) shows a similar result for the paraconsistent logic LP, in which classical
inferences for some cases are gained back by using a recovery operator ◦.
5.1 The Theory NTT 63
The problem is that recapturing classical logical rules in these non-classical
theories is hard. They cannot maintain classical logic for the full language LT , so
what is typically done is to show that classical logic can be applied, whenever all
premises are formulae of the base language LPA. But proving the consistency of PA
or the well-ordering of certain ordinals can of course not be done by working within
the base language. We need the detour of using truth-theoretic principles and must
thus prove sequents involving T-formulae. But here the classical principles can
no longer be applied, which would be necessary to derive the new arithmetical
theorems.
NTT[UTB(Z2)] does not suffer from these issues of the non-classical approaches
discussed above. We have shown that, given some classical theory of truth S, we can
construct a nontransitive theory NTT[UTB(Z2)], which has the same arithmetical
consequences as S itself – and more truth-theoretic consequences, such as all
instances of the (uniform) T-schema. Thus we conclude that our nontransitive
approach fares much better with respect to recapturing the reasoning of classical
theories of truth than other non-classical logics. NTT[UTB(Z2)] has been shown to
combine the strength of classical and non-classical theories of truth by being both
proof-theoretically and truth-theoretically very strong.
5.1.3 An Alternative Formulation
So far we have expressed transitivity in our systems via Cut as the only elimination
rule. But there are ways to make Cut admissible and thus absorb transitivity
into other meta-inferences. We already saw this fact when we showed that Cut is
equivalent to EME, a rule which allows one to eliminate instances of the law of
excluded middle on the left hand side. Two other interesting elimination rules for
negation and the conditional respectively are the following :
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ
¬E
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
→E
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
¬E and →E cannot be added to NTT without entailing triviality, as they make
an unrestricted rule of Cut admissible:
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Lemma 5.1.13. Cut is admissible in NTT + ¬E.
Proof. Assume that Γ⇒ ∆, φ and φ,Γ⇒ ∆ are provable. Apply ¬R to the latter
sequent to obtain Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ and then apply ¬E together with the first sequent to
conclude Γ⇒ ∆.
The only problem to prove the admissibility of Cut when →E instead of ¬E
is added, is that →E cannot conclude the empty sequent. This obstacle can be
overcome by adding a falsity constant ⊥, and let ⇒ ⊥ be derived instead of the
empty sequent. But nothing really hangs on this, since we now consider systems in
which both rules are added instead of Cut2. Similarly, we can show that →E and
¬E are admissible in a theory with unrestricted Cut:
Lemma 5.1.14. →E and ¬E are admissible given Cut.
Proof. For the case of →E, assume that there are proofs of Γ ⇒ ∆, φ and Γ ⇒
∆, φ→ ψ. By the invertibility of →R, we get a proof of φ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ. Applying Cut
gives us Γ⇒ ∆, ψ. To prove the admissibility of ¬E, assume proofs of Γ⇒ ∆, φ
and Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ. An application of ¬L to the first premise gives ¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆. Cut
then concludes Γ⇒ ∆.
Given the admissibility in both ways, we may conclude that→R and ¬E express
just as much transitivity as Cut itself. This gives us the option of an alternative
formulation of NTT[S]. Instead of restricting Cut, we drop the rule of Cut and
replace it by restricted versions of →E and ¬E:
Definition 5.1.8. Noneliminable Transparency over S
The theory NET[S] is defined by replacing the rule of Cut of NTT[S] by
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ
S¬E
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
S→E
Γ⇒ ∆
2Although the empty sequent cannot be derived by replacing Cut by →E, NTT[S] still cannot
be closed under →E unrestrictedly, since it renders the theory trivial. This is easily established
via the Curry-paradox. Given premises ⇒ Tpκq and Tpκq⇒ φ, we simply first introduce the
conditional and then use →E to conclude ⇒ φ as also shown in (Ripley, 2015b)
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where in both rules, both premises must have been derived using only (instances
of) rules of S.
Corollary 5.1.14.1. For any S, NTT[S] and NET[S] are deductively equivalent.
Proof. Immediate by the admissibility of the elimination rules given Cut and vice
versa.
So we need not formulate the restriction of transitivity after certain T-inferences
in terms of instances of Cut. We can also do so by considering the (meta-)rules of
modus ponens and/or explosion, which are in a sense operational rules, since they
are concerned with logical vocabulary.
5.2 An Indexed Calculus
So far our restriction on Cut was only expressed in the metalanguage. The fact tat
the Cut premises must be derived in some classical theory S is neither expressible
in our object language LT nor in the language of our sequent calculus. Here we
present a way of making this restriction more explicit by expressing it on the level
of sequents. To this purpose, we introduce indices i, j ∈ {0, 1}, which are attached
to the sequent arrow yielding indexed sequents Γ⇒i ∆. The intended reading of
Γ⇒0 ∆ is that this sequent was derived using only instances of rules of S. Γ⇒1 ∆
then indicates that the sequent was derived using some instances of rules, which
are not included in S itself.
Where arbitrary, we omit the indices for side formulae for the purpose of
readability. In two-premise rules, if the two sequents have different indices i, j, the
conclusion sequent has index m(i, j). We use m(i, j) to abbreviate max{i, j} where
max is the maximum function.
In the following we provide a full reformulation of NTT[S] using indices and
showing how the rules fare with indexed sequents. Given a classical theory of truth3
3Here we assume (as often before) that S includes the compositional principles unrestrictedly and
only restricts T1 and T2.
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S, an indexed formulation of NTT[S] – NTT[S]i – is defined as the collection of the
following rules:
Ref
φ,Γ⇒0 ∆, φ
=F
s = t,Γ⇒0 ∆
=T
Γ⇒0 ∆, s = t
s = t,Γ⇒i ∆
= E
Γ⇒i ∆
Where in = T , s = t must hold an in =F, s = t must not hold. As before,
identity statements in these rules are limited to primitive recursive functions (for
reasons of decidability).
Γ⇒i ∆, φ
¬L
¬φ,Γ⇒i ∆
φ,Γ⇒i ∆
¬R
Γ⇒i ∆,¬φ
Γ⇒i ∆, φ ψ,Γ′ ⇒j ∆′
→ L
φ→ ψ,Γ,Γ′ ⇒m(i,j) ∆,∆′
φ,Γ⇒i ∆, ψ
→ R
Γ⇒i ∆, φ→ ψ
φa,Γ⇒i ∆
∀L
∀xφx,Γ⇒i ∆
Γ⇒i ∆, φy
∀R
Γ⇒i ∆, ∀xφx
φs,Γ⇒i ∆
SubL
s = t, φt,Γ⇒i ∆
Γ⇒i ∆, φs
SubR
s = t,Γ⇒i ∆, φt
Γ⇒0 ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒0 ∆
Cut
Γ⇒ ∆
Q1
0 = St,Γ⇒0 ∆
Q2
Sr = St,Γ⇒0 ∆, r = t
Q3
Γ⇒0 ∆, r + 0 = r
Q4
Γ⇒0 ∆, r + St = S(r + t)
Q5
Γ⇒0 ∆, r × 0 = 0
Q6
Γ⇒0 ∆, r × St = (r × t) + t
Q7
∀x¬(r = Sx),Γ⇒0 ∆, r = 0
φ,Γ⇒i ∆
T1[S]
Tpφq,Γ⇒i ∆
Γ⇒i ∆, φ
T2[S]
Γ⇒i ∆, Tpφq
φ,Γ⇒i ∆
T1
Tpφq,Γ⇒1 ∆
Γ⇒i ∆, φ
T2
Γ⇒1 ∆, Tpφq
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Where in T1[S] and T2[S], it must be the case that S includes this instance of
T1 or T2 respectively. T1 and T2 are only applicable if the theory does not include
instances of T1[S] or T2[S] respectively for φ.
Γ,¬Tt⇒i ∆
¬CL
Γ, Sent(t), T¬. t⇒i ∆
Γ⇒i ¬Tt,∆
¬CR
Γ, Sent(t)⇒i T¬. t,∆
Γ, T t→ Ts⇒i ∆
→CL
Γ, Sent(t→. s), T (t→. s)⇒i ∆
Γ⇒i Tt→ Ts,∆
→CR
Γ, Sent(t→. s)⇒i T (t→. s),∆
Γ,∀tTs[t/v]⇒i ∆
∀CL
Γ, Sent(∀.vs), T (∀.vs)⇒i ∆
Γ⇒i ∀tTs[t/v],∆
∀CR
Γ, Sent(∀.vs)⇒i T (∀.vs),∆
It is easy to check that NTT[S] and NTT[S]i are deductively equivalent (besides
the indices of course).
5.2.1 Local And Global T-context
Formulated in terms of indices, a possible alternative restriction comes to mind:
Instead of tracking which sequents were derived using instances of rules not included
in S, one should track which formulae have been derived using such instances. Com-
pare the following two applications of Cut (we assume that the shown applications
of T1 and T2 are not included in S):
ψ,Γ⇒0 ∆, φ
T1
Tpψq⇒1 ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒0 ∆
Cut
Tpψq,Γ⇒1 ∆
Γ⇒0 ∆, φ
T2
Γ⇒1 ∆, Tpφq Tpφq,Γ⇒0 ∆
Cut
Γ⇒1 ∆
Both applications of Cut would be blocked in NTT[S]i, because the left Cut-
premise is not derived using only instances of rules of S. However, there is an
intuitively important difference between the two derivations. In the lower one, the
68 5. Nontransitive Transparency
Cut-formula is derived using the problematic instance of a T-rule. In the upper
derivation, the T-rule is only applied to some side formula. To distinguish what
is happening in the two cases, we introduce the notions of a local and global
T-context.
An inference is in a global T-context iff at least one of its premises was derived
using T1 or T2. It is a in a local T-context iff at least one of its (occurrences of)
active formulae was derived using T1 or T2. This distinction brings about the
possibility of a less severe restriction on Cut: We restrict Cut iff its application is
in a local T-context instead of whenever it is in a global T-context as before. In
the following we introduce a calculus, which makes this idea precise and show that
the local and global restrictions are deductively equivalent.
Locally Nontransitive Transparency
The distinction between a global and a local T-context gives two ways of restricting
Cut – either if it is applied in a local or in a global T-context. NTT[S]i above
reflects the restriction in a global T-context, which we will call the global restriction.
Locally nontransitive transparency over S – LNTT[S]i – reflects the local restriction:
Again, we make use of indices i, j ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, we do not sign sequents
with indices but rather formulae, yielding φi. The intended interpretation of φ0
is that φ was not derived using an instance of T1 or T2 not included in S. φ1
respectively is read as φ being derived using such an instance. Where Γ is a set of
formula, by Γi we mean that for all φj ∈ Γi, it holds that i = j. As in the global
case, only the instances of T-rules not included in S raise the index from 0 to 1,
the rest of the rules determine the index of the conclusion depending on the indices
of the premise(s). The theory LNTT[S]i is comprised of the following rules:
Ref
φ0,Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, φ0
=F
(s = t)0,Γ0 ⇒ ∆0
=T
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, (s = t)0
(s = t)0,Γ⇒i ∆
=E
Γ⇒i ∆
Where in =T and =E, s = t must hold an in =F, s = t must not hold and the
identity statements are limited to primitive recursive functions.
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Γ⇒ ∆, φi
¬L
¬φi,Γ⇒ ∆
φi,Γ⇒ ∆
¬R
Γ⇒ ∆,¬φi
Γ⇒ ∆, φi ψj,Γ⇒ ∆
→ L
(φ→ ψ)m(i,j),Γ⇒ ∆
φi,Γ⇒ ∆, ψj
→ R
Γ⇒ ∆, (φ→ ψ)m(i,j)
φsi,Γ⇒ ∆
∀L
(∀xφx)i,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φyi
∀R
Γ⇒ ∆, (∀xφx)i
Where in ∀R, y must be an eigenvariable.
φsi,Γ⇒ ∆
SubL
(s = t)0, φti,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φsi
SubR
(s = t)0,Γ⇒ ∆, φti
Γ⇒ ∆, φ0 φ0,Γ⇒ ∆
Cut
Γ⇒ ∆
Q1
(0 = St)0,Γ0 ⇒ ∆0
Q2
(Sr = St)0,Γ⇒ ∆0, (r = t)0
Q3
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, (r + 0 = r)0
Q4
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, (r + St = S(r + t))0
Q5
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, (r × 0 = 0)0
Q6
Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, (r × St = (r × t) + t)0
Q7
(∀x¬(r = Sx))0,Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, (r = 0)0
φi,Γ⇒ ∆
T1[S]
Tpφqi,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φi
T2[S]
Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφqi
φi,Γ⇒ ∆
T1
Tpφq1,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φi
T2
Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq1
Where in T1[S] and T2[S], it must be the case that S includes this instance
of T1 or T2 respectively. T1 and T2 are only applicable, if the theory does not
include instances of T1[S] or T2[S] respectively for φ.
Γ,¬Tti ⇒ ∆
¬CL
Γ, Sent(t)0, T¬. ti ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ¬Tti,∆
¬CR
Γ, Sent(t)0 ⇒ T¬. ti,∆
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Γ, (Tt→ Ts)i ⇒ ∆
→CL
Γ, Sent(t→. s)0, (T (t→. s))i ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ (Tt→ Ts)i,∆
→CR
Γ, Sent(t→. s)0 ⇒ T (t→. s)i,∆
Γ, (∀tTs[t/v])i ⇒ ∆
∀CL
Γ, Sent(∀.vs)0, T (∀.vs)i ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ (∀tTs[t/v])i,∆
∀CR
Γ, Sent(∀.vs)0 ⇒ T (∀.vs)i,∆
Theorem 5.2.1. `LNTT[S]i Γ⇒ ∆ iff `NTT [S]i Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. The right to left direction is trivial since any Cut in a local T-context is
also in a global T-context (but not vice versa). The strategy for the left to right
direction goes as follows. Assume for contradiction that there is some proof of a
sequent Γ⇒ ∆ which is provable without Cut in a local T-context but not without
Cut in a global T-context. We give a procedure to transform any such proof with a
Cut in a global but not local T-context into one in which the Cut-inference is no
longer in a global T-context.
Start with the last T-inference not included in S before the Cut-inference in
question. Starting from this T-inference, go down the derivation to the first inference
in which the principal formula of this T-inference or formulae in its trace are not
active formulae. Then simply switch the last two inferences, i.e. the last inference
in the trace of the principal T-formula and the first inference on the context of
the T-inference. Repeat this process until the Cut-inference is pushed above the
T-inference. For the purpose of illustration, consider the following example:
ψs,Γ⇒ ∆, φ
T2
ψs,Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
¬L
ψs,¬Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
∀L∀xψx,¬Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
B
ψs,Γ⇒ ∆, φ
T2
ψs,Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
∀L∀xψx,Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
¬L∀xψx,¬Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
B
ψs,Γ⇒ ∆, φ
∀L∀xψx,Γ⇒ ∆, φ
T2∀xψx,Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq
¬L∀xψx,¬Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
After these transformations, we have pushed up the ∀L-inference on formulae
in the context of the original T-inference above that T-inference. Iterating this
5.3 Transitive Non-Classical Approaches 71
procedure for all inferences on side formulae of the T-inference will push up the
Cut in a global but not local T-context above the T-inference. But then it is no
longer in a global T-context and thus becomes a proof of NTT[S]i as well. Thus
NTT[S]i and LNTT[S]i prove the same sequents (modulo indices of course).
We conclude from this excursus that although the distinction between a local
and a global T-context looks promising as a way of getting a more fine-grained
restriction on Cut, this hope is in vain. Both restrictions yield the same theories in
terms of provable sequents.
5.3 Transitive Non-Classical Approaches
The simplicity of the restriction and the strength of the resulting theory raises the
question, whether it can be applied to other rules of NT. Especially the fact that
it recovers strong classical theories completely makes it seem attractive for other
non-classical approaches. As mentioned before, these approaches often struggle
with recapturing classical logic. In the following we discuss the applicability of
these ideas to well-known paracomplete, paraconsistent and noncontractive logics.
Paracomplete theories such as K3 are non-classical theories, which take the
lesson from the paradoxes to be that sentences such as the Liar are neither true nor
false. Axiomatically, this amounts to dropping the law of excluded middle φ ∨ ¬φ
in its general form and thus restricting any rule, which may derive it. In our setting
of NT, this amounts to dropping the rule of ¬R and replacing it with some weaker
negation rules but the details of these replacements do not matter here.
Paraconsistent theories such as LP accept the fact that the Liar and its negation
are provable and so such sentences are both true and false. Since paraconsistent
theories are (typically) closed under Cut, they cannot derive the principle of
explosion φ ∧ ¬φ⇒. The derivation of this principle is blocked by giving up ¬L of
NT and replacing it with some weaker principles for negation.
So both paracomplete and paraconsistent theorists might come up with the
idea to play with the same recapture strategy of NTT[S]. However, we have already
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implicitly shown that no such project can work. For reconsider the derivation of
the empty sequent via the Liar using the weak diagonal lemma and inversion:
...
⇒ λ, Tpλq
T2⇒ Tpλq
...
λ, Tpλq⇒
T1
Tpλq⇒
Cut⇒
The derivations leading up to ⇒ λ, Tpλq and λ, Tpλq ⇒ can be obtained in
pure PAT. So the proofs up to this point must go through in the newly restricted
theory as well. Further, non-classical approaches aim to be transparent theories
of truth and so the following applications of T1 and T2 must go through as
well. An application of Cut (also unrestricted in paracomplete and paraconsistent
approaches) then shows that they still derive the empty sequent and are trivial by
admissible Weakening (or the derivation for a Curry-sentence). The problem simply
is that in deriving triviality, we do not need to use ¬L or ¬R s.t. their premises
are derived using instances of rules not included in some classical theory of truth S.
We only need to make use of ¬L or ¬R while we are still working in PAT.
However, it might be conjectured that every paradox p of NT contains an
application of Contraction4 s.t. its premise was derived using instances of rules not
contained in S. Contraction expresses the property that repetitions of formulae in
a sequent matter (see (Paoli, 2013) for different interpretations and motivations to
restrict Contraction). For the most prominent proposal of noncontractive theories
of truth see (Zardini, 2011) and (Grǐsin, 1982) for a noncontractive set theory.
So far, we have dealt with sequents Γ ⇒ ∆ where Γ,∆ are sets and these do
not distinguish between multiple or a single occurrence of a formula. So in order
to cash out Contraction, we momentarily interpret Γ,∆ as multisets [φ, φ, ψ] of
formulae, which are sensitive to the number of occurrences of the same formula in
them. Where {φ, φ} = {φ}, it holds for multisets that [φ, φ] 6= [φ]. Contraction as
a property of the consequence relation is then given by the following two rules:
φ, φ,Γ⇒ ∆
CL
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ, φ
CR
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
4By Contraction we always mean the structural rules shown below. In the literature, the scheme
(φ→ (φ→ ψ))→ φ→ ψ is sometimes called Contraction as well and plays a role in blocking
the Curry-paradox.
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Given →R, we can show that there the conjecture above is false: There are
paradoxes in which all applications of Contraction use premises derived fully in
PAT. Obtain by weak diagonalisation a sentence α↔ Tpαq→ ¬Tpαq, which we
call the ‘Curry-Liar’. Informally, this sentence says ‘If I am true, then I am not
true’. By inversion we obtain sequents α, Tpαq, Tpαq ⇒, Tpαq → ¬Tpαq ⇒ α
and α ⇒ Tpαq → ¬Tpαq. The following derivations of ⇒ α and α ⇒ then go
through, where the premise of the application of Contraction is derived in PAT:
...
α, Tpαq, Tpαq⇒
CL
Tpαq, α⇒
T1
Tpαq, Tpαq⇒
¬R
Tpαq⇒ ¬Tpαq →R⇒ Tpαq→ ¬Tpαq
...
Tpαq→ ¬Tpαq⇒ α
Cut⇒ α
...
α⇒ Tpαq→ ¬Tpαq
...
⇒ Tpαq
...
⇒ Tpαq ¬L¬Tpαq⇒ →L
Tpαq→ ¬Tpαq⇒
Cutα⇒
A Cut on ⇒ α and α⇒ then gives the empty sequent. Thus such a restriction
of Contraction cannot be successful in blocking paradoxes (and thus triviality)
of NT. The Liar and the Curry-Liar show that the only rule which needs to be
applied in a T-context in all paradoxes is Cut – at least relative to the setup of
rules in NT. Of course, it might always be possible to reformulate ones sequent
rules in order for them to become more fine grained in making different aspects of
the consequence relation explicit. But we do not know of any such reformulations
which would be fruitful in constructing a nontrivial theory of truth using the same
idea as in NTT[S].
However, there might be a way for the noncontractivist around problematic
derivations like the one via the Curry-Liar. Just as e.g. →E makes Cut an admis-
sible rule, there are formulations of operational rules which make at least some
Contraction admissible. Compare the following two versions of the right conditional
rule (of which the left one is included in NT):
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φ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
→R
Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
[φ],Γ⇒ ∆, [ψ]
(R
Γ⇒ ∆, φ( ψ
Where the brackets [φ],Γ ⇒ ∆, [ψ] indicate that either φ or ψ is taken as
an active formula but not both. (R is typically called the additive version of
the right conditional rule, since (intuitively speaking) it only takes one of φ or
ψ as a premise and ‘adds’ the other one. →R is called the multiplicative version.
With unrestricted rules of Contraction, it is easy to show that the two rules are
interderivable. However, without Contraction, the following comparison shows that
they come apart with respect to what is provable with them:
φ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
→R
Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
φ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
(R
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ, φ( ψ
(R
Γ⇒ ∆, φ( ψ, φ( ψ
CR
Γ⇒ ∆, φ( ψ
If both immediate subformulae of φ → ψ are present in the premise sequent,
then we need Contraction to obtain a single occurrence of φ( ψ, whereas the same
conclusion can be obtained via →R directly without Contraction. This matters to
paradoxes, because in the above derivation of the empty sequent via the Curry-Liar,
we need to apply →R in a T-context with both immediate subformulae of the
conditional in the premise. So replacing →R with (R would make Contraction in
a T-context necessary in the above derivation. Of course, this is no guarantee that
there are no other paradoxes, in which no Contraction in a T-context needs to be
applied despite having (R. However, it is a necessary start for the noncontractivist
and we do conjecture that with (R replacing →R and with Contraction explicit,
every p of NT includes an application of Contraction in a T-context. But this
turned out to be rather difficult to prove.
However, this gets us into the problem that structural rules are entangled
with the operational rules: in the case of Contraction, →R makes some cases of
Contraction admissible. Thus restricting Contraction and replacing →R by (R,
weakens the conditional. For example, we can no longer prove all instances of the
T-schema, since some applications of Contraction in at least some T-contexts are
blocked. Thus the following derivation no longer goes through for all instances of
T1:
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φ⇒ φ
T1
Tpφq⇒ φ
(R⇒ φ, Tpφq ( φ
(R⇒ Tpφq ( φ, Tpφq ( φ
CR⇒ Tpφq ( φ
Generally, we can only derive one direction of the T-schema for theorems
⇒ Tpφq or ⇒ φ and anti-theorems Tpφq ⇒ or φ ⇒. For in these cases there is
only one of the immediate subformulae of the conditional present. So although a
(working) noncontractive solution would be transparent due to the unrestricted
T-rules, its conditional is too weak to express this fact in the object language LT
as it is not able to prove all instances of the (uniform) T-schema.
There is also another important issue for the noncontractivist who tries to
restrict Contraction in T-contexts. It turns out that a noncontractive approach
cannot be strengthened by embedding any consistent theory of truth S as was
possible in NTT[S]. For suppose that S is consistent and closed under Tpφq→ φ as
some of the strongest theories of truth like KF of (Reinhardt, 1986; Feferman, 1991)
or VF of (Cantini, 1990) are. This amounts to a closure under T1 in our sequent
calculus setting. It is then easy to show that S derives ⇒ λ and Tpλq⇒ for our
standard Liar sentence λ. A noncontractive theory over S blocking Contraction-
inferences after applications of T2 not contained in S derives the empty sequent
and is thus trivial:
...
⇒ λ
T2⇒ Tpλq
...
Tpλq⇒
Cut⇒
So some classical theories of truth (despite their consistency) already contain
‘too much’ Contraction, s.t. an embedding into a noncontractive solution is not
possible. Our nontransitive approach NTT[S] has neither of the two problems
discussed above.
Another difference between applying the idea of restricting rules in a T-context
to the noncontractive or the nontransitive approach is the behaviour with respect
to the distinction between a local and a global T-context. In the previous section we
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have shown that whether we restrict Cut locally or globally makes no difference with
respect to which sequents are provable. This is not the case in the noncontractive
approach. This is because due to the unrestricted Cut-rule in the noncontractive
approach, we can always change active formulae of applications of Contraction
with index 1 for occurrences with index 0 as follows:
...
Γ⇒ ∆, φ0, φ1 φ0 ⇒ φ0
Cut
Γ⇒ ∆, φ0, φ0
CR
Γ⇒ ∆, φ0
Since φ is arbitrary, this works in the case of paradoxes as well, allowing
derivations of the empty sequent and triviality in the noncontractive approach
when Contraction is restricted only locally.
Chapter 6
Assessing Theories Of Truth
This chapter is concerned with the assessment of theories of truth, discussing various
criteria a theory of truth should fulfil. This allows us to assess our nontransitive
theory NTT[S] with respect to these criteria and to compare it with other rival
accounts. To do so, the chapter is divided into three parts: The first part discusses
what role the truth predicate plays or should play in formal theories of truth. This
gives us a list of functional roles the truth predicate should be able to play in a
formal theory of truth and we can judge a theory of truth as adequate or inadequate
with respect to these functional roles. The second part focuses on theoretical virtues
of theories of truth by giving a systematic overview over the (still young and
unexplored) work in the literature. This list is extended by further virtues taken
from the literature on virtues in science and the philosophy of science in the third
section.
After the discussion of each set of assessment criteria for a theory of truth, these
criteria are applied to our nontransitive theory. Overall, we argue that NTT[S] fares
very well with respect to many of the discussed virtues, in fact much better than
most of the other theories of truth on the market. In particular, we argue that
NTT[S] is able to improve upon classical and other non-classical theories of truth.
78 6. Assessing Theories Of Truth
6.1 Functional Desiderata
A good theory of truth is one in which truth is able to fulfil certain functional
roles. So in order to determine how well a truth theory behaves and to be able to
compare it with other theories of truth in these respects, we first need to clarify
the functional roles our truth predicate T plays. We distinguish two major groups
of functional roles of the truth predicate: substitutional and quantificational. In
the following, we discuss and explain these two groups and show how functional
roles identified in the literature fit into this classification.
6.1.1 Substitutional Roles
There are different substitutional roles of the truth predicate as we will see in more
detail below, but they all have to do with the idea that at least in certain contexts,
φ can be replaced by Tpφq and vice versa. We first describe some examples from
natural language where this replacement plays a role before we discuss ways in
which this idea can be made precise.
(Picollo and Schindler, 2019) describe what they call the redundant and blind
uses of the truth predicate, which are both forms of the substitutional role of T in
natural language in our sense. The redundant use is exemplified in cases in which
the truth predicate is simply applied to a single sentence. For example, one may
utter the sentence “Snow is white’ is true’. This use of the truth predicate, however,
is redundant. For we would convey the exact same message or content by simply
uttering the sentence ‘Snow is white’ without making use of the truth predicate.
When applying the predicate to names of sentences one might not know explicitly,
we are using the truth predicate in the blind sense. They give the example of someone
using the sentence “Goldbach’s conjecture’ is true‘. This use is different from the
previous, redundant, one because, dependent on the knowledge of the speaker, it
cannot be so easily dismissed with as in the previous case. For if the individual
does not know what Goldbach’s conjecture is, or cannot express it for some reason,
she would not be able to express her acceptance of the conjecture without making
use of the truth predicate.
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Both uses of the truth predicate, the redundant and blind one, can be formalised
in terms of some replacibility of φ and Tpφq in sequents. Formally, the possibility
to replace φ by Tpφq and vice versa comes in different degrees. The weakest degree
comes in the form of the rules of NEC and CONEC:
⇒ φ
NEC⇒ Tpφq
φ⇒
CONEC
Tpφq⇒
In the case of NEC and CONEC, the substitutability is very restricted as it
only applies to formulae in sequents with no side formulae.
The redundant and blind use are contained in the idea that the truth predicate
ought to be transparent. As mentioned before, the truth predicate of a theory is
transparent iff: it proves φ,Γ⇒ ∆ iff it proves Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆ and it proves Γ⇒ ∆, φ
iff it proves Γ ⇒ ∆, Tpφq. Many logicians who take a nonclassical approach to
theories of truth advocate transparency as a key feature of such theories, including
proponents of nontransitive theories such as Ripley (see e.g. Ripley, 2013a). This
feature is clearly fulfilled by NTT[S] given that the theory in question is closed
under the truth rules T1-T4. NTT[S] contains T1 and T2 unrestrictedly, T3 and
T4 are admissible as shown in 2.2.4.
(Field, 2008) emphasises that the substitutional roles of the truth predicate are
not fulfilled by a merely transparent truth predicate. Rather than being merely
transparent, the truth predicate must be intersubstitutable. Whereas transparency
allows us to substitute φ for Tpφq and vice versa in sequents, intersubstitutivity
goes further than that. For the truth predicate to be intersubstitutable, we need
to be able to substitute φ for Tpφq in formulae. So for example, we need that
Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ is derivable iff Γ⇒ ∆, Tpφq→ ψ is. The same goes for other logical
constants such as negation.
To motivate such a desiderata, suppose you are a politician listening to an
elaborate speech of a climate scientist talking about the causes and consequences
of global warming. You are impressed by the speech and in particular convinced by
the large number of arguments and facts presented to you. It is also clear to you
that the consequence of these facts is to radically change the political course of
your party. You would like to express the linkage between the scientist’s speech and
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the political change in terms of a conditional. But instead of listing all the facts
f1, f2, ..., fn, which all seem relevant for your decision, you use the truth predicate
and simply say
If everything the scientist said in his speech is true, we must change
our political course.
Of course you rely on the fact that your uttered sentence is equivalent to ‘If
f1 ∧ f2... ∧ fn, then we must change our political course’. But this equivalence
demands that the facts and the result of applying the truth predicate to them
(given some quotation device) are intersubstitutable. What we need is not just
that facts ⇒ φ and ⇒ Tpφq are interderivable but also that φ and Tpφq are
intersubstitutable in hypothetical contexts – as in the example of an antecedent
of a conditional. The examples above speak only of the intersubstitutivity of the
truth predicate in propositional connectives, i.e. where the main connective of the
formula in question is a logical constant of propositional logic.
Definition 6.1.1. Intersubstitutivity of T
A theory of truth S has an intersubstitutable truth predicate iff S contains the
following rules or they are admissible in S:
¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
¬TL
¬Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ
¬TR
Γ⇒ ∆,¬Tpφq
φ→ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
→TL
φ† → ψ†,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
→TR
Γ⇒ ∆, φ† → ψ†
where † in →TL and →TR indicates that either φ or ψ has been replaced by
either Tpφq or Tpψq respectively (or both). The double lines indicate that the rule
can be applied both ways – from bottom to top and top to bottom.
That the truth predicate of NTT[S] is intersubstitutable in this sense can be
shown as follows:
Lemma 6.1.1. The truth predicate of NTT[S] is intersubstitutable.
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Proof. The admissibility of all four rules can be shown with the help of the
invertibility of our rules for ¬ and →. Consider first only the top to bottom
directions. For the admissibility of ¬TL, assume that ¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆ is provable. By
the invertibility of ¬L, it follows that Γ⇒ ∆, φ is provable. An application of T2,
followed by an application of ¬L yields ¬Tpφq,Γ⇒ ∆. The case for ¬TR works
analogously. For the case of →TL, assume that φ → ψ,Γ ⇒ ∆ is provable. By
the invertibility of →L, it follows that Γ⇒ ∆, φ and ψ,Γ⇒ ∆ are provable. An
application of T1 or T2 yields either Γ ⇒ ∆, Tpφq or Tpψq,Γ ⇒ ∆ (depending
on which subformula should be replaced by the T-formula). An application of →L
then yields φ† → ψ†,Γ ⇒ ∆. The case of →TR works analogously by inversion.
The bottom to top directions work the same way. First use inversion, then the
admissibility of T3 or T4 to eliminate the truth predicate and then reintroduce the
constant.
Thus NTT[S] fulfils the desideratum of having a propositionally intersubstituta-
ble truth predicate and fulfils all discussed substitutional roles.
6.1.2 Quantificational Roles
Where the substitutional roles had to do with the possibility to switch from φ
to Tpφq in different contexts, the quantificational uses are concerned with the
utility of using quantifiers in formula containing the truth predicate. For the case
of quantifying over finitely many objects while using the truth predicate, consider
the example
Everything that Carnap said is true.
Since Carnap (unfortunately) lived only a finite amount of time with finite
resources, he has only uttered finitely many sentences. So our example expresses a
finite generalization. Here we must note two things regarding the dispensability of
the truth predicate when using it for finite generalizations. First, the generalization
above could have been expressed using sentential quantification. If we allow for
variables p ranging over sentences (or propositions), giving us quantification of the
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form ∀pφ and letting Cp express that ‘Carnap said p’, then the sentence above can
be formalised as ∀p(Cp→ p). Second, the truth predicate can be made redundant
in the sense of the redundant use discussed above. Let p1, p2, ..., pn be the list
of sentences (or propositions expressed thereby) uttered by Carnap. Then the
above sentence can be rewritten as the conjunction of the list of sentences, so
p1 ∧ p2, ... ∧ pn.
Things look a bit different in the case of infinite generalizations. (Picollo and
Schindler, 2019) give the example
Every theorem of PA is true.
The difference to the sentences uttered by Carnap during his lifetime is of
course that there are infinitely many theorems of PA. Still, the truth predicate
is redundant in the sense that it could be replaced via sentential quantification:
∀p(ProvPAp → p). However, it cannot be so easily replaced by making use of
conjunctions. Since there are infinitely many theorems of PA, the conjunction would
have to have infinitely many conjuncts. Of course we can build formal theories
in which such infinite conjunctions are allowed. However, the point here is that
natural language is not expressive enough to include such conjunctions. Human
speakers are not able to make use of such conjunctions. So outside the scope of
such artificial languages, we cannot dispense of sentential quantification or the
truth predicate (or maybe some other finite quantificational device) in order to
express such sentences as the one about the truth of the theorems of PA.
Famously, Quine already saw this crucial difference between finite and infinite
generalizations when it comes to the use of the truth predicate:
We may affirm the single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by
quotation or by the truth predicate; but if we want to affirm some
infinite lot of sentences that we can demarcate only by talking about
the sentences, then the truth predicate has its use. (Quine, 1970: p.12)
Expressing finite or infinite generalizations as the ones above can be done using
sentential (propositional) quantification or the truth predicate (or possibly other
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linguistic devices). So the truth predicate allows us to emulate this sentential
quantification without introducing it explicitly into our language. There are also
other cases in which the truth predicate helps us with issues of quantification,
namely regarding quantification into predicate position. (Picollo and Schindler,
2019) use the following example to make this point clear:
Tom is mortal.
Based on this sentence, we may want to infer that ‘There is a property X, s.t.
Tom exhibits X’ and by doing so, we would quantify into predicate position. This
is simply to say that we introduce variables ranging over predicates and bind these
variables by using appropriate quantifiers. First order logic does not allow this,
since variables only range over objects, not over predicates. One easy way out,
similar to using sentential quantification in the examples above, is to make use
of second-order logic. Such logical systems introduce new variables ranging over
predicates which can then be bound by second-order quantifiers. Again, analogous
to the case of sentential quantification, the truth predicate allows us to mimick this
second-order quantification. Consider the sentence
‘Tom is mortal’ is true.
What happens by going from ‘Tom is mortal’ to “Tom is mortal’ is true’ is
not only the introduction of the truth predicate but also, crucially, the syntactic
move from a sentence to an object. By introducing the quotation device on the
sentence ‘Tom is mortal‘ we have syntactically transformed it into an object to
which the truth predicate applies – and we can quantify over objects in our first-
order languages and systems. To see how this works, consider the operation of
concatenation of objects by which we simply mean binding two objects together.
So the result of applying concatenation to Tom and ‘is mortal’ is ‘Tom is mortal’.
Considering the sentence ‘The result of applying concatenation to Tom and ‘is
mortal’ is true‘, quantification into predicate position as shown above can then be
done as follows using the truth predicate:
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There is an x, s.t. the result of applying concatenation to ‘Tom’ and x
is true.
So how does NTT[S] fare with respect to the quantificational role of the truth
predicate, how much second-order quantification is it able to emulate? To answer
this question, it makes sense to assess a theory of truth over PA in this respect
by comparing it to the result of adding second-order quantification to PA instead
of the truth predicate. This way we can see, just how much of the functional
role of quantification the truth predicate in some formal theory of truth is able
to play (at least relative to the case of Peano Arithmetic). As discussed before,
the result of extending PA by second-order quantifiers and all instances of the
comprehension scheme is full second-order arithmetic Z2. Further, we have shown
that there is an instance of NTT[S], NTT[UTB(Z2)], which proves all translations
of sequents provable in Z2. So there is a clear sense in which NTT[UTB(Z2)] fulfils
the quantificational role of the truth predicate.
However, there are two restrictions which apply to the emulation of second-order
quantification via the truth predicate. First, Picollo & Schindler point out that
Truth theories can handle quantification into predicate position by
talking about the concatenation of certain terms with certain formulas
being true, as indicated above. But this means that truth theories
can only simulate predicate quantification for those languages that
contain a name for each individual in the domain of the first-order
quantifiers – thus, the domain needs to be countable. (Picollo and
Schindler, 2019: p.334)
This first concession need not really bother us. At least for now, it is hard to
see what motivation there would be to add a truth predicate to an uncountable
language. At least if our motivations to study truth, roughly, come from reflections
on natural language, this does not limit our project at all. Further, if there is a
need or an interest in emulating second-order quantification via a predicate, Picollo
and Schindler go on to show that this limitation can be overcome by switching
from a truth predicate to a satisfaction predicate. Second, Schindler concedes in a
different paper that
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While second-order languages allows us to generalize over any predicate
of the second-order language, the truth predicate of UTB(Z2) does
not allow us to generalize over all predicates of the language of truth,
but only over those predicates that can be translated back into the
second-order formalism. (Schindler, 2018: p.473)
This remark does not really tell us something new about the kind or range
of emulating second-order quantification. Of course, using the translation from
L2 into LT is not the same as adding second-order quantifiers to LT . But such a
limitation is not a shortcoming of the translation function and does not reveal any
problems for the project overall. After all, we already knew real second-order logic
to be too powerful (as exemplified by its lack of compactness) in order to be fully
mimicked by the truth predicate.
In the previous two sections we have identified two major categories of functional
roles of the truth predicate: Substitutional roles and quantificational roles. Our
assessment has shown that our nontransitive approach fulfils all of these roles.
Choosing a suitable classical theory S such as UTB(Z2) allows NTT[UTB(Z2)] to
mimick second-order quantification over arithmetical predicates. Thus it fulfils the
quantificational function of the truth predicate. Further, we have seen that the
nontransitive approach fulfils the substitutional functions. By unrestricted T1 and
T2, φ is derivable whenever Tpφq is and the theory is able to non-trivially deal
with substitution rules T1† and T2† for the truth predicate.
This already puts our approach in a very favourable position compared to
other theories of truth: First, concentrating on only either the substitutional or the
quantificational role, NTT[UTB(Z2)] already fares much better than other theories
of truth. This is especially clear with respect to the quantificational role. We
do not know of any non-classical theories of truth which are able to mimick ‘as
much’ second-order quantification as NTT[UTB(Z2)] is able to do. In fact, non-
classical theories of truth are often much weaker from a proof-theoretic perspective
than their classical cousins. The classical axiomatisation of the Kripke fixed-point
construction KF proves transfinite induction for the language of truth up to Γ0,
whereas the non-classical axiomatisation PKF only proves transfinite induction for
LT up to ωω (see Halbach and Horsten, 2006). So already considering just one of
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the functional roles shows that our nontransitive approach is superior compared to
other non-classical approaches.
Second, NTT[S] is superior to classical theories of truth because it is not only
able to fulfil the quantificational roles but also the substitutional roles at the same
time. Although at least some classical theories fulfil the quantificational roles,
their truth predicate does not allow for an unrestricted redundant use, let alone
full intersubstitutivity. This is because the classical approach, by maintaining all
classical rules, must by Tarski’s theorem put some restrictions on T1 and T2. Thus
the full redundant use and intersubstitutivity are lost. This is not the case with
NTT[S]: Here we have a truth predicate which plays both roles – the substitutional
and the quantificational one.
6.2 Theoretical Virtues
In the previous sections, we have explored what functional roles we should expect
a truth predicate to play in a formal theory of truth over PA and determined
that our nontransitive approach is able to fulfil this demand. However, when
discussing and comparing theories of truth, such functional roles often play a
subordinate role (we do not think this is the right approach, but that is a different
matter for now). Rather, many authors in the literature on truth theories focus on
theoretical virtues of such theories. This section gives a systematic overview over
such theoretical virtues as they have been discussed in the literature and argues
that our nontransitive approach fulfils many of them.
One might object from the outset against considering theoretical virtues in
assessing theories of truth as such virtues are rather applied in assessing theories in
natural science. After all, their subject matter and methodology are vastly different.
One might even go so far to say that the enterprise of a formal theory of truth
is a priori, whereas the one of natural sciences is a posteriori. So since the two
are so vastly different, one cannot transfer the methodology of the one to the
other. Drawing such a categorical wedge between formal theories (such as those of
truth) and empirical theories has a long tradition. However, this tradition has been
questioned quite extensively in the recent literature – for good reasons as we think.
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Defenders of the classical idea that there is a categorical difference between
formal theories and empirical theories take it that this difference has clear conse-
quences for the possibility of revising one’s theory. Where it is possible and often
necessary to change ones empirical theory in the light of new data, such a change
is in principle not possible for formal theories such as logic or mathematics. The
principles of such theories (and thus their consequences) are eternal and analytic,
they cannot be changed. One of the most prominent defenders of the alternative
view that even logic can in principle be changed is Quine.
Recently, such views have gained new interest, especially in the work of Hjortland
and Williamson (see e.g. Hjortland, 2017; Williamson, 2017, 2018). They argue
that empirical and formal theories are not radically different when it comes to
their methodology, motivation and possibility of revision. In all these cases, one
should follow an abductive methodology. This idea that there is nothing special
about formal theories such as logic is called anti-exceptionalism. In the following,
we assume a certain amount of anti-exceptionalism without arguing for it explicitly,
at least to a degree which allows us to apply abductive criteria such as theoretical
virtues to the theory choice when it comes to picking a formal theory of truth. In
the following two subsections we first explore theoretical virtues from the literature
on theories of truth and then virtues from the literature in the philosophy of science.
6.2.1 Virtues For Theories Of Truth
The current locus classicus of theoretical virtues in theories of truth is (Leitgeb,
2007). Leitgeb gives the following list of virtues:
1. Truth is a predicate applied to objects given by some syntax theory which is
part of the theory of truth.
2. Adding a theory of truth to some base theory (mathematical or empirical),
the resulting truth theory should prove the consistency of the base theory.
3. No type restrictions should apply to T.
4. Instances of the T-schema should be derivable for all sentences of the language.
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5. The truth predicate should adhere to compositional principles regarding the
connectives and quantifiers.
6. The theory of truth should have an ω-model.
7. The outer and inner logic should be the same.
8. The outer logic should be classical logic.
Before we comment on this list of virtues, a few explanations are necessary.
What exactly amounts to typing is up to some philosophical debate, but the term
is widely used in two senses in the literature on theories of truth. A truth predicate
can be typed syntactically if there are restrictions with respect to what counts as a
well formed formula in the formal language count as well-formed. For example, we
could define a sublanguage of LT in which the truth predicate can only be applied
to sentences themselves not including the truth predicate. In the case of axiomatic
theories of truth, one sometimes speaks of typed theories, if the T-schema (or
respective rules for T) are restricted in the same sense. The rules for T can only be
applied to formulae themselves not containing the truth predicate.
What lies behind the idea of the compositionality of truth is that the truth
of a complex sentence should be equivalent to the truth of its components. The
truth of a conjunction should hold iff all conjuncts are true and a universal formula
∀xφx should be true iff all instances of φx are. Compositionality can be expressed
differently in axiomatic theories of truth. A theory of truth might be able to
prove all instances of the schema T¬. pφq ↔ ¬Tpφq or it might be able to prove
the sentence ∀x(Sentx → (T¬. x → ¬Tx)) or contain this sentence as an axiom
as compositional theories of truth typically do. In NT, the compositionality is
expressed in terms of the compositional principles in the form of sequent rules.
The criterion regarding the ω-model really has two components: consistency and
ω-consistency. Consistency (assuming classical logic) is an immediate requirement,
since otherwise the theory would be trivial. Regarding ω-consistency, Leitgeb
argues that a theory of truth would otherwise rule out the intended interpretation
of symbols of the arithmetical base theory and mess up the original ontological
commitments:
6.2 Theoretical Virtues 89
A theory of truth should not exclude this standard interpretation, for
otherwise the theory could not be understood as speaking about the
very objects that it was designed to refer to. Put differently: a theory
of truth does not only have to be consistent (of course it has to be!), it
also should not mess up its intended ontological commitments. (Leitgeb,
2007: p.281).
90 6. Assessing Theories Of Truth
The distinction between inner and outer logic has to do with the scope of
the truth predicate. The idea is to distinguish which logical principles apply to
sentences φ and Tpφq. In the case of φ (assuming it is not of the form Ts) we
speak of the outer and in the case of φ under the scope of the truth predicate we
speak of the inner logic. As Leitgeb points out, there are theories of truth, which
prove all instances of φ ∨ ¬φ but also prove ¬T (λ ∨ ¬λ), i.e. that exluded middle
for the Liar sentence λ is not true. (Horsten and Halbach, 2015) point out that this
criterion can be reduced to the demand that all instances of the T-schema should
be provable and that the outer logic should be classical.
Before we assess our nontransitive theory of truth with respect to these virtues,
we extend the list by some further considerations and try to give a systematic
account of all relevant virtues. (Sheard, 2013) gives another list of desiderata for a
theory of truth:
1. Truth is an objective concept, which applies independently of such things as
desires or thoughts.
2. Provability preserves truth, i.e. the inference from ` φ to ` Tpφq is available
unrestrictedly.
3. Constructions to determine the extension of T should be simple, choices of
axioms should follow some principle and not be ad hoc.
4. It is fine for different theories of truth to serve different purposes.
5. A theory of truth should be closed under infinitary closure, i.e. ∀x(Tpφx.q→
Tpφxq).
Some desiderata turn out to be special cases of items on Leitgeb’s list, others
expand it. The first two and the last desiderata are special cases of things we have
already discussed above: That truth is an objective concept is guaranteed by our
setup as a formal theory of truth with a suitable arithmetical base theory. The rule
of Necessitation, to go from ` φ to ` Tpφq, follows from an unrestricted T-schema
and the infinitary closure is part of the compositionality criterion mentioned before.
Desiderata three and four about simplicity, non-adhocness and the fact that different
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theories can serve different purposes are not included in the virtues discussed so far.
We will discuss them in detail in the next section on virtues from natural science.
The last paper we will consider on desiderata for theories of truth is (Horsten
and Halbach, 2015). As is usual in these kinds of reflections on desiderata for
theories of truth, the authors begin by pointing out that they do not expect there
to be a list of desiderata which gives a final verdict over which theory of truth is the
best or the fully correct one. Rather, there is a certain kind of pluralism in the air,
suggesting that different authors and different theories may be seen as focussing on
different aspects of truth. Horsten and Halbach point out the following desiderata
of theories of truth on which they would like to focus. The first desiderata of
coherence is the most complex one, which comes in many different forms:
1. A theory of truth should be coherent.
• Compositional coherence: If truth behaves compositionally with respect
to conjunction, then it should also do so with respect to disjunction.
The reason for this being that there seems to be no reason why compo-
sitionality should hold for one but not the other, especially with respect
to the possibility of defining them in terms of each other and negation.
• Base coherence: The truth theory should not contradict the base theory.
Adding a truth predicate and principles governing it to e.g. an arithme-
tical theory should not allow us to derive statements, which contradict
what can be proven in that arithmetical base theory.
• Soundness coherence: Even though truth theories may be too strong
to prove their own soundness, it should be possible to consistently add
a soundness claim to the theory. For example, adding the reflection
principle ∀x(Prov(x) → Tx) to a theory of truth should be possible
without leading to inconsistency.
• Language coherence: Adding a truth predicate to the language of the
base theory, all principles and axiom schemes should be extended by
the truth predicate. In the case of PA this amounts to the fact that the
Induction scheme be extended to formulae including the truth predicate.
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• Internal coherence: The theory should not only be non-trivial but also
not internally trivial. This is to say that there should be some formulae
φ ∈ LT , s.t. Tpφq is not derivable.
The next two desiderata which they list are disquotation and compositionality
for T. However, these can be subsumed under what we have already discussed
above with respect to Leitgeb’s list. They do go at greater length to discuss
different forms of disquotation (transparency, biconditionals, uniform biconditionals,
intersubstitutivity) but we do not need to formulate this in a new desiderata.
However, the last two desiderata in their discussion are new with respect to what
we have seen so far.
2. Preservation of ordinary reasoning
This desideratum has two dimensions. The first we have already seen above is
concerned with the extension of well-known principles to the added truth predicate
of the language. This has to do with preserving a kind of ordinary reasoning of the
mathematician as they argue that “[o]rdinary reasoning should be taken to include
schematic mathematical or syntactic reasoning. So, for instance, in mathematics we
are used to subjecting every predicate to mathematical induction. This means that
axiomatic truth theories where the truth predicate is not allowed in the induction
schema, do not receive a maximal score on this desideratum.“ (Horsten and Halbach,
2015: p.272).
The other dimension does not have to do with mathematical principles but
rather with logical ones. In particular, it is a critique of non-classical approaches
motivated by the often-cited remark by Feferman that “[...] nothing like sustained
ordinary reasoning can be carried on [...]“ (Feferman, 1984: p.95) in non-classical
logics (Feferman is in particular talking about partial logics). The requirement here
is that the logic underlying the theory of truth should be, at least in principle,
applicable informally. Of course we can prove many (meta-)theorems about all
kinds of non-classical logics, but it is a different thing to use it proving theorems in
some theory informally as is common in mathematics:
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Our ordinary and mathematical reasoning is carried out in classical logic.
Reasoning in intuitionistic logic does not come as natural to most of us,
but it can be learned without too much difficulty. Reasoning in partial
or in paraconsistent logic is a lot less natural still: it is very difficult to
learn. Reasoning fluently in even more artificial logic, such as a logic
in which certain structural rules are restricted (such as contraction,
perhaps), might well be practically impossible. (Horsten and Halbach,
2015: p.272)
This idea of applicability of a logic in formal proofs (or being able to learn to
do so) should of course be extended to principles and axioms governing the truth
predicate as the authors argue themselves. Too many such axioms, ones which are
syntactically too complex or complex with respect to the conditions under which
they can be applied imply that the theory does not fulfil this desideratum. Their
last desideratum has to do with the philosophical background story of a formal
theory of truth:
3. A formal theory of truth ought to capture a philosophical story about which
principles are to be restricted and how
Here the idea is that the axioms of the logical system and the axioms for truth
should not only be easily learnable for informal reasoning, but they should also be
motivated. Such motivation is typically achieved by arguing that the chosen axioms
capture or reflect a certain philosophical picture or story. A straightforward example
of this are attempts to capture Kripke’s fixed point construction from (Kripke, 1975)
axiomatically. The philosophical story behind the model-theoretic construction is
that it reflects the way a speaker learns about the meaning of the truth-predicate.
We start with some ordinary language not containing T. Further, we learn that
the truth predicate is applicable to any atomic sentence of the language we have
spoken so far. Finally, truth of complex sentences is determined compositionally.
The semantic clauses of Kripke’s construction can then be turned into axioms.
Thus one may argue that the choice of axioms is motivated by the philosophical
story of how a competent speaker learns about the meaning of the truth predicate
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and how to use it correctly. In general, what the desideratum tells us is that we
should have some argument ready in order to defend the choice of axioms and
argue for this particular choice over other potential options.
Having gone through and explained various desiderata discussed in the literature,
we now want to bring all of them together in a more systematic way. In the following,
we offer a way of grouping the desiderata together into three different categories:
desiderata regarding the truth predicate, the underlying logic and consistency.
1. Desiderata regarding T
1.1. Syntactic desiderata
1.1.1. T is a predicate of objects referring to sentences, the theory of truth
includes a syntax theory providing and governing these objects
1.1.2. There are no type restrictions applying to T
1.1.3. Principles and axioms of the base theory are fully extensible by T
1.2. Inferential desiderata
1.2.1. All instances of the (uniform) T-biconditionals should be derivable
1.2.2. The choice of axioms for T should reflect some philosophical story
or motivation
1.2.3. Truth should behave compositionally in a way which preserves
compositional coherence
1.2.4. T should be able to fulfil the substitutional roles
1.2.5. T should be able to fulfil the quantificational roles
1.2.6. The principles governing T should make it possible to prove the
consistency of the base theory
2. Desiderata regarding the underlying logic
2.1. The logic should be classical
2.2. The outer and inner logic should coincide
2.3. The logic(s) should be learnable and applicable informally
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2.4. If classical logic is restricted, it should not cripple the functional roles
of T
3. Desiderata regarding consistency
3.1. The truth theory should be non-trivial
3.2. The truth theory should be internally non-trivial, i.e. there is some φ
s.t. Tpφq is not provable
3.3. The truth theory should be consistent
3.4. The truth theory should be ω-consistent
3.5. The truth theory should not contradict the base theory
3.6. The truth theory should be consistent with the addition of reflection
principles
It is easy to see that some desiderata in the lists are redundant in the sense
that they are implied by other desiderata (but not vice versa). For example, a
consistent theory of truth is of course also non-trivial. Nevertheless, we prefer to
present the desiderata this way. For it may be the case that a theory of truth may
not fulfil some desiderata (in order to sustain others). In this case it would then be
important to see which of the desiderata implied by the one theory fails to fulfil can
still be maintained. So in the example above, if a theory fails to be consistent, we
would still like to check whether it is non-trivial and internally non-trivial although
these things are consequences of consistency. Further, some desiderata interact with
each other across the different groups from 1 to 3. For example, in the presence of
a fully classical conditional, the substitutional role of the truth predicate would
imply the derivability of all instances of the (uniform) T-biconditionals. Finally,
some desiderata are inapplicable to some approaches. If we desire a fully classical
theory of truth, the desiderata of not restricting the logic in a way that interferes
with the functional roles of T is irrelevant since it is fulfilled in every case.
Especially due to the last phenomenon of some desiderata not being relevant
for some approaches, we might wonder what a list of fully relevant and in principle
satisfiable list of desiderata looks like. As Tarski’s theorem tells us, the main
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issue with theories of truth is that the functional roles of T cannot be fulfilled
non-trivially while working with full classical logic. Assuming consistency, we can
only have one or the other: classical logic or the fulfilment of all functional roles of
the truth predicate. As a consequence, we device lists of desiderata for each of the
disjuncts:
Desiderata for classical approaches
1. Desiderata regarding T
1.1. Syntactic desiderata
1.2. Inferential desiderata
1.2.1. The choice of axioms for T should reflect some philosophical story
or motivation
1.2.2. Truth should behave compositionally in a way which preserves
compositional coherence
1.2.3. T should be able to fulfil the quantificational role
1.2.4. T should be able to fulfil the substitutional role as well as possible
1.2.5. The theory should prove a wide range of instance of the (uniform)
T-biconditionals
1.2.6. The principles governing T should make it possible to prove the
consistency of the base theory
2. Desiderata regarding the underlying logic
3. Desiderata regarding consistency
In the case of syntactic desiderata regarding T and the consistency desiderata,
we left out the individual desiderata as they are unchanged compared to the
original list above. The main point of this list is that all the desiderata regarding
the underlying logic and consistency are enforced, whereas the inferential desiderata
regarding T are restricted. In the case of non-classical approaches, we make the
opposite move: we focus on the fulfilment of the inferential desiderata and pay the
price of giving up some of the items on the lists of logic and consistency.
Desiderata for fully functional approaches
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1. Desiderata regarding T
2. Desiderata regarding the underlying logic
2.1. The outer and inner logic should coincide
2.2. The logic(s) should be learnable and applicable informally
2.3. If classical logic is restricted, it should not cripple the functional roles
of T
3. Desiderata regarding consistency
3.1. The truth theory should be non-trivial
3.2. The truth theory should not contradict the base theory
3.3. The truth theory should be consistent with the addition of reflection
principles
In the desiderata regarding consistency, we can eliminate the requirement that
the theory be internally non-trivial since this immediately follows by the non-
triviality requirement and the fulfilment of the substitutional role of T. The two
lists above collect features which can and should be expected of our best classical
or non-classical theories of truth. We now go on to argue that our nontransitive,
fully functional approach fares very well with respect to the non-classical list above.
In fact, it fares much better than any non-classical alternative on the market.
Beginning with the desiderata regarding T, we can easily see that all desiderata –
both syntactic and inferential – are met. Syntactically, we have made no restrictions
at all, Induction is extended to the full language and there are no type restrictions.
Inferentially, the presence of unrestricted T1 and T2 rules guarantee that the
substitutional roles are fulfilled. Picking some suitable classical theory like UTB(Z2
as S, our nontransitive theory NTT[S] also fulfils the quantificational roles completely.
Since NTT[UTB(Z2)] proves the translation Γ
∗ ⇒ ∆∗ of any sequent Γ⇒ ∆ provable
in Z2, it emulates second-order quantification as well as possible.
Given the fully classical rules for →, we can also prove all instances of the
uniform T-schema by using T1 and T2. NTT[S] includes all compositional principles
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unrestrictedly and so there are also no compositional coherence issues. Regarding
the philosophical story behind the truth theoretic principles, we have chosen a
non-classical approach so we do not have to motivate any such restrictions. The
motivation with respect to truth is the naive one.
What about the desiderata concerning the underlying logic? Let us start with
whether or not the restriction of classical logic interferes in any bad way with the
truth principles, s.t. the truth predicate cannot fulfil any of its roles. We argue
that there is no such interference. The quantificational part is played mostly be the
classical theory embedded in our nontransitive approach, so the restriction of Cut
plays no role here. If we ‘step out’ of the classical theory S and into nontransitive
lands, we can still apply the truth theoretic principles unrestrictedly and that is
enough to ensure the fulfilment of the substitutional roles. Thus we argue that there
is no relevant drawback in the interaction between the truth theoretic principles
and the restrictions on classical logic in NTT[S].
Horsten and Halbach argued that restrictions on either the logic or the truth
theoretic principles should be applicable easily also in informal proofs. They paid
special attention to some substructural approaches, naming the noncontractive
one, and argued that such approaches would fare worst with respect to this
desideratum. The argument here seems to be that we seldomly (or probably never)
pay attention to number of times we have used an assumption or whether we have
used the multiplicative or additive formulation of an operational rule in an informal
mathematical proof. Thus it would be very hard (if not impossible) for the ordinary
practitioner to learn how to apply such a logic. To begin with, things are not so bad
for the nontransitive case as they are for the noncontractive one. Mathematicians
point out a lot of explicit uses of transitivity by constructing lemmata, which
are then combined to prove a theorem. The same holds in many cases for uses of
modus ponens (in the sense of the elimination rule for → discussed in the previous
chapter). So this already speaks in favour of the nontransitive approach.
Further, the restriction on Cut rarely comes to play and is easily learnable.
It rarely comes into play because the more complex, mathematical proofs of
reconstructing proofs of second-order theorems in our theory of truth happen
completely within the classical theory S. So we can do business as usual and
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need not worry about any problems with Cut. It is only when we wish to make
unrestricted use of the substitutional role of T that we must not apply Cut. But
first, it is not clear what more complex proofs there are in which we need Cut after
using instances of T1 and T2 not included in S. Second, even if we need to do so,
we can easily check whether the informal proof is sound with respect to NTT[S] by
looking at the order of applications of rules.
What about the relation between the inner and the outer logic in our nontran-
sitive approach? Here things are not so straightforward. With respect to classical
theories of truth, it is often demanded that the two coincide. Counterexamples
to this fact are often given by pointing out that e.g. the theory might derive all
instances of excluded middle, yet still proves that some of them are not true.
This is also the case with NTT[S]: it proves all instances of ⇒ φ ∨ ¬φ, but also
⇒ ¬T (pλ ∨ ¬λq). However, since we deal with an inconsistent (yet non-trivial),
non-classical approach, this should come as no surprise and we think that this
criterion is unfit to be applied to such non-classical approaches.
However, we still might want to make sense of the idea that (classical) logic
should apply across the board - regardless whether we talk about the inner or
outer logic. Understood this way, the desideratum is not fulfilled, since NTT[S]
is only classical as long as we stay within the boundaries of the classical theory
S. Thus classical logic is not applicable in all contexts. Nevertheless, we would
like to point out that NTT[S] dissatisfies this desideratum in an independently
motivated way and does so very elegantly. The independent motivation comes from
understanding that Cut is really a consistency assumption in disguise and that
such an assumption is not justified in NT unrestrictedly due to the paradoxes. Our
restriction on Cut directly mirrors the requirement of consistency by demanding
that both Cut-premises must be derived in a classical and thus consistent theory
of truth. Further, the inner and outer logics do coincide over a wide range of cases.
Even in NTT (without the embedding of a classical theory of truth), full PAT is
preserved so there is no distinction between the logics on the basis of the vocabulary
of formulae. Regardless of whether the formula is purely arithmetical or contains
the truth predicate – as long as the proof happens within PAT, classical logic can
be applied across the board. This feature is further strengthened by embedding
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classical theories S which then also add instances of T1 and T2, s.t. their conclusions
are governed by classical logic as well.
In this context we introduced the distinction between a theory being L-classical
or S-classical. It is L-classical iff it proves all sequents of formulae for the full
language (in our case LT ) provable in classical logic. S-classicality is obtained if
the theory proves all sequents provable in some other theory of truth closed under
classical logic. Where L-classicality is well motivated by the idea that logic is
language independent, no theory of truth can be fully S-classical with respect to the
naive theory of truth NT. Thus also classical theories of truth do not and cannot
meet this requirement. Our nontransitive approach is L-classical. There are no
restrictions of the rules with respect to language and all classically provable sequents
for the full language remain provable. Further, a strong sense of S-classicality can
be obtained by embedding a strong classical theory of truth S into our nontransitive
approach obtaining NTT[S]. So where full S-classicality cannot be obtained, our
nontransitive approach still preserves a strong, restricted version of this notion.
We argue that having an inner and outer logic, which do not coincide, is a
necessity of any nonclassical theory of truth meeting other basic requirements. With
a nonclassical approach, we have to have a nonclassical logic at play when it comes
to at least some formulae containing the truth predicate, for otherwise the theory
would be trivial. However, we also need full classical logic for at least all arithmetical
formulae, since we consider preserving classical PA as a necessity. So there needs to
be some distinction between logics when it comes to some T-formulae. Our main
point here is that NTT[S] suffers from this defect as well but (and this is a big
but) it does so in a motivated, elegant way, still surpassing all other non-classical
approaches known so far.
Finally, we come to the class of desiderata regarding consistency. The infamous
Liar derivation using the inversion principles
...
⇒ λ, Tpλq
T2⇒ Tpλq
...
λ, Tpλq⇒
T1
Tpλq⇒
Cut⇒
shows that if i) fully classical PAT is preserved, ii) T1 and T2 are unrestricted,
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then Tpλq⇒ and⇒ Tpλq are provable. Given the classical ¬R-rule (after applying
a T-rule), we can then derive Tpλq and ¬Tpλq. So given the desiderata i) and
ii), we have to accept some inconsistencies. Given minimal arithmetic, we can
then show that the theory is also ω-inconsistent. For this reason, our nontransitive
approach should only be judged with respect to the non-triviality criteria and
whether the theory contradicts the base theory or not.
We have established early on that NTT[S] is non-trivial (also internally due to
the transparency of the truth predicate) since the paradoxes rely on the assumption
that reasoning is transitive after T-inferences are made under which S cannot be
closed consistently. Further, we determined that NTT[S] is LPA-conservative over S.
So if S does not contradict the base-theory, NTT[S] does not do so either.
Last, NTT[S] can deal with reflection principles. Consider for example the global
reflection principle (see e.g. Kreisel and Lévy, 1968) saying that everything which
is provable in our theory is true: ∀x(Prov(x)→ Tx) where we take Prov to be a
standard provability predicate of the theory to which we add the reflection principle.
The reflection principle as an axiom tells us that if we can prove something in
our original theory, then we may infer that it is true. This is why such reflection
principles are often motivated by the conviction that if one endorses a theory, one
is committed to the truth of what it proves (see e.g. Feferman, 1991).
The NEC rule allow us to express this trust in our theory as well:
⇒ φ
NEC⇒ Tpφq
Upon a proof of φ (with no side formulae in the sequent), we may infer Tpφq.
However, NEC and global reflection are incomparable in some sense, since neither
of them is derivable in the current setting from the other. NEC is not derivable
from global reflection since we can apply the rule to theorems which we have proved
using NEC. This is not the case with the reflection principle, since it can only be
applied to things provable in the original theory, not generally to what is provable
in the theory extended by a reflection principle. On the other hand, NEC does
not prove the global reflection principle in its universally quantified form. It does,
however, prove all instances of the schema Prov(pφq) → Tpφq as can be easily
checked by using NEC, T2 and →R.
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Every instance of NTT[S] is inconsistent and ω-inconsistent. So the only additio-
nal harm a reflection principle could have is to render the theory trivial. However,
since the global reflection principle introduces a truth predicate, we should handle
it along the lines of T1 and T2. In particular, this means that Cut should be
non-applicable after making use of global reflection. Given this modification, it is
easy to see that every instance of NTT[S] + global reflection will be non-trivial as
well. So we conclude that NTT[S] can deal with reflection principles.
6.2.2 Virtues From Natural Science
So far we have discussed desirable features of formal theories of truth with respect
to the functional roles of the truth predicate as well as desiderata one might come
up with by reflecting on what a theory of truth should look like. Both of these
classes of considerations are specific to the truth predicate and are only discussed
within the literature on formal theories of truth. Another set of theoretical virtues
sometimes mentioned in the discussion of theories of truth are virtues such as
beauty, simplicity, depth etc. which can originally be found in the philosophy of
science. There they are used to discuss empirical theories from the natural sciences.
A problem in the literature on formal theories of truth is that these virtues
are hardly discussed systematically. Typically, only an open ended list is given
together with some vague remarks about which virtues are fulfilled by ones own
theory or which of them are not fulfilled by some rival theory; “Scientific theories
are compared with respect to how well they fit the evidence, of course, but also
with respect to virtues such as strength, simplicity, elegance, and unifying power“
(Williamson, 2017: p.334). In contrast to the literature on formal theories of truth,
the literature on scientific practice and theory change already has a long history
of discussing these matters. So it makes sense to have a look at what has been
done within this area of philosophy of science and see what can be transferred to
our subject matter. This chapter discusses the most systematic account of such
virtues given so far in (Keas, 2018), makes some adjustments, and argues that our
nontransitive approach fulfils many of these virtues.
(Williamson, 2017) is the only systematic attempt to discuss a range of theo-
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retical virtues when it comes to picking a classical or non-classical solution to
semantic paradoxes (including at least both truth-theoretic and vagueness related
paradoxes) we know of. Instead of just discussing Williamson’s paper, we choose a
different approach and start from a systematic account of theoretical virtues from
the literature on virtues in the natural sciences and see what can be used from that
for our purposes.
(Keas, 2018) gives a systematic overview over virtues typically discussed in
favour or against scientific theories. His virtues are grouped into four groups. Each
group contains various virtues, which are ranked or ordered by expansion. So each
succedent virtue, in some way, contains and expands or generalises the precedent
virtue. We first give Keas’ list including some explanation of virtues which might
not be self-explanatory, before we argue which virtues are relevant for a formal
theory of truth and which are fulfilled by our nontransitive approach.
1. Evidential virtues
1.1. Evidential accuracy: The theory fits the (empirical) evidence well.
1.2. Causal adequacy: The theory includes causal factors, which explain the
observed phenomena in question.
1.3. Explanatory depth: The theory is able to answer a wide range of coun-
terfactual questions, i.e. it is able to make correct predictions for a
preferably wide range of counterfactual scenarios.
2. Coherential virtues
2.1. Internal consistency: The theory is consistent.
2.2. Internal coherence: The theory is composed into an overall intuitively
plausible picture, this excludes e.g. ad-hoc hypotheses
2.3. Universal coherence: The theory fits well with other theories and findings
from other research fields (in particular, it does not contradict them)
3. Aesthetic virtues
3.1. Beauty: The theory “[...] evokes aesthetic pleasure in properly functioning
and sufficiently informed persons.“ (Keas, 2018: p.2762)
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3.2. Simplicity: Compared to theories explaining the same facts, the theory
does so with less theoretical content.
3.3. Unification: Compared to theories with the same amount of theoretical
content (or more), the theory explains more facts.
4. Diachronic virtues
4.1. Durability: The theory has survived a history of testing and predicting
the correct outcomes of new experiments or observations.
4.2. Fruitfulness: The theory generates new knowledge or insights by unifying
other theories or making novel predictions.
4.3. Applicability: The theory allows for applications in the real world, for
example by motivating and making possible new technologies.
Before we have a look at individual virtues, we can already see that some virtues
play no role for our case of formal theories of truth. Evidential accuracy is of course
not applicable if we understand it strictly in terms of empirical evidence. For it is
hard to see, what empirical observations would be relevant in judging a solution to
truth-theoretic paradoxes. One might lift the restriction to specifically empirical
data and argue that the phenomena which need to be accounted are the paradoxes.
Evidential accuracy then becomes the claim that a formal theory of truth ought to
give a solution to all truth-theoretic paradoxes. However, with this understanding,
the virtue collapses into a mere consistency or at least non-triviality desideratum
we already discussed in the previous sections.
Causal adequacy also does not appear to be particularly relevant simply because
there are no causal claims1 in formal theories of truth. We are dealing with abstract
concepts such as truth and abstract objects such as those of arithmetic. Again,
one might interpret this similarly to the previous virtue of empirical adequacy as
being able to account for all the different phenomena, i.e. the different paradoxes.
Again, this would mean that the virtue collapses into a consistency or non-triviality
1(Zardini, 2011) seems to invoke some causal role of sentences when explaining his notion of
instability. However, this does not seem to be fleshed out and it seems far from clear how to
make sense of such causal claims in the domain of self-referential sentences such as the Liar.
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desideratum. Another interpretation of the causal adequacy claim is that the theory
ought to give a plausible account of how the paradoxes could arise in the first place
and how the proposed solution connects to this explanation. This will of course
not be a causal relation but still an explanatory one. We find this to be the most
plausible and promising interpretation of this virtue. Nevertheless, it then appears
that we have already discussed it in the previous section as the desideratum that
the theory of truth should capture or be motivated by a certain philosophical
picture or idea about truth.
Explanatory depth is the idea that the theory in question should be able to
account for a wide range of phenomena – the wider the better. Understood as
applied to one particular subject matter such as truth-theoretic paradoxes, this
again collapses into the consistency or non-triviality desideratum. However, we
might also understand it more liberally in connection with the diachronic virtues
of fruitfulness and applicability. According to this understanding, a theory (or
rather the solution to the relevant paradoxes it is built on) should also provide a
solution to at least similar paradoxes in other areas. If we have provided a solution
to truth-theoretic paradoxes, we might wonder whether an analogous solution can
be given for paradoxes of vagueness, of set theory, class theory etc.
In the camp of coherential virtues, we can also relate some of the theoretical
virtues to desiderata we have already discussed. Consistency in the sense of the
unprovability of a contradiction is a contentious desideratum in assessing formal
theories of truth. For some theories are fine with accepting the provability of
instances of φ ∧ ¬φ. Other theories, dialetheist approaches, even go a step further
and embrace these consequences, allowing for true contradictions. Thus demanding
of a formal theory of truth to be consistent is too contentious and cannot be judged
to be a virtue of formal theories of truth (without further, independent argument).
Internal coherence appears to be strongly related to the desideratum about
non-ad-hocness regarding axiom choice discussed in (Horsten and Halbach, 2015).
Here we do not see any interesting differences or room for interpretation which
would make a separate discussion of this virtue necessary. Universal coherence
demands that theories should not stand in contradiction with data of other research
fields or consequences of their theories. This reminds of the desideratum that a
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formal theory of truth should not contradict its base theory. The claim is simply
widened to theories in different scientific areas as well (empirical or not).
The group of virtues standing out the most when comparing it with the list of
desiderata from the previous sections is surely the list of aesthetic virtues. Here
we cannot find desiderata to which these virtues could be reduced. Thus they give
arguably the most interesting list of virtues and will be discussed below in more
detail. When it comes to diachronic virtues, we have already argued that they are
in our case of paradoxes reducible to the virtue of explanatory depth in our present
context of formal theories of truth.
So the only virtues, which cannot be reduced to desiderata for theories of truth
we have already discussed are explanatory depth and the set of aesthetic virtues.
We now go on to argue that NTT[S] fares well with respect to these virtues. We
begin with the virtue of explanatory depth. With respect to formal theories of
concepts which can lead to paradox, we argued that the best interpretation is that
the solution to truth-theoretic paradoxes should be applicable in other domains as
well. The nontransitive approach by giving up or restricting the rule of Cut fulfils
this virtue very well.
Consider for example paradoxes in naive set theory. Naive set theoretic principles
leads to paradoxes such as Russell’s paradox by considering the Russell set, which
contains all sets that do not contain themselves. Similar to the Liar, we can
then deduce that the Russell-set does contain and does not contain itself. By an
application of Cut, we can then derive any formula whatsoever. Historically, this has
lead to dropping the naive comprehension principle stating that for every property
there is a set containing all and exactly those objects satisfying the property.
However, (Ripley, 2015a) has shown that by dropping Cut, one can sustain all naive
principles for reasoning about sets while remaining non-trivial. So the nontransitive
approach is applicable to set-theoretic paradoxes such as Russell’s paradox.
Another paradoxical area one might expect a solution to paradoxes to be
applicable in, is the domain of vague predicates. Such predicates give rise to the
Sorites paradox roughly as follows. Suppose that Tom is not bald as he has clearly
a sufficient amount of hair on his head in order to not count as bald. Further, it
clearly holds that for any person with n hair being bald, the same person with
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n+ 1 hair is bald as well. By instantiating the last principle and applying modus
ponens (or some other form of transitive reasoning), we can conclude that Tom
is indeed bald. For say that Tom currently has m hair on his head. Then by the
general principle above, we can reason that a person with m hair (however large
that number may be) is bald as well. Thus Tom is bald. But this contradicts our
original judgement and so we land ourselves in a paradox.
(Cobreros et al., 2012) have shown that there is a nontransitive solution to
these problems by giving a new semantic framework called strict-tolerant semantics,
which can be shown to be sound and complete with respect to a Cut-free formulation
of first order logic. So the nontransitive approach is able to deal with paradoxes of
vagueness as well. As in the case of the solutions to set-theoretic and truth-theoretic
paradoxes, this solution is defended and motivated by arguing that it preserves the
originally motivated naive principles, while still blocking the paradoxical conclusion
of triviality. Judging from the examples above, we conclude that the nontransitive
approach does indeed fulfil the virtue of explanatory depth.
Last, we will discuss whether and if so to what degree, our nontransitive
approach satisfies the aesthetic virtues. We begin with the aesthetic virtue of
beauty. Keas defines this virtue relative to subjects sufficiently informed about
the subject matter. The idea is that if such subjects come across the theory in
question or compare it with other theories, they are struck by a certain aesthetic
sensation of beauty. This is surely one of the hardest virtues to get a grip on and
it is even harder to determine whether a given theory fulfils it or not. In the case
of consistency or non-triviality we can give proofs which do not depend on the
judgement of an individual. In the case of beauty, nothing like this seems possible.
Nevertheless, we do like to claim that our nontransitive approach is beautiful
in certain respects and this beauty is best seen by considering how the approach
relates to the overall literature. We think that the beauty of our approach lies in the
fact of how little of a restriction has to be done in order to achieve a theory of truth,
which is able to have a truth predicate fulfilling both the substitutional and the
quantificational functions. The only thing we need to do is to drop Cut whenever
we move beyond the boundaries of the classical theory of truth we are currently
considering. Its beauty lies in the combination of both strength and simplicity.
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This connection to classical theories of truth is another sign of beauty: The
nontransitive approach is able to elegantly embed nice, powerful and well under-
stood theories and further improve upon them by adding a transparent (or even
substitutional) truth predicate which would not be possible in the classical theory
of truth alone. Beauty still lies in the eye of the beholder, so the informed reader
will have to judge for himself whether these traits make the nontransitive approach
beautiful – but we certainly think it does.
Moving on to the virtue of simplicity, we can argue from similar traits as in the
case of beauty. Again, we do not have a precise definition of sufficient and necessary
criteria for what it means for a theory to be simple. However, we do believe that by
looking at the way the nontransitive theory of truth is constructed, the informed
reader will recognize the theory as simple. Theories of truth are given by putting
restrictions on some of the principles of our naive theory NT. So whether or not a
theory of truth is simple should be judged in terms of whether these restrictions
can be regarded as simple. In the case of NTT[S], we only need to consider one
simple restriction: Blocking Cut whenever its premises are derived using instances
of rules not contained in S.
Deciding whether or not the premises of a possible application of Cut are derived
within S can sometimes become complex. For example, to construct UTB(Z2), we
need to define a translation function between the second-order language of arithmetic
L2 and the first order language of truth LT . We then need to check whether all
applications of T-rules in the derivations of the Cut-premises are applied to formulae
in the range of that translation function. Other theories of truth such as CT rely on
a range of compositional axioms for all logical constants of the language in order to
define what instances of the T-schema their theory admits. Both of these options
introduce some complexity compared to the naive theory, which simply includes
the T-schema (or all instances of the T-rules) for all formulae of the language and
unrestricted compositional principles. As NTT[S] is in part defined by the classical
theory S, this makes it more complex compared to both a nontransitive approach
which simply gives up Cut completely (or at least for formulae containing T) and
compared to at least some classical approaches.
However, we do not think that these comparisons of complexity are justified. As
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Keas already remarked above in his explanation of simplicity, we need to consider
theories, which explain the same facts. We interpret this as saying that we can only
compare theories of truth with respect to simplicity or complexity if truth predicate
can play the same functional roles in the compared theories of truth. We first need
to fix groups of theories which are equally powerful in some relevant respect before
considerations of simplicity can become relevant. For one of the easiest theories of
truth is to give up the T-rules completely or restrict them to arithmetical formulae.
But such a theory is far from being able to fulfil most of the desiderata we expect
of an ideal formal theory of truth.
But if we consider only theories of equal or at least similar strength when it
comes to the roles of the truth predicate, then NTT[S] has no match in the current
literature. For there seems to be no other theory of truth, which fulfils both the
quantificational role to the degree of proving all translations of provable sequents
of Z2 and having a transparent and intersubstitutable truth predicate. Thus there
are no theories with which one could compare our nontransitive approach with
respect to issues of simplicity or complexity to begin with. Further, we would like
to argue that starting from a classical theory of truth, the restriction of Cut is still
rather simple and the only restriction we need to impose. We do not require any
further or new theoretical terms, the restriction can be formulated purely in terms
of notions already available.
Our very last virtue to consider is that of unification. In contrast to simplicity,
unification demands that given the same complexity of theoretical content and
resources, the theory explains more phenomena. So in our case, we would have to
say that a theory with the same complexity of its restrictions fulfils more desiderata
of a formal theory of truth. Here we face the problem of finding other theories which
we can judge to have the same simplicity as NTT[S]. Good candidates appear to
be other non-classical theories of truth, which attempt to recover classical logic in
particular, safe contexts. For example, a typical claim of non-classical approaches
is that they can recover full classical logic, whenever we deal with only arithmetical
formulae. The non-classical logic is then only applied whenever we consider formulae
containing T. Such approaches seem to be comparable in terms of complexity with
NTT[S] since they too contain some classical subtheory (namely classical arithmetic)
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and restrict classical logic only when the truth predicate is in play.
The issue however is that these non-classical approaches, which are comparable
in terms of complexity, do not even come close to the power of NTT[S] in terms of
the functional roles the truth predicate can play here. We have noted many times
before that non-classical approaches are proof-theoretically much weaker than their
classical rivals and these classical approaches are in turn considerably weaker than
their embedding into NTT[S]. So there simply are no theories to compare with
NTT[S] with respect to unification – at least not in the way understood by Keas
demanding that the compared theories are matched in terms of what data they are
able to explain. NTT[UTB(Z2)] is unmatched with respect to the functional roles
the truth predicate can play.
We also believe that there is a slightly different, yet related sense of unification,
which is one of the most important virtues of our nontransitive approach. Above,
we have distinguished between the substitutional and the quantificational function
or role of the truth predicate. Historically, i.e. judging from the literature so far,
theories of truth are either (more or less) successful in fulfiling one of these roles but
not both at same time. Non-classical theories of truth are successful in maintaining
a truth predicate which fulfils the substitutional role (or at least are transparent)
since the truth-rules are unrestricted. Classical theories of truth are particularly
powerful with respect to the quantificational role, being able to relatively interpret
stronger subsystems of second-order arithmetic than any non-classical theory so
far. Crucially, there is no other theory of truth so far, which unifies both of these
roles of the truth predicate in one theory. This unification is achieved for the first
time by our theory NTT[UTB(Z2)].
Judging from the considerations and arguments above, we conclude that our
nontransitive approach of embedding a classical theory and closing it nontransi-
tively under transparent T-rules is rather successful. It is able to fulfil both the
substitutional and the quantificational roles of the truth predicate. It fulfils a wide
range of desiderata for theories of truth in particular, which have been discussed
in the literature. Last, we have also seen that there is at least some plausible
interpretation of theoretical virtues taken from the natural sciences, s.t. NTT[S]
satisfies these virtues and typically does so more successfully than its rivals.
Chapter 7
Objections And Replies
This section is concerned with objections, which have been put forward in the
literature (or could be put forward) against nontransitive theories of truth and how
these objections can be met. Some of them have already been published, others
have been presented to us by other researchers in some way, yet others we have
discovered ourselves. The objections concern various issues in connection with
a nontransitive theory (of truth). Some are concerned with the general issue of
revising classical logic in general, others see a problem in revising Cut in particular.
Others do not focus on the logical revision but on the properties of the theory such
as its ω-inconsistency or its claim of preserving classical logic in some important
sense. In the following, we have ordered these objections with respect to which
aspect of the theory they take to be problematic.
We thereby do not limit ourselves to issues having to do with nontransitive
theories of truth, but also consider objections against nontransitive theories of
naive validity. In order to discuss these objections, we first introduce such a theory.
Of course, the discussion of such objections involves no claim of completeness, the
literature on these issues is simply too broad in order to give a comprehensive
discussion of such issues. We discuss these objections using the following format:
Objections are quoted from representative papers or rephrased from memories of
personal correspondence as parts of a conversation and put in italics. The replies
are then given below.
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7.1 Objections Against Revising Classical Logic
7.1.1 Against Revising Classical Logic In General
Objection 1: “Once we assess logics abductively, it is obvious that classical logic
has a head start on its rivals, none of which can match its combination of simplicity
and strength. Its strength is particularly clear in propositional logic, since [classical,
propositional logic] is Post-complete, in the sense that the only consequence relation
properly extending the classical one is trivial (everything follows from anything).
First-order classical logic is not Post-complete, but is still significantly stronger
than its rivals, at least in the looser scientific sense, as well as being simpler than
they are; likewise for natural extensions of it to more expressive languages. In many
cases, it is unclear what abductive gains are supposed to compensate us for the loss
of strength involved in [restricting] classical logic.“ (Williamson, 2017: p.337f)
Reply: We split the objection into two parts. We first discuss the issues arising
from the Post-completeness of classical propositional logic and then then issues
having to do with classical predicate logic. The notion of strength of a logical theory
that Williamson has in mind here has two parts. First, a logical theory S is stronger
than some other logical theory S∗ iff all theorems of S∗ are also theorems of S but
not vice versa. He also argues that one should compare the consequence relations
of logics in terms of strength, where the consequence relation of S is stronger than
that of S∗ iff any sequent Γ⇒ ∆ provable in S∗ is also provable in S but not vice
versa. Classical, propositional logic is thus the strongest propositional logic possible,
in virtue of its Post-completeness.
The Post-completeness of classical, propositional logic is a fact, so there is no
room for discussion here. However, what remains a bit unclear is what exactly
follows from this with respect to the choice of a logic. Supposedly, what Williamson
has in mind here is to argue along the following lines: Strength is a virtue of logical
theories, so when confronted with a weaker or stronger logical theory (salva veritate)
one should pick the stronger one. Classical, propositional logic is Post-complete
and thus the strongest because it could only be extended into triviality. However,
the second premise of this argument is mistaken. Just because a logic cannot be
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(nontrivially) extended does not make it the strongest one. For it might just be
that the logic is incomparable with respect to other logics. In fact, as (Read, 2019)
points out, classical propositional logic is not the only Post-complete logic. For
example, Abelian logic is Post-complete as well. So it is hard to see how this fact
about classical, propositional logic would support its choice.
Let us now consider the issues having to do with classical, first order logic. As
Williamson remarks himself, this logic is not Post-complete but nevertheless he
argues that it turns out to be the strongest at least in what he calls the looser,
scientific sense. By this looser, scientific sense, Williamson means the following.
There are cases in which logics are incomparable with respect to the strength
criterion. He gives the example that adding propositional quantifiers to classical
logic lets one derive a quantified version of excluded middle ∀p(p ∨ ¬p). Adding
the same to intuitionistic logic lets one derive the negation of that generalisation
¬∀p(p∨¬p). Clearly, none of the two logics is a subtheory of the other (in terms of
theorems and in terms of their consequence relations). However, Williamson argues
that classical, quantificational propositional logic is to be regarded as stronger
compared to the intuitionistic version. This is due to the fact that a generalisation
is more informative than a negated universal sentence. For the former tells us that
all propositions adhere to some law, whereas the negated version only tells us that
there is some counterexample to the universal claim (although intuitionstic logic
cannot prove ¬(p ∨ ¬p) for any particular p since that would render it inconsistent
and thus trivial).
So what are we to make of this looser, scientific sense of strength and Wil-
liamson’s attribution of this virtue to classical logic? We find it hard to assess
this claim with respect to pure logic, which is why we will focus on Williamson’s
claim that this virtue also holds for classical logic when it is extended to more
expressive languages. As before, we will stick to the case of extending classical logic
(or classical arithmetic) to a theory of truth. But here we need to make another
distinction between extending classical logic (or rather classical arithmetic PA) to
PAT by extending the language by a truth predicate or by extending it to NT by
extending the language by a truth predicate and the set of rules by truth rules
(typically T1 and T2).
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Consider first the claim that classical logic is better at handling the extension
of the language by a truth predicate. Of course, if we just consider the extension of
the language, at least most non-classical logicians will be happy to accept classical
logic in this case for the theory is perfectly well consistent. It does prove the weak
and strong diagonal lemmata but no contradiction from such sentences, since it
lacks the necessary truth principles to do so. Things only get ugly when we consider
the extension to NT by truth principles. But even in NT, we can consider what
happens to PAT in the classical and in the non-classical approach. In the classical
approach, PAT is left untouched since the only restrictions which are made are
concerned with the truth theoretic principles which are not part of PAT. With most
non-classical approaches, however, this is not the case. Their change of classical
logic needs to lead into some restriction of PAT. This is because our Liar derivation
using the inversion principles tells us that we land in triviality already from the
inverted diagonal lemma of PAT together with T1 and T2 and Cut (which are
unrestricted on the nonclassical approach). However, our nontransitive approach
does not have this problem. We have already seen that all of PAT is preserved since
we only need to restrict Cut after making certain T-inferences.
Let us now consider the claim that classical logic is better at handling extensions
of principles, such as the truth theoretic principles. Using our distinction between
the substitutional and quantificational roles of the truth predicate, we argue as
follows. We agree with Williamson with respect to the scientific strength of classical
logic when it comes to the quantificational role of the truth predicate. At least
so far, investigations into theories of truth have shown classical theories to be
significantly stronger, i.e. more successful in capturing the quantificational role
of the truth predicate. In this sense we agree with Williamson and his claims of
strength for classical logic.
However, things look different when we consider the substitutional role of the
truth predicate. Here it is hard to see how a classical theory of truth could possibly
fulfil this role. For given classical PAT and a fully intersubstitutable truth predicate
(together with assuming transparency after making use of these rules) already
commits us to triviality. So we judge that classical logic is less apt for this role of
the truth predicate. It is here that we see the strength of non-classical approaches
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– or more particularly the strength of our nontransitive approach. So while it is
true that classical logic makes for a stronger theory when extended by certain
principles, this is not the case for all aspects of such extensions. Our nontransitive
approach gives us the best of both worlds while being a non-classical theory of
truth. It preserves the quantificational role of the truth predicate made possible
in classical theories and adds to it a fully transparent (or even intersubstitutable)
truth predicate.
Objection 2: “The case may indeed be strengthened by reference to the track record
of classical logic: it has been tested far more severely than any other logic in the
history of science, most notably in the history of mathematics, and has withstood
the tests remarkably well.“ (Williamson, 2017: p.338)
Reply: The idea behind this objection is clearly to argue that i) a historic track
record of successfully testing a theory counts in favour of that theory, and ii)
classical logic has the best track record. We do not see any issues with the first
claim although there is of course some work to be done to fully flesh out what
this testing amounts to, what relevant tests look like. Nevertheless, we can work
with some intuitive understanding, looking at established theories which are closed
under classical logic (rather than some nonclassical one). So instead of attacking
the first claim regarding the relevance of the historic track record of a logic, we
focus on the second claim about classical logic having the best track record.
Williamson gives the example of mathematical theories and certainly, classical
logic seems to be the most succesful, i.e. most widely applied, logic here. Although
there are some experiments of non-classical mathematics (including paraconsistent
and even noncontractive mathematics), they form a tiny minority. One might
strengthen this argument by pointing out that in mathematical crises such as the
search for a safe foundation of mathematics in the face of Russell’s paradox has lead
to the restriction of set-theoretic principles rather than to a revision of classical
logic. Nevertheless, one should be careful with such considerations. One might very
well object that it is precisely because non-classical mathematics is such a minority
that such arguments turn out to be rather weak. For if we had investigated more
non-classical foundations of mathematics, it might have turned out that there are
viable alternatives to classical logic and potentially even better ones in certain
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respects.
But here we do not want to push this point about necessary investigations into
non-classical mathematics any further. Rather, we follow a different line of replying
to this kind of objection regarding the track record of classical logic, which is similar
to the reply to the previous objection. Consider again the distinction between the
substitutional and the quantificational role of the truth predicate. We have seen
that classical logic is great at letting the truth predicate fulfil its quantificational
role but is rather bad at maintaining its substitutional role. Thus the track record
of classical logic is not great across all possible extensions or applications of a logic.
Sometimes it turns out that a non-classical approach is better at handling certain
applications.
One might object that although non-classical logics may be better suited for
single purposes, this is not the point of the original objection. The point was not
that classical logic is best at every single application or for extending it to any
possible theory. Rather, the argument was that comparing all logics, it has the best
track record of being applied. There may be some exceptions to such applications,
but classical logic is the one with the fewest exceptions. We have no problem with
such claims (although they would probably need some more detailed investigation
compared to what has been done so far by Williamson and in general), classical
logic is probably the single best logic we have. Our point is merely that in order
for some tools such as the truth predicate to fulfil their role completely, we need to
become a bit non-classical. This is what was achieved by introducing NTT[S].
Objection 3: “Let us return to the choice between restricting classical logic and
restricting disquotation. On second thoughts, one might doubt the apparent symmetry
between the options. For the constants of classical logic seem to express absolutely
fundamental structure. By contrast, the constants at issue in the disquotational
principle – the truth predicate, quotation marks – seem to express much less
fundamental matters, specific to the phenomenon of language. Thus the comparison
between classical logic and disquotation looks analogous to the contrast between
a successful theory in fundamental physics and a successful theory in one of the
special sciences, such as economics. Suppose that the economic theory is found to
be inconsistent with the fundamental physical theory. Faced with the choice as to
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which theory to restrict in order to preserve the other unrestricted, which would
you choose? “ (Williamson, 2017: p.339)
Reply: Given the above question, we would give the same answer as Williamson:
one should restrict the economic theory rather than the fundamental theory of
physics. In our nontransitive approach, we have made the choice of restricting Cut,
the principle of transitivity rather than the rules concerning the truth predicate.
One might then argue in the same vein as the economics vs. physics example: the
transitivity of consequence is more fundamental than the truth rules.
At first glance it looks like the analogy is clear. Just any aspect of the consequence
relation of classical logic will be regarded as more fundamental than the truth
rules. After all, the truth principles are specific to a particular predicate, whereas
the logical principles are independent of any specific vocabulary. One might try to
argue that transitivity is of course not given up completely in NTT[S]. Rather only
those applications are given up, which are not included in S as a theory already.
But then it is still not clear why one would regard these instances of transitivity as
less fundamental than the instances of the truth principles extending S. Instead, we
argue that the following two considerations undermine the relevance of fundamental
vs. less fundamental principles.
First, we have given independent motivation to give up particular instances of
Cut. This motivation is twofold. Following Ripley, we argued that understanding
that Cut is an extensibility criterion on assertion and denial, we see that it is not
clear why it should hold for all extensions of classical logic (or classical arithmetic)
by further rules. It might very well be the case that it is not safe for every coherent
position to be extended by either the assertion or the denial of φ. Second, we argued
that Cut is really a rule assuming consistency in disguise. Given a theory such
as NT with paradoxes, such an assumption is no longer justified and thus needs
to be restricted to a suitable context. Such independent motivations undermine
the argument from fundamentality in the absence of similarly strong reasons to
abandon the instances of the truth rules missing from a given classical theory of
truth.
Second, the fundamentality argument is undermined by considerations about
the functional role that the truth predicate can play in a classical or a non-
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classical theory. When comparing restrictions with respect to which involves more
fundamental principles, we ought to compare theories with the same or at least
similar strength. Otherwise we would get a clash with the virtue of strength.
Consider the case of two physical theories, which differ greatly in strength and
explanatory power, such as Newton’s theory of gravitation and General Relativity.
Suppose we find a contradiction which is relevant to both theories. However, in
order to get rid of the contradiction, we would have to restrict more fundamental
principles in the case of restricting General Relativity compared to the case of
restricting Newton’s theory. Surely, we should go for the revision of General
Relativity despite the difference in fundamentality of the principles which are
to be revised. We take this to be explained by the fact that General Relativity
turned out to be much more successful in terms of applications (such as GPS) and
explaining empirical data. However, the case looks different if we compare General
Relativity and some rival theory which is (at least roughly) equally good in terms
of applications and explanations but where the rival theory needs to be restricted
in a less fundamental respect. Thus when comparing restrictions in terms of how
fundamental the restricted principles are, we should only compare theories which
are similar in terms of strength, explanatory power and possibly other virtues.
Our point is now to argue that there is such a difference between classical theories
of truth and our nontransitive approach, s.t. a comparison of the restrictions in terms
of fundamentality is not apt. As we have argued in replies to other objections and
in previous chapters, there is a significant difference with respect to what functional
roles the truth predicate can fulfil in a classical or a non-classical theory of truth.
Again, where NTT[S] is able to let the truth predicate fulfil both its quantificational
and substitutional role, this cannot be achieved by a fully classical theory of truth.
Given this discrepancy in strength, we argue that the fundamentality criterion
should not be applied to compare NTT[S] with purely classical theories, since the
former is significantly stronger.
Objection 4: “[Our abductive methodology] recommends us not to compare two
logics only in isolation, but also to compare the results of combining each of them
with well-confirmed results from outside logic, such as principles of natural science.
But now a crucial asymmetry becomes visible. For any complex scientific theory,
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especially one that involves some mathematics, will make heavy use of negation,
conjunction, disjunction, the quantifiers, and identity. Thus, restricting classical
logic will tend to impose widespread restrictions on its explanatory power, by blocking
the derivation of its classical consequences in particular applications.“ (Williamson,
2017: p.340)
Reply: We have not covered the possibility to apply our theory of truth NTT[S] in
the natural sciences but this is not special to our theory, since (as far as we know)
this has not been done for any theory of truth whatsoever. However, we agree with
the general idea of the objection, pointing out that we should compare classical
and non-classical logics when applied to specific domains. In our context of formal
theories of truth, it seems best to compare them when applied to mathematical
theories, such as arithmetic as we have already done from the start.
But comparing classical arithmetic to the arithmetic contained in NTT[S], we
see that there are no restrictions whatsoever with respect to the use of negation,
conjunction, disjunction etc. We have seen that any proof – including proofs of
pure first-order PA and of emulated Z2 – of any classical theory of truth S can also
be given in the exact same way in our nontransitive theory NTT[S]. We only need
to invoke a non-classical logic when we make use of instances of truth-rules, which
are not contained in S.
But this amounts to no restriction which could become relevant in the compari-
son with a classical theory as the following dilemma shows. Given some proof t, the
classical rival theory S either contains t or it does not. If it contains t, then so does
our nontransitive theory NTT[S]. If it does not contain t, then the classical logician
has no grounds to claim that the non-classical logician is missing something.
Objection 5: “That would invalidate a vast array of arguments in mathematics
and the rest of science. The dialetheist may respond by permitting instances of
disjunctive syllogism in nonparadoxical cases, whichever they are. But, just as before,
that still involves a heavy abductive cost across a vast range of ordinary science, by
remodeling ordinary scientific explanations in ways that introduce numerous ad hoc
elements. The piecemeal reintroduction of instances of missing classical principles
involves heavy abductive costs through loss of simplicity and elegance.“ (Williamson,
2017: p.342)
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Reply: What Williamson attacks here are typical recovery strategies of non-
classical logics to regain some instances of classical rules (and thus theorems). In
non-classical theories of truth e.g. it is common to argue that classical logic may
be given up, but it still holds for the theory of the base language. So we can use all
classical rules on φ ∈ LPA but have to use the non-classical logic on φ ∈ LT \ LPA.
This restriction is a syntactic one because it is only concerned with the syntactic
form of the premises of a possible inference. At least most (if not all) recovery
strategies for classical logic in a non-classical framework work syntactically.
Williamson’s critique is now to argue that such an approach has abductive
costs, because it is ad hoc in character. Where classical logic simply contains all
instances of all classical rules and thus expresses a maximum of generality, the
non-classical logician cannot give a general account. Rather, she needs to give up
classical logic in order to get around the paradoxes and then reconstruct classical
logic for particular cases. Adding instances of classical rules has an ad hoc character,
at least when compared to the general account of classical logic.
We have two responses to this kind of objection. First, while it is true that a
classical theory of truth is able to maintain the full generality of classical rules,
it cannot maintain the truth rules in its full generality. The typical non-classical
theory, which Williamson argues against, may not be able to have the classical rules
in its full generality but it can still hold on to the truth rules in their full generality.
If the non-classical theory needs to reconstruct classical logic, then the classical
theory needs to reconstruct the truth rules. So the argument may very well backfire
on the proponent of the classical theory, since it involves ad hoc reconstruction
as well. One may object by invoking a notion of fundamentality as in an earlier
objection, arguing that such reconstruction is less severe in the truth rule case than
it is in the logic case. However, we have already argued above that one needs to be
careful when invoking such fundamentality notions in order to argue for abductive
gains of one theory over another.
Our second response is concerned with our nontransitive theory NTT[S] in
particular and comes in two parts: First, our restriction of Cut by demanding
that both Cut-premises be derive in some classical theory of truth has nothing
unsystematic or ad hoc it. Where the typical non-classical logician may need to
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admit new instances of classical rules when they are needed, we have given a general
recipe of obtaining our nontransitive theory NTT[S] as soon as we are presented
with a classical theory S. Simply take S, add all missing instances of truth rules
and restrict Cut whenever at least one premise was not derived using the original
rules in S. Second, one need not interpret our nontransitive theory as a way of
recapturing classical logic or a classical theory. Similar to what we remarked in the
first response to the overall objection, it is perfectly fine to see the nontransitive
approach as a way of recapturing the instances of the truth rules missing from
S – rather than recapturing instances of Cut for a fully nontransitive theory of
truth. Such an interpretation would render NTT[S] a classical approach to truth
and move it outside the scope of Williamson’s objection.
We believe that the above reply also serves as a reply to a similar objection
with respect to the alleged lack of systematicity of non-classical approaches:
Consider any other theorem-schema of classical mathematics, formulated
with predicate variables like F. Does the non-classical logician simply
look at it, and make an educated guess at the minimal mutilation of it
to escape counterexamples with vague or semantic predicates in place
of the variables? Such an unsystematic, conjectural approach would fall
far short of the standards of contemporary mathematics, which provides
an enormous accumulating body of theorems ultimately derived from a
very small group of first principles [...].“ (Williamson, 2018: p.415)
7.1.2 Against Revising Transitivity
Objection 6: “In general, substructural logics are ill-suited to acting as background
logics for science.“ (Williamson, 2018: p.413)
Reply: This objection needs some clarification. The starting point of Williamson’s
dismissive remark is that logic underlying for example a scientific theory should be
able to play the role of a closure operator. He identifies three rather uncontroversial
features such a closure operator Cn should have (see (Williamson, 2018: p.413)):
1. If Γ ⊆ ∆ then Cn(Γ) ⊆ Cn(∆)
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2. Γ ⊆ Cn(Γ)
3. Cn(Cn(Γ)) ⊆ Cn(Γ)
The desiderata of a closure operator together entail all typical properties of the
classical consequence relation, including transitivity and contraction (assuming that
Γ,∆ are sets and not multisets). So the desiderata of the closure operator rules out
a substructural (at least nontransitive or noncontractive) consequence relation and
so any nontransitive or noncontractive logic. Further, Williamson argues that such
a closure operator is important for scientific theories because they are assessed by
looking at their consequences (which are elements of the result of applying a closure
operator to the theory). But if our logic is substructural, we would have to give
up at least one of the desiderata above for a closure operator. Thus, Williamson
argues, substructural logics are not apt for backgrounds logics of science.
Our reply to such an objection is reminiscent of the replies above to previous
objections: Given some (consistent) classical theory of truth S, we can give a
nontransitive theory NTT[S] which has the same consequences and the same
consequence relation as S as long as we stay within the boundaries of S. It is only
when we apply rules, which are not included in S that we need to invoke a different
consequence relation. But then we are outside the scope of what any purely classical
theory can do. So the comparison of the consequence relations with respect to the
above desiderata is not in favour of classical logic. NTT[S] and its consequence
relation still fulfil the desiderata as long as we work within S. If we go beyond S
by applying new instances of the truth rules, the comparison of the consequence
relation makes no sense because the classical theory does not and often cannot
include these inferences.
Objection 7: “Imagine someone who says ‘I accept that special relativity entails
that nothing travels faster than the speed of light, and I accept that special relativity
plus the claim that nothing travels faster than the speed of light entail neutrinos do
not travel faster than the speed of light, but I do not accept that special relativity
entails that neutrinos do not travel faster than the speed of light.’ I think that this
sort of claim would strike the audience as baffling. Thus, I do not see that denying
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transitivity is any better than denying modus ponens or conditional proof. That is,
this structural rule is constitutive of the derivability operator.“ (Scharp, 2013: p.80)
Reply: The argument aims to establish that transitivity is a constitutive feature of
the consequence relation (or what Scharp calls the derivability operator). It is not
just a desiderata but if we were to drop this feature, the result would be ‘baffling’ –
which we interpret as ‘it does not make sense to accept the two consequence claims
but reject the conclusion’ or ‘dropping transitivity makes it hard to even grasp
what the speaker is talking about’. We first consider the objection with the kind of
example Scharp gives in the quote above and then a possibly more pressing kind of
example involving truth theoretic paradoxes.
The quote uses an example regarding positions about the theory of special
relativity SR – so a rather well-understood physical theory which we (as typically
anyone else) will assume to be consistent. Dropping Cut would then make it possible
to assert two claims about SR of the form φ⇒ ψ and ψ ⇒ ε but reject the position
φ⇒ ε. This would indeed be baffling since we expect at least physical theories to
be closed under Cut and we use such transitive reasoning all the time, especially
when researching or explaining such theories. Note first that dropping Cut as a
rule does not necessarily entail that one is no longer committed to accept φ⇒ ε. It
might very well be that a cut-elimination theorem for SR (or sufficiently strong
subtheories thereof) hold s.t. even without Cut there is a proof of φ⇒ ε.
Further (and more importantly), our nontransitive approach would not give up
such instances of Cut. Assuming that SR is consistent, there is no reason under
our approach to put a restriction on Cut or any other classical feature of the
consequence relation. The theory simply counts as an instance in which classical
logic was shown to be successfully applicable. So to summarise, our nontransitive
approach would make no such restriction on transitivity as in the quoted example
necessary.
One may object that our kind of reply only works if the example is taken from
a consistent theory. However, the same bafflement and incredulous stare may occur
if we deny transitivity for cases in inconsistent theories. For example, it will be
hard to understand what a speaker commits himself to if he accepts the position
that ‘the Liar is true’ and that ’If the Liar is true, then 0 = 1’ while not being
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committed to the position that ‘0 = 1’. Of course, such instances of Cut cannot be
maintained even in NTT[S] on pain of triviality. So such examples still show that a
nontransitive account would have to give up on at least some instances of crucial
properties of the consequence relation.
However, we would like to argue that the instances of Cut which are missing
from NTT[S] should not raise any bafflement about the commitments of the non-
transitivist. This is because the lack of these instances in our nontransitive approach
is independently motivated by the proper understanding of Cut. As we have shown
in earlier chapters, Cut plays the role of an extensibility constraint on assertion
and denial. As such, it commits one to the idea that any coherent position can
be coherently extended by either the assertion or the denial of any formula φ. In
certain contexts such as PA, this commitment does not raise any issues. However, in
other contexts such as a theory of naive truth NT, we should expect the extensibility
criterion to fail for there are ill-behaved sentences such as the Liar. In such cases
we should neither assert nor deny the sentence in question. So since the missing
instances of Cut are independently motivated, they should not be reason for any
bafflement.
Objection 8: Blocking paradoxes by rejecting Cut brings with it the rejection
of modus ponens as a meta-rule. For if modus ponens would still hold, we could
derive any φ whatsoever from the premises ⇒ Tpκq and ⇒ Tpκq→ φ, which are
derivable in the nontransitive approach. Since this inferential move is invalidated,
on the typical understanding of logical consequence we are thus asked to accept both
premises as true but the conclusion φ as false. But this would in effect mean that
the conditional has a true antecedent and an untrue consequent, which breaks with
the common understanding of the conditional (see Zardini, 2013: p.579).
Reply: In our objection we follow the response of (Fjellstad, 2016a). In order to
understand what is going on in this objection, we need to carefully distinguish
between the following two things, which can both be labelled ‘modus ponens’:
MP
φ, φ→ ψ ⇒ ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Γ⇒ ∆, φ→ ψ
MMP
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Where MP stands for modus ponens and MMP for meta modus ponens. The
first is a theorem of a sequent calculus, for example of classical logic which derives
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all instances of it for a given language. All instances of MP are derivable in NTT,
so there is no problem here for the nontransitive approach.
The second one, MMP, is not a theorem but a rule. We have seen that there is
a close connection between MMP and Cut. In fact, if the right-hand side of the
second Cut-premise is non empty, then MMP makes Cut admissible. Given the
Cut premises Γ ⇒ ∆, φ and φ,Γ ⇒ ∆, we simply introduce a conditional in the
second premise on φ and some element ψ ∈ ∆ and then eliminate the conditional
via MMP, giving us the conclusion of an application of Cut. So for example due to
the Curry paradox, NTT[S] cannot have all instances of MMP.
What is problematic about the failure of MMP? Following the interpretation
of (Fjellstad, 2016a), Zardini has two objections in mind: an inferential and a
semantic one. The inferential objection is that there is an incoherence in a logic
which accepts MP but not MMP for the two express the same logical idea. To this
we reply that the failure of MMP should come as no surprise when investigating
a nontransitive logic. For we have already seen that MMP makes Cut admissible
given that the right side of the second premise is non empty. So pointing out the
failure of MMP is like pointing out the failure of some instances of Cut, which is
a trivial observation in a nontransitive logic which is able to deal with the Curry
paradox.
The semantic problem Zardini sees in the failure of MMP is that this fact
contradicts the meaning of the material conditional. Ordinarily, we would think
that if a conditional and its antecedent are true, then so is its consequent. But, so
Zardini argues, this cannot be the case in the nontransitive approach since we can
prove for a Curry sentence κ the sequents ⇒ Tpκq and ⇒ Tpκq → ψ for any ψ.
The reply to this semantic objection is very similar to the inferential one. The truth
conditions behind the objection are those of the conditional in classical semantics.
But of course classical semantics is transitive, so it has to go. For the truth conditions
of the conditional already invoke a form of transitivity which is sufficient to bring
back paradox. So the failure of these truth conditions simply amount to the intended
failure of transitivity. Further, there is an alternative semantics (typically called
strict-tolerant) (see Cobreros et al., 2012) which captures the nontransitive account
semantically. So the conditional of the nontransitive approach is well-understood
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and its non-classicality is motivated since the classical truth conditions for the
conditional are transitive.
Objection 9: Applications of Cut can be shown to correspond to derivations
in non-normal form in natural deduction. However, the analysis of Tennant of
paradoxes in terms of non-normalizable derivations (so where Cut cannot be elimi-
nated) fails. For we can already construct derivations of absurdity in propositional
logic (given additional premises) in a way that the derivation is non-normalisable
(involves ineliminable applications of Cut). But surely there are no paradoxes in
pure propositional logic (see Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini, 2017).
Reply: Here we reconstruct the original derivation, which is given in a system of
natural deduction, for a sequent calculus system in the straightforward way. In
the case of natural deduction, two premises φ → ¬φ and ¬φ → φ are added. In
natural deduction, these conditionals can then be used by a standard elimination
rule concluding the consequent with the antecedent as a further premise. Since NT
does not include an elimination rule for the conditional, we add the initial sequents
φ ⇒ ¬φ and ¬φ ⇒ φ instead, which can then be used via Cut to infer φ from
¬φ and vice versa. The derivation of the empty sequent (absurdity ⊥ in natural
deduction) then looks as follows:
φ⇒ φ
¬R⇒ φ,¬φ ¬φ⇒ φ
Cut⇒ φ
φ⇒ ¬φ
φ⇒ φ
¬L¬φ, φ⇒
Cut
φ⇒
Cut⇒
Of course, this derivation would not be possible in pure propositional logic
without the addition of the new initial sequents φ ⇒ ¬φ and ¬φ ⇒ φ together
with the use of Cut. In natural deduction, this derivation is not normalisable, in
sequent calculus the applications of Cut are not eliminable. Schroeder-Heister and
Tranchini take this to be a counterexample to the analysis of paradoxicality in
terms of non-normalisability (ineliminable applications of Cut) of Tennant, which
we discussed in earlier chapters. Tennant in (Tennant, 1982, 1995, 2016) argued
that paradoxes are exactly those derivations, which cannot be normalised. Yet the
derivation above should not count as a paradox. Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini
argue that the derivation above “[...] would thus show that loops are not a feature
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of the extralogical part, but of the logical part of paradoxical derivations. The
looping feature would not depend on the possibility to move, for a certain λ, from
λ to ¬λ and vice versa, but that we can move, for any formula φ, from φ ↔ ¬φ
to absurdity.“ (Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini, 2017: p.571, notation slightly
changed)
By the logical part of a derivation they simply mean any applications of rules
of classical or intuitionistic predicate logic. The extralogical part is then any rule
added to the logic in order to reconstruct paradoxes. Instead of adding a powerful
background theory able to play the role of a syntax theory, they add paradoxes
via piecemeal rules. So for the Liar sentence, one adds a rule which allows to
infer λ from ¬λ and vice versa. The authors argue that the transition from φ
to ¬φ and vice versa is still part of the logical part of the system because it is
not concerned with any particular sentence. But then the example above would
show that there are paradoxes in what the authors regard as the purely logical
part. So the analysis of paradoxes in terms of non-normalisability or ineliminable
Cuts fails. This argument has sparked some discussion about which reduction rules
(in natural deduction) should be accepted in order to correctly classify paradoxes
(see (Tennant, 2016; Schroeder-Heister and Tranchini, 2018)) but we will not be
concerned with these discussions here as our response to the supposed problem
goes in a different direction.
We argue that there are three things wrong with this objection. First, the
reconstruction of paradoxes in terms of extra-logical rules is a toy example but
mistaken in giving a general account of paradoxes. When investigating theories of
predicates which are prone to paradoxes, one should work with a theory which is
strong enough to express some notion of self reference and which thereby generates
paradoxical sentences. Working with the theory PAT for example shows that the
Liar equivalences λ↔ ¬Tpλq or l = p¬T lq are theorems of classical arithmetic. So
basic arithmetical principles – closed under classical logic – generate paradoxical
sentences. They are not extra-logical.
Second, it is not clear at all why we should regard the sequents φ⇒ ¬φ and
¬φ⇒ φ (or the respective conditionals) as logical. We do not know of any logical
system which includes them and see no reason why they should be added to any
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logical system. The mere fact that φ is a schematic variable does not make it a
logically valid sequent or conditional.
Third, we have already seen that there are independent and better reasons to
drop Tennant’s analysis of paradoxes according to which any derivation with an
ineliminable application of Cut is a paradox. We only need to extend our system
of classical logic by arithmetical principles such as Induction. This renders Cut-
elimination for finite derivations impossible and so we get ineliminable applications
of Cut. However, noone would regard these derivations involving Induction as
paradoxes. So the analysis is mistaken anyway but we should not believe so on the
basis of the above derivation.
7.2 Objections Against The Treatment Of Vali-
dity
Before we consider objections against the nontransitive response to what is now
known as the validity-Curry (vCurry) paradox, we need to show what this paradox
is all about. (Beall and Murzi, 2013) introduced a paradox similar to the original
Curry paradox, but instead of being formulated via the unary truth predicate, it
makes use of a two-place validity predicate. We extend our base language LPA
by the two-place predicate V al(x, y) s.t. V al(pφq, pψq) is a formula iff φ and ψ
are. The rest of the definitions remain the same. The result of extending our base
language that way is called our language of validity LV . PAV is then the theory of
PA formulated in LV . NV, our theory of naive validity, is given by all rules of PAV
plus the following two rules VP and VD for Val:
φ⇒ ψ
VP
⇒ V al(pφq, pψq)
VD
φ, V al(pφq, pψq)⇒ ψ
We can then obtain the vCurry sentence ν ↔ V al(pνq, p0 = 1q) by the weak
diagonal lemma just as in the case of the truth theoretic paradoxes. The rules for the
validity predicate are not invertible (simply because VD is a zero-premise rule), so
we cannot give the structurally identical derivation as in the original Curry paradox.
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However, the conditional is still invertible, so we know that ν ⇒ V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)
and V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)⇒ ν are derivable. We can then derive ⇒ 0 = 1 as follows:
ν ⇒ V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)
VD
ν, V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)⇒ 0 = 1
Cut
ν ⇒ 0 = 1
VP
⇒ V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)
...
V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)⇒ ν
Cut⇒ ν
...
⇒ ν
...
ν ⇒ 0 = 1
Cut⇒ 0 = 1
Where the original Curry paradox involved use of the rules for the conditional
(at least in the PAT part of the derivation), no such rules need to be used in the case
of vCurry. This fact is often taken to motivate a substructural (i.e. noncontractive
or nontransitive) approach to paradoxes over other non-classical approaches. For
one would expect the Liar, Curry and vCurry to have the same solution. However,
structural non-classical approaches work by restricting the operational rules. Since
no such rules are present in the derivation of triviality via vCurry, this is not an
option.
Given the argument just stated, vCurry leads to favour substructural over
structural non-classical approaches but it does little to favour them over classical
approaches. Just as full classical logic may be retained by restricting the truth rules,
the same could in principle be done with the validity rules. But here we will not
be concerned with this possibility. In the following, we discuss objections against
both the supposed motivation for substructural approaches and the nontransitive
solution to vCurry.
Objection 10: Let ν be a vCurry-sentence of your choice. Then in the nontran-
sitive approach we can still derive ν ⇒ φ. Using one of the validity-rules, we can
conclude that V al(pνq, pφq) is true. Truth should be closed under logical equivalence.
If so, we can conclude that ν is true as well. However, the fact that absurdity (or
any formula of the language whatsoever) follows from a true sentence is what makes
a paradox. So the nontransitive approach has not discharged the paradox at all. (see
Shapiro, 2013: p.104)
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Reply: We take it that Shapiro’s argument roughly has the following structure: i)
The problem with paradoxes is that they establish that something false (including
the possibility of any formula of the language) follows from something true. ii) The
nontransitive approach still proves that anything follows from a true sentence such
as the Curry sentence. Therefore, the problem of paradoxes is not solved by the
nontransitive approach.
Let us consider the second premise of the argument first. What Shapiro has in
mind is that both ⇒ ν and ν ⇒ ψ are provable (where ψ again is arbitrary). We
agree that provability should entail truth (speaking now on the meta-level). Thus
since ν is provable, it is true. But the second sequent tells us that any arbitrary ψ
follows from ν. So any arbitrary formula ψ, and thus something false, follows from
ν, which is something true.
When it comes to the first premise, it seems that Shapiro seems to invoke at
least a similar definition to what we used as a starting point for our investigation
into paradoxes in an earlier chapter. There the idea was, roughly, that a paradox is
an argument which leads one from (supposedly) true premises and valid reasoning
to a false or unacceptable conclusion. Shapiro’s claim then is that what remains
derivable in the nontransitive approach about the Curry sentence, namely⇒ ν and
ν ⇒ ψ, still fit this definition of a paradox and so the paradox is not solved at all.
However, we want to argue that what is derivable about the Curry sentence,
or any other formula of the language, does not fit this intuitive picture of what
makes a paradox. Shapiro’s mistake, it appears to us, is that he takes the truth of
the premises to be sufficient to constitute a paradox while not paying attention
to the fact that the reasoning needs to be valid as well. It is this point which
marks the crucial difference between the original Curry paradox and what remains
provable in NTT[S]. Whereas in the original we supposed that the application of
Cut concluding ⇒ ψ was valid, we know better in the nontransitive approach.
The move from ’If φ is true, then it entails ψ’ and ‘φ is true’ to ‘ψ is true’ may
be valid in classical logic due to the leading principle of truth preservation – but
this of course ceases to be the case in certain non-classical logics, including our
nontransitive one. So the nontransitive approach does indeed block the paradoxes,
just not on the level of the truth of premises but on the level of the validity of the
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involved reasoning.
Objection 11: There is no paradox of logical validity. The construction of the
v-Curry sentence relies on some machinery of expressing self-reference, typically
Gödel coding and the diagonal lemma. But such resources cannot be regarded as
logical. In the case of PA or similar theories, they are arithmetical. If the Validity
rules are supposed to capture logical validity, they cannot be applied to the v-
Curry sentence, since a derivation of the latter involves not only logical but also
arithmetical resources. So there is no paradox of logical validity. Of course, this is
no objection against the nontransitive treatment of the paradox. Rather, it weakens
the nontransitive approach more generally, by showing that one of its motivations –
being able to solve both truth-theoretic and validity paradoxes – is void. (see Cook,
2014)
Reply: Recall the derivation from above of the empty sequent from the v-Curry
sentence:
ν ⇒ V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)
VD
ν, V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)⇒ 0 = 1
Cut
ν ⇒ 0 = 1
VP
⇒ V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)
...
V al(pνq, p0 = 1q)⇒ ν
Cut⇒ ν
...
⇒ ν
...
ν ⇒ 0 = 1
Cut⇒ 0 = 1
In this derivation we need to apply the validity rules VP and VD to the vCurry
sentence. However, if the validity predicate and the rules governing it are supposed
to capture logical validity, then no such application should be possible. For the proof
of the sequent κ⇒ ψ for example involves not only logical but also arithmetical
rules which are necessary to derive the instance of the weak diagonal lemma that
is the v-Curry sentence. But if the validity rules are not applicable to anything we
derive with the help of arithmetical rules but only with logical rules, then there is no
paradox. This is because pure logic is too weak to generate any kind of paradoxes.
Of course, there being no paradox is not in itself a problem for an approach to
such paradoxes. We take it that the best objection in this vein is to argue that it
undermines the motivation for nontransitive or noncontractive logics. (Beall and
132 7. Objections And Replies
Murzi, 2013) argue that the paradox makes necessary a noncontractive approach,
(Ripley, 2013a) argues in favour of his nontransitive approach by pointing out that
dropping Cut blocks the derivation of the empty sequent from vCurry. If there is
indeed a validity paradox, then this speaks in favour of substructural approaches
over other non-classical but fully structural approaches. This is because it is often
seen as a virtue for a solution to the paradoxes to be applicable in other domains
as well. However, in order to arrive at triviality from the vCurry sentence one only
needs to invoke the validity rules and structural rules. Both would still be present
in structural non-classical approaches such as K3 or LP which restrict the rules
of the conditional and negation. So if it turns out that there is no threat from
v-Curry due to a misunderstanding of the validity rules, this would take away some
considerate support in favour of substructural approaches to paradox.
We agree with Cook’s analysis that the paradox, presented as a paradox of logical
validity, is mistaken. If the validity rules are supposed to capture logical validity, then
they cannot be applicable to paradoxical sentences which are generated by nonlogical
rules such as arithmetical ones. However, we do not believe that this undermines
the motivation in favour of substructural approaches completely. Although correct
in his analysis, Cook misses the more general point about paradoxes which are
similar to the supposed v-Curry. What is crucial in the original argument is not
that we consider logical validity. Rather, what makes the substructural approach
necessary is that we can circumvent the use of logical constants such as → or ¬ by
the introduction of certain two-place predicates. Together with some plausible rules
for this predicate, there are derivations of the empty sequent which only consist of
structural and VP-/VD- inferences but make no use of rules for logical constants.
To strengthen our point, we show that the validity rules VP and VD are
equivalent to the classical rules for the conditional if we translate V al(pφq, pψq) as
φ→ ψ and vice versa given Cut. Consider first the rule of VP:
φ⇒ ψ
VP
⇒ V al(pφq, pψq)
Here it is easy to see that this corresponds directly to the right sequent rule for
the conditional →R (under the restriction that there are no side formulae). The
same thing can be shown for VD although it is not as obvious:
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VD
φ, V al(pφq, pψq)⇒ ψ
This rule corresponds to the left conditional rule →L given Cut which can
be shown as follows. Rewriting VD with the conditional instead of the validity
predicate gives us modus ponens as a theorem
φ, φ→ ψ ⇒ ψ
Suppose that we are given the premises Γ⇒ ∆, φ and ψ,Γ⇒ ∆. We can then
establish the conclusion of an application of →L as follows:
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
φ, φ→ ψ ⇒ ψ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
Cut
φ, φ→ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
Cut
φ→ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
So what is really going on in the vCurry paradox is that the role of the
conditional in the usual Curry paradox is played by the validity predicate. But
in order to play this role, a given predicate need not represent validity, let alone
logical validity. It only needs to be governed by rules which are strong enough to
mimick the rules for the material conditional. In the following we explore some
alternative predicates and rules for them. By this we show that although vCurry
where validity is understood as logical validity might fail, there are still other
interesting paradoxes which show the same structural behaviour of only involving
VP, VD and structural rules.
A first idea might be to introduce a predicate Imp for implication expressing
the conditional as a predicate. Then Imp(pφq, pψq) is understood as ‘φ implies ψ’.
Using diagonalisation and the straightforward rules for Imp following the scheme of
the rules for Val, we could then give a new version of the vCurry paradox. However,
we doubt that such a paradox would have the wanted effect. For if the predicate
is simply supposed to express the material conditional, then the proponent of
a nonclassical logic which restricts the classical rules for → has every right and
motivation to restrict the rules for Imp as well. So this paradox would raise no issue
for the structural non-classical logician or support the case of the substructural
approach.
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Although the strategy might fail for Imp, we believe that there are other
predicates for which our strategy is successful. When working in a formal calculus,
validity and truth are typically notions of our metalanguage. So it makes sense to
express other predicates in the object language which are typically only available in
the metalanguage. Consider the predicate Ent(p
∧
Γq, p
∨
∆q), which is to be read
as ‘the conjunction of formulae in Γ entails the disjunction of formulae in ∆’. In
other words, Ent represents the intended reading of a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ in the object
language of the formulae in sequents. We can then give the following rules EP and
ED for Ent, which are analogous to the rules for Val in the original vCurry:
ED
Γ, Ent(p
∧
Γq, p
∨
∆q)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
EP
⇒ Ent(p
∧
Γq, p
∨
∆q)
Consider then the entailment Curry sentence eCurry: ε↔ Ent(pεq, p0 = 1q).
The rules for Ent are not invertible, so we will have to use some additional Cuts
compared to the short derivation of the empty sequent via the common Curry
sentence. Nevertheless, the rules for the conditional in the instance of the weak
diagonal lemma are invertible. So we know that ε ⇒ Ent(pεq, p0 = 1q) and
Ent(pεq, p0 = 1q)⇒ ε are provable. We can then prove ⇒ 0 = 1 as follows:
...
ε⇒ Ent(pεq, p0 = 1q)
ED
ε, Ent(pεq, p0 = 1q)⇒ 0 = 1
Cut
ε⇒ 0 = 1
EP
⇒ Ent(pεq, p0 = 1q)
...
Ent(pεq, p0 = 1q)⇒ ε
Cut⇒ ε
...
⇒ ε
...
ε⇒ 0 = 1
Cut⇒ 0 = 1
We argue that eCurry, in contrast to vCurry, is able to motivate a substructural
logic and overcomes Cook’s objection. Let’s start with the motivation. In the
derivation of a falsity such as 0 = 1, we only made use of diagonalisation with the
Ent predicate, ED, EP and the structural rule of Cut (applications of Contraction
are implicit in the context-sharing formulation of Cut and the use of sets instead
of multisets). However, there was no use of any rules governing logical constants,
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so a structural non-classical approach is no option. The only way to keep the naive
rules for the entailment predicate is to go substructural.
Does Cook’s objection against vCurry have an analogue for eCurry? We think
not. With vCurry the problem was that we cannot apply VP and VD to the vCurry
sentence because it is obtained by extralogical resources. So if VP and VD are
understood as governing logical validity, they cannot be applied to the vCurry
sentence. But no such problem arises in the case of eCurry. EP and ED are not
limited to formulae derived using only logical resources. The intended interpretation
of Ent covers all formulae in any sequent derivable in a given sequent calculus. So
via eCurry we get a motivation for substructural approaches compared to other
non-classical options while getting around Cook’s objection.
To be fair to Cook, he does anticipate a version of our reply and concludes himself
that although there may be no paradox of logical validity, other interpretations of Val
as analytic or metaphysical necessity will do the trick: “Thus, there are paradoxes
that can be formulated in terms of important understandings of validity. But there
are no paradoxes that plague the notion of logical validity.“ (Cook, 2014: p.466).
We tried to make a similar point, introducing a predicate for entailment rather
than interpreting Val differently. The lesson remains the same: There are paradoxes
which require substructural logics if the naive rules for certain predicates are to be
kept.
7.3 Objections Against The Recapturing Strat-
egy
Objection 12: You spend a great amount of resources in order to strengthen a
nonclassical theory of truth with respect to its proof-theoretic power, such that it
becomes non-conservative over the base theory. But especially nonclassical theorists
about truth tend to be deflationists and many deflationists see themselves committed
to being conservative over the base theory. So it makes more sense for the nontran-
sitive theorist to simply admit Cuts on arithmetical formulae, getting around the
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issue of Cut in PA while remaining proof-theoretically conservative.1
Reply: We reconstruct the argument as follows: i) Non-classical logicians (including
substructural ones) tend to be deflationists, ii) If one is a deflationist, one is
committed to a theory of truth conservative over the base theory, iii) NTT[S], given
some suitably strong theory S, is a non-classical theory of truth over the base
theory PA. i) - iii) then get us into trouble because NTT[S] is non-conservative
although it should be due to i) and ii). Denying iii) is no option since it merely
reflects a straightforward theorem about our nontransitive approach. Rather, the
problem with the argument lies in premise ii).
There is a long tradition of interpreting deflationism about truth and its claims
about the metaphysical lightness or insubstantiality of truth (see e.g. Horwich,
1998) to be committed to a conservative theory of truth. The idea here is typically
that if the truth predicate plays no substantial role but is only a tool, then it should
not let us prove new facts about the base theory. However, we already argued in
the earlier chapter on the functional roles of truth that this understanding of the
truth predicate is mistaken. It is precisely because of the functional roles of the
truth predicate that we should expect our theory of truth to be non-conservative.
Arguments for non-conservativity from deflationism typically focus on the
substitutional role of the truth predicate (see e.g. Cieslinski, 2017). Great emphasis
is put on the desideratum that the truth predicate ought to be at least transparent
and possibly even fully intersubstitutable. What is neglected is the quantificational
role of the truth predicate, which allows one to mimick second-order quantification.
Given the technical results of earlier chapters, this functional role of truth cannot
be denied. So if deflationists want to embrace the truth predicate due to the roles
it plays, they should also embrace the quantificational role. But if so, one should
not want or expect ones theory of truth to be conservative. In contrast, one should
rather expect it to be non-conservative. For just as we do not expect the result of
adding second-order quantification and suitable rules to a theory to be conservative
over the original theory, we should not expect the result of adding suitable truth
rules to the theory to be conservative either:
1I thank Lucas Rosenblatt for pressing this objection in private correspondence.
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[...] if a truth predicate can serve as a device for mimicking higher-order
quantification, as we submit, then it’s neither bad nor puzzling that the
truth systems that are up to the task are not conservative over their
respective base theories. It is to be expected. (Picollo and Schindler,
2019: p.347)
Objection 13: Typically, when one tries to recover instances of classical rules in
a non-classical logic, one does so for the language of the base theory. This fits the
idea that it is safe to apply the classical rules as long as no semantic vocabulary is
in play. To achieve the same for the nontransitive approach, one simply needs to
add Cut for arithmetical formulae. Thus the whole idea of closing classical theories
of truth nontransitively under remaining instances of truth-rules appears to be
unnecessary for the business of recapturing classical logic.2
Reply: There are two things we would like to say as a reply to this objection.
First, we suspect that the recovery of classical inferences only for formulae of
the base language is a consequence of the limitations of such approaches in the
literature and not an intention. We take it that if other non-classical approaches
had straightforward ways to recover more classical inferences, then they would do
so. After all, the restriction of classical logic is typically not independent of the
matters of paradox3 but is seen as a price which one has to pay in order to keep
the naive semantic principles such as the truth rules. If so, recapturing as much of
classical logic as possible (at least while maintaining some other desiderata) seems
desirable for other non-classical approaches as well. It is not that they only want
to keep classical logic for arithmetical formulae, they simply lack a systematic way
of recapturing more of classical logic.
But even if many non-classical logicians were to put their foot down and
claim that classical logic is only to be recovered for the base language, there are
independent reasons as why one should not live with this limitation. Classical logic
2I thank Lucas Rosenblatt for pressing this objection in private correspondence.
3It might be for some authors such as Graham Priest, who does not seem to take classical logic as
a starting point but adopts paraconsistent logics for different reasons but sees the logic confirmed
due to the fact that it is able to deal with the paradoxes. However, since such approaches are
not concerned with recapturing classical logic, they are not relevant here.
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is extremely powerful and especially successful in letting the truth predicate fulfil
its quantificational role. So in the current absence of a non-classical alternative,
we should recover at least as much of classical logic as is necessary in order for
the truth predicate to fulfil that quantificational role. Our nontransitive approach
fulfils this desideratum, other nonclassical approaches which only recover classical
logic for arithmetical formulae do not.
The second response we want to give changes the perspective a bit. As was
remarked before, NTT[S] need not be understood as a non-classical approach, which
tries to recover many classical inferences by embedding a classical theory of truth.
We can also understand it as a classical approach, which tries to recover those
instances of the truth rules, which cannot, on pain of triviality, be included in
the original classical theory. Understanding our nontransitive approach as a way
of recapturing the missing instances of T1 and T2 for classical theories puts it
outside the scope of the original objection claiming that classical logic should only
be recovered for the arithmetical language.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this chapter we summarise the dissertation by giving an overview over its
advancements in applying nontransitive logics to formal theories of truth compared
to the research which has been done so far.
1. We formulated a nontransitive theory of truth over the arithmetical base
theory PAT, which is strong enough to prove the existence of self-referential
phenomena both in the form of sentences (weak diagonalisation) and terms
(strong diagonalisation). This is sufficient to express all paradoxes typically
discussed in the literature without adding them in a piecemeal way by
additional rules.
2. We showed how to reason with paradoxical sentences generated from an
arithmetical theory in a sequent calculus for naive truth NT.
3. The nontransitive theory of truth NTT is formulated with unrestricted compo-
sitional principles as rules, which are strong enough to prove the compositional
axioms for truth as universally quantified sentences.
4. We showed that a restricted rule of Cut is necessary especially in the presence
of powerful tools such as Induction or the truth predicate.
5. We discussed motivations and reasons from the literature to give up or
restrict Cut and argued that some of them are inadequate with respect to
mathematical theories such as PA or ZF.
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6. A new motivation to restrict Cut was found by showing that Cut is equivalent
to a rule expressing a consistency assumption. Such an assumption, however,
is not justified when reasoning in inconsistent theories. Thus Cut should only
be applicable if the premises have been derived in a consistent theory.
7. Based on this motivation to restrict Cut, various ideas of axiomatising this
restriction were discussed. Typical axiomatisations of a consisency condition
via default logics by introducing defaults (consistency checks) are not viable
for the case of formal theories of truth over arithmetic due to issues of
complexity and triviality. As a simple alternative, we introduced a restricted
Cut rule, which is only applicable if both of its premises are derived using
only instances of rules of some consistent theory of truth S.
8. The restricted Cut rule builds on previous research especially on classical
theories of truth by embedding such a theory S into a nontransitive setting
while preserving it completely, leading to a theory NTT[S]. Strong instances
such as NTT[UTB(Z2)] can be shown to fulfil both the quantificational and
the substitutional role of the truth predicate. It proves all translated sequents
of Z2, proves Tpφq iff it proves φ and proves all instances of the (uniform)
T-schema.
9. We showed that the same restriction we used for Cut cannot be applied to
any other rule of NT alone in order to obtain a nontrivial theory of truth.
Given a classical theory of truth S, Cut is the only rule which needs to be
applied after an application of an instances of T1 or T2 not contained in S in
all paradoxes.
10. We provided a systematic analysis of desiderata for theories of truth in the
literature and argued that NTT[S] fulfils the set suitable for fully functional,
non-classical approaches very well. Further, we gave an overview of theoretical
virtues from the natural sciences and argued that many but not all of these
virtues are reducible to the desiderata. Lastly, we argued that NTT[S] fulfils
these virtues as well.
11. Finally, we surveyed and responded to a number of objections against the
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revision of classical logic in general, the restriction of transitivity in particular
as well as against the nontransitive treatment of pradoxes of validity by
Williamson, Shapiro, Zardini, Cook etc.
Despite the advancements that were made in this dissertation, there are of
course open questions and problems, which should be considered in the future:
1. How does a model theory look for NTT[S]? We have not investigated the
model theoretic side of things at all due to the focus on the proof theoretic
representation of paradoxes and transitivity. Here we would like to note
again that (Cobreros et al., 2012) introduced a model-theoretic approach
for nontransitive theories. They showed soundness and completeness for a
nontransitive sequent calculus for truth and three valued Kripke-models. Due
to the embedding of a classical theory S, a straightforward idea would be to
create an inner and an outer model: The inner model is simply a classical
model for S, the outer model is a three valued Kripke-model for sequents
derived using rules not contained in S.
2. In Chapter 5, we discussed the possibility of obtaining a nontrivial theory of
truth by restricting the rules of Contraction in a similar way as in NTT[S].
Contraction is only applicable, if its premise was derived using only rules
contained in S. We showed that this cannot work as long as the multiplicative
version of →R is present but conjectured that it might be possible given the
additive version of →R. This conjecture needs to be checked, as well as the
possibly resulting noncontractive theory of truth.
3. We argued that NTT[S] is a better theory of truth than both classical and
non-classical alternatives on the market. We expect that one of the biggest
objections, especially from the classical camp, will be that NTT[S] is inconsi-
stent in the sense of proving⇒ φ and⇒ ¬φ for some φ ∈ L. It would be nice
to defend NTT[S] by giving a detailed and plausible interpretation of these
inconsistencies. We also think that it makes sense to flesh out an argument
as to which success with respect to the functional desiderata proof theoretic
strength and proving all instances of the uniform T-schema overwrites the
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need for fulfilling philosophical goals like being consistent. But this needs to
be fleshed out in more detail.
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Fujimoto, José Mart́ınez Fernández, Henri Galinon, and Theodora Achourioti,
editors, Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, pages 263–280. Springer Verlag, 2015.
Paul Horwich. Truth. Clarendon Press, 1998.
Michael N. Keas. Systematizing the theoretical virtues. Synthese, 195(6):2761–2793,
2018.
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